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THE  
SĀMKHYA--KĀRIKĀ

*Is'vara Kṛṣṇa's Memorable Verses on Sāṃkhya Philosophy  
with the Commentary of Gauḍapādācārya*

श्रीमदीश्वरकृष्णप्रणीताः सगौडपादभाष्याः

सांख्यकारिकाः

*Critically edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes*

BY

*Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,*



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विस्तृतोपोद्घातपाठान्तरटिप्पण्यादिभिः समलङ्कृताः

BY

*Vidyāsudhākara Dr Har Dutt Sharma, M.A., Ph.D.,  
Professor of Sanskrit, Sanātana Dharma College,  
(Nawabganj) Cawnpore.*

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## INTRODUCTION

### I. *The Origin of Philosophical Enquiry*

In this world, the end of all activity is happiness. Nobody even in his imagination likes to suffer pain even for a moment. Even those who commit suicide do so only when they are sorely disgusted with the pains inherent in Saṁsāra. Truly has it been said by our elders, "Every one desists from pain ; every one desires happiness." But what happiness is cannot be very well explained by those who lack philosophical insight. The enjoyment of sense-objects which people resort to as 'pleasure' day and night and for which they put forth their utmost effort is considered by philosophers as entirely undesirable, mixed as it is always with pain. So the wise leave all worldly enjoyments even as one does honey mixed with poison and seek the highest end of human existence which alone leads to final and absolute happiness; and after they have attained it for themselves, they are moved with pity for the creatures quivering in the well of miseries and for their good they apply themselves to the propagation of the truth attained. Thus do the wise explain the Origin of Philosophical Enquiry.

### II. *The Significance of Sāṁkhya Philosophy*

Of all the philosophical systems, Sāṁkhya has been considered by all to be the most ancient. Nobody can gainsay the fact that this occupies a prominent place in all the Śāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical system. Therefore, the importance of this Śāstra is recognised by all the systems. Śāṅkarācārya says—"The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-

difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sūtras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine." (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 289). So also in the Mahābhārata we read— "There is no knowledge like that of Sāmkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāmkhya being the highest knowledge." (S'ānti. 316, 2).

Though the use of the word *Sāmkhya* is found first of all in the S'vet. Up.—तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं etc., (VI, 13), yet Sāmkhya reflections are found even in the R̥gveda and the other Upaniṣads. This proves the antiquity of this S'āstra. This will be made clear in detail further on.

*Sāmkhya* is derived from the word *saṁkhyā*. The word *saṁkhyā* is used in the sense of thinking and counting. Cf. "चर्चा संख्या विचारणा" (Amara I. V. 3). Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of Self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles and *as'akti*, *atuṣṭi*, etc. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāmkhya-pravacanabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mbh.—

“संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।

तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत्तेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥”

So, *Sāmkhya* means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word *Sāmkhya* was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the 25 principles. (For details and the opinion of Jacobi, see S. P., p. 189, 2n. and pp. 190–191). Jayacandra S'armā says with regard to *Sāmkhya* in *Saṁskṛta-Candrikā*, a magazine which became defunct long ago, that the Sāmkhya is tawny, with deep-brown face, and has a big belly. He has a rosary in his hand and a staff, and keeps long nails and hair. (Ādi-purāṇa quoted. VII of 1821 *S'aka*, Vol. 1 and 2, p. 8). Really

speaking, since the word *Kapila* stands both for a particular colour and for the founder of Sāmkhya Philosophy, therefore, owing to the similarity of word the writer of the Purāṇa has indulged in conjectures of his own. It appears that the writer of the Purāṇa at the time of writing happened to see some sage with tawny face and corpulent body and was led to describe his form and colour.

Some scholars, seeing the rejection of Īsvara in the Sāmkhya-system, have maintained that it is *vedaviruddha* or opposed to S'ruti (S. S., p. 21 f.; S. P., 13 ff.). S'aṅkarācārya also, seeing that Sāmkhya is opposed to *advaita*, avers that Sāmkhya is not rooted in the S'rutis.

“Although there are many Smṛtis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sāmkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sāmkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (S've. Up. VI, 13). ..... we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude is not to be attained by the knowledge of Sāmkhya Smṛti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice." (S. B. E., XXXIV, pp. 297–8). In deciding also the *vaidika* or the *non-vaidika* character of Sāmkhya, the great S'aṅkara says—“The scriptural passage which the pūrvapakṣin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i. e., of some Kapila) as are contrary to scriptures, for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz., the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname of Vāsudeva.” (S. B. E., XXXIV, p. 294).

Similarly others have also maintained the opposition of Sāmkhya to S'ruti. Truly speaking, Sāmkhya could be divided into two—one *ses'vara*, the other *nirīs'vara*. Let the theists not take the *nirīs'vara-Sāmkhya*, propounded in the Kārikā, etc., as rooted in S'ruti, but who can take exception to the *vaidika* character of the *ses'vara-Sāmkhya* as propounded in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas? For instance, we come across 'yathā-s'rutinidars'ana as a synonym of Sāmkhya in —

एतानि नव सर्गाणि तत्त्वानि च नराधिप ।

चतुर्विंशतिरुक्तानि यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शनात् ॥

( Mbh., S'ānti., 310, 25 )

In the 313th chapter of S'āntiparvan, in the section describing the intrinsic, extrinsic and super-natural aspects of the *vibhūti*s of *Prakṛti* many synonyms of the upholders of Sāmkhya are met with; e. g., ब्राह्मणास्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ( v. 1 ) तत्त्वार्थदर्शिनः, (2) योगप्रदर्शिनः, (3) संख्यानदर्शिनः, (4) योगनिदर्शिनः, (5) यथाश्रुतिनिदर्शिनः, (6, 7, 8 and 9) तत्त्वबुद्धिविशारदाः, (10) यथाशास्त्रविशारदाः, (11) तत्त्वनिदर्शिनः, (12) यथावदभिदर्शिनः, (13). Here the word 'Yathās'rutinidars'inaḥ' being repeated four times establishes the *vaidika* character of theistic Sāmkhya. Moreover, even the atheistic Sāmkhya is *vaidika* in character, inasmuch as the traditional categories have been borrowed from Upaniṣads, etc. [Jacobi takes the atheistic Sāmkhya as older, and believes that there has been an attempt for the synthesis of the theistic and the atheistic Sāmkhyas in the later Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā and portions of the Mahābhārata. *vide*-Ent. Gott. p. 32 ]. Therefore, from the presence of the names of the *ācāryas* of Sāmkhya in the offering to R̥ṣis, it may be fairly guessed that in olden times, even the most staunch theists undertook the study of Sāmkhya. ( S. S., p. 22 ). This could not have been possible if Sāmkhya was not founded on S'rutis.

### III. Germs of Sāmkhya in the Vedas, etc.

The presence of Sāmkhya categories in the S'rutis in a germinal form corroborates the former guess. We do not mean to say that the principles of Sāmkhya in their detail are to be sought in the Vedas and Upaniṣads as propounded by Sāmkhya-Kārikā. That would be as ridiculous as trying to find out the great banyan tree in its minute seed. *Tamas* described in the R̥gveda (X. 129, 3) "तम आसीत्तमसा गूळहमग्रेऽप्रकृते" etc., assumed later on the form of the Unmanifest. This very S'ruti, showing the dissolution of the elements and the elemental world in its cause, the darkness, points to *satkāryavāda*. Sāyaṇa also favours this interpretation in his *bhāṣya* on this verse. Giving this very interpretation elsewhere, the Veda even explains *Aja* ( the unborn ) as the name of *Pradhāna*—

तमिद्रुर्भं प्रथमं दध्र आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्तु विश्वे ।

अजस्य नाभावध्येकमपितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुवनानि तस्थुः ॥

( R̥gveda, X. 82, 6 )

Chronologically, Jacobi has divided the Upaniṣads into four divisions on account of their variety, their origin in different times, and their subject-matter ( Ent. Gott. p. 6 and 19; H. I. P. I, p. 28 ff; I. P. I., p. 141 ff. ).

1. *The most ancient* : as, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Taittiriya, Aitareya and Kauṣītaki.

2. *Ancient* : as, Kāṭhaka, Īśa, S'vetās'vatara, Muṇḍaka and Mahānārāyaṇa.

3. *Modern* : as, Praśna, Maitrāyaṇi and Māṇḍūkya.

4. *Most modern* : the many Atharvaṇa Upaniṣads.

Among the most ancient ones, in the Br. Up., the *Puruṣa* is declared to be only a seer, not a doer, devoid of activity in as much as he is without any association with anything ( in

reality) as in “स वा एष एतस्मिन् संप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा दृष्ट्वै..... असङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुष इत्येवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य” (IV. 3, 15 ff). The word *mahat* is indicative of the Sāmkhya word *Buddhi* in “स यथा सैन्धव.....यतो यतस्त्वाद्दीत लवणमेवैवं वा अर इदं महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय etc.” (Br. Up. II. 4, 12). The term *Vijñānaghana* expounds the intelligent nature of *Buddhi*. [Jacobi says that it is very surprising how Sāmkhya attributes unconsciousness to *Buddhi* which is by nature intelligence. *vide*, Ent. Gott. p. 32. In this connection, consult also the *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* on the Gautama-Sūtra “बुद्धिरूपलब्धिज्ञानमित्यनर्थान्तरम्” (I. 15).]

In the Ch. Up. (VI, 2, 1) having first introduced the theory of *satkāryavāda* in “सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” the S'ruti in the same *mantra* mentions the *pūrva-pakṣa* of *asat-kāryavāda* in “तद्वैक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सजायत”. It then advances in the next *mantra* *satkāryavāda* that is, (सतः सजायते), as a contradiction of the previous statement, *e. g.*, “कुतस्तु खलु सोम्यैवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सजायेतेति, सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्” (VI, 2, 2). Here the difference from S'ānkara-Vedānta is that it accepts the aggregate of effects as *real* and not *unreal* like *māyā*. It maintains that this aggregate of effects exists as a reality in the cause. Thus it clearly expounds *satkāryavāda*. The cause has been signified as real. This has also been indicated in the *mantra* यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्” (Ch. Up. VI. 1, 4). Thus arose the *Parināmavāda* of the Sāmkhyas (Ent. Gott., p. 14). From this reality or existence were produced fire, earth, etc. The expounding of three forms of these objects in “यद्ये रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तद्रूपं, यच्छुक्लं तद्रूपां, यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्यापागाद्ग्रेरग्रित्वं वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणीत्येव सत्यम्” (Ch. Up., VI 4, 1) is only an earlier form of the *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* of the Sāmkhya philosophy. The redness of fire indicates *Rajas*. Just as

red colour colours cloth, etc., so *Rajas* colours *citta*, because of its property of activity. Even so, the whiteness of water indicates *Sattva*, because white water has the property of purifying things. *Sattva* also purifies the mind with knowledge. The dark colour of *anna* = Earth is an indication of *Tamas*. The dark colour covers everything. Even so, the insentient *Tamas* covers the knowledge born of *Sattva*. [See, Bāla, p. 3. What has been propounded by Sūryanārāyaṇa Sāstri in contradiction of this will be found in the Introduction, S. N. S.]. This very thing is propounded in the *mantra* “अजामेकां लोहितशुकृष्णाम्” (S'v. Up. IV 5; Mahānārāyaṇa Up., p. 141, Īśādi). The *trivṛtkaraṇa* (trebling) *S'ruti* found in the (Ch. Up. VI. 4 and 5) also corroborates this opinion. We also see that the word *trivṛta* has been used in the sense of the three Attributes in “तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतम् etc.” (S'v. Up. I, 4) also. There the three-foldness of grain, etc., has been indicated by the gross, the medium and the small sizes. It appears that the three-foldness of the Attributes has also been used similarly. Jacobi has also accepted this (Ent. Gott., p. 32).

The Sāmkhya categories are clearly stated in the later Upaniṣads, *e. g.*, in Kāṭha “मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः (III, 10). *Mahat* is the synonym of *Ahānkāra*. Similarly we find *Avyakta* and *Puruṣa* in “महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः। पुरुषात् परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः॥” (*Ibid*, III, 11). Prof. Radhakrishnan believes that the indifference and inactivity of *Puruṣa* have been indicated in “द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वति अनभ्रन्नयो अभिचाकशीति॥” in the Muṇḍaka Up. (III, 1) [I. P. I, 259, 1n].

It is a well-known fact that S'vetās'vatara is essentially a Sāmkhya Upaniṣad. It abounds in the Sāmkhya categories. For instance in this alone, the words *Sāmkhya* and *Kapila* have been used for the first time. “तत्कारणं सांख्य-

योगाधिगम्यम्” ( VI. 13 ), “ ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमये ” ( V. 2 ). In this connection, we shall show later that there is a good deal of controversy about the word *Kapila*. It is again in this Upaniṣad that the words *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā* are found, e. g., “ संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः etc.” ( I. 8 ); also “ ज्ञासौ द्वावजावीशानीशावजा खेका etc.” ( I. 9 ). *vide* also the Mbh. “ अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ” ( III. 30. 88. This whole verse is quoted in the Gaudā. on the 61st Kārikā ). Similarly, the use of the words *Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *guṇa* is also found here, e. g. “ क्षरं प्रधानम् ” ( I, 10 ), “ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् ” ( IV, 10 ). “ देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणैर्निगूढाम् ” ( I, 13 ), etc. Also, the *mantra* “ तमेकनेमिं त्रिवृतं षोडशान्तं शतार्धारं विंशतिप्रत्यराभिः । अष्टकैः षड्भिर्विश्वरूपैकपाशं त्रिमार्गभेदं द्विनिमित्तैकमोहम् ॥ ” ( S’v. Up. I, 4 ) propounds the categories of Sāṁkhya. The word *trivṛta* refers to the three *guṇas*, the word *ṣoḍaśānta* refers to sixteen *vikāras*, the word *s’atārdhāra* points to the fifty varieties of *pratyaṣa-sarga*. Keith’s doubt about the Sāṁkhya character of this verse will not bear examination ( S. S. p. 11 ). He has given up the reasonable interpretation and says, “ The worth of such identifications must be regarded as uncertain and no conclusive evidence is afforded by them, as plays on numbers are much affected by the Brahmanical schools. ” But he has not given any different interpretation himself and is, therefore, open to the charge of leaving the present and the relevant in favour of the absent and the irrelevant.

But simply on the basis of the presence of a few technical terms of Sāṁkhya, we should not conclude that a particular Upaniṣad propounds Sāṁkhya doctrines. For instance, in places like “ मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ” ( S’v. Up. IV, 10 ) though there is a technical term of Sāṁkhya, yet it appears that it is only supporting the Vedānta doctrine. Therefore, seeing that Sāṁkhya comes closely after Vedānta in these Upaniṣadas, Jacobi declares that there cannot be

any two opinions among scholars with regard to the fact that the rise of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems lies between the most ancient and the ancient Upaniṣads. ( Ent. Gott. p. 21 ).

Among the modern Upaniṣads, the mention of *Sativa*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṁkhya categories of *kṣetrajñā*, *saṁkalpa*, *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna* and *liṅga* clearly show that these Upaniṣads come after the formulation of the Sāṁkhya system. As—“ तमो वा इदमेकमास, तत्पश्चात्तत्परेणोरितं विपमत्वं प्रयात्येतद्धे रजसो रूपं.....सोऽशोऽयं यश्चेतनमात्रः प्रतिपुरुषं क्षेत्रज्ञः संकल्पाध्यवसायाभिमानलिङ्गः प्रजापतिः etc.” ( Maitrāyaṇī, Up. IV, 5 ), “ पञ्चतन्मात्राणि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते पञ्चमहाभूतानि भूतशब्देनोच्यन्ते etc. ( Ibid III, 2 ), “ पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्राः etc. ( Pr. up IV. 8 ) and so on.

In the Mbh, and the Purāṇas, we find Sāṁkhya philosophy fully reflected. At one place we find the mention of the five gross elements, the twenty-four categories in their manifested or unmanifested character and the three *guṇas* (Mbh. III, 209, 16–21; 211, 4). The distinction between *Prakṛti*, and *Puruṣa* has been extensively expounded in S’āntiparvan (285, 33–40). Here the word *sattva* stands for *Prakṛti* and not *Brahman*. But Keith, seeing that *sattva* was used as the subject of comparison of a spider, erroneously maintains that *sattva* is referring to *Brahman* ( S. S., p. 17 ). It will be clear from the two verses quoted below that his explanation is erroneous, since it is opposed to the context :—“ मृजते हि गुणान् मत्त्वं क्षेत्रज्ञः परिपश्यति । सम्प्रयोगस्तयोरेष सत्त्वक्षेत्रज्ञयोर्ध्रुवः ॥ ३७ ॥ स्वभावामिदमेवैतद्यदिमान् मृजते गुणान् । ऊर्णनाभिर्यथा सूत्रं विज्ञेयास्तन्तुवद् गुणाः ॥ ३८ ॥ ”. We find a reference in the Mbh. of Sāṁkhya knowledge being called *Vaiśeṣika* which was imparted to Janaka by Pāṇāśikha of Parāśara *gotra*, e. g., “ यस्माच्चैतन्मया प्राप्तं ज्ञानं वैशेषिकं पुरा ” ( S’ānti. 330, 23a ). There again, three paths of emancipation have been described. We find there from the

context that leaving aside the paths of mere knowledge or action, Sāṁkhya lays down a third kind of path, viz., a combination of knowledge and action. S'ānti, 320, 38—40. In this connection, vide my article, P. O. C., Lahore, II, 1027 f ).

In the dialogue between Janaka and Sulabhā, the latter uses the word *Sāmkhya* in the sense of a particular kind of a sentence, —“सौक्ष्म्यं सांख्यकर्मौ चोभौ निर्णयः सप्रयोजनः । पञ्चैतान्यर्थ-जातानि वाक्यमित्युच्यते नृप ॥ दोषाणां च गुणानां च प्रमाणं प्रविभागतः । कंचिदर्थमभिप्रेत्य सा संख्येत्युपचार्यताम् ॥” ( S'ānti. 320, 79 and 82 ). But at one place in the Mbh., thirty qualities of a body have been mentioned. This classification of qualities is not met with in the Sāṁkhya philosophy e. g., (1) *S'abda*, (2) *Spars'a*, (3) *Rasa*, (4) *Rūpa*, (5) *Gandha*, (6-10) the five senses, (11) *Manas*, (12) *Buddhi*, (13) *Sattva*, (14) *Ahaṁ-kartā*, (15) *Sāmagrya*, (16) *Saṅghāta*, (17) *Prakṛti*, (18) *Vyakti*, (19) *Dvandvayoga*, (20) *Kāla*, (21-25) the five gross elements, (26) *Sadbhāvayoga*, (27) *Asadbhāvayoga*, (28) *Vidhi*, (29) *S'ukra* and (30) *Bala* ( S'ānti. 320, 97-112 ). So it has been said :—“विंशति-दशैव हि गुणाः संख्यानतः स्मृताः । समग्रा यत्र वर्तन्ते तच्छरीरमिति स्मृतम् ॥” ( ibid, 112 ). There, the eight-fold varieties of *Prakṛti* and sixteen varieties of modifications have been described in the 310th chapter of the same *parvan*. Again, the nine kinds of creation mentioned there are not found in Sāṁkhya books. They are as given below :—

(1) The creation of *mahat* from *avyakta*, (2) from *mahat* there is the creation of *ahamkāra*, (3) from the latter of *manas*, (4) from it, that of the five gross elements, (5) from these, that of five attributes, (6) from these, that of five senses, (7) from these, that of “connected with the senses ( *aindriyaka* ),” (8) from this, that of the upper and oblique varieties and (9) from the oblique, there is the creation of the lower variety. Thus, there is mutual discrepancy in the doctrines expounded in the Mbh. The categories taught by Pañcas'ikha in S'ānti. 219, are nowhere obtained in the

Sāṁkhya. A teaching of this very teacher, quite different from that mentioned above, is found in 321, 96-112 of the S'ānti. In the 274th chapter, the doctrines expounded by Devala are different from every other. But even in the midst of divergent expositions of Sāṁkhya doctrines, all agree with regard to the exposition of *Brahman* or *Īs'vara*. Even though the plurality of *puruṣas* has been accepted, *Brahman* has been described as the basis of all. (vide—“बहुनां पुरुषाणां स यथैका योनिरुच्यते,” S'ānti 350. 26 ). Āsuri, having taught Sāṁkhya to Pañcas'ikha, got merged in *Brahman*—“यत्तदेकाक्षरं ब्रह्म नानारूपं प्रदृश्यते । आसुरिर्मण्डले तस्मिन् प्रतिपेदे तदव्ययम् ॥” ( S'ānti, 218, 13 ).

In the Bhagavadgītā also, we do not find atheism among the Sāṁkhyas. Rather we find the antiquity and dualism of Sāṁkhya propounded in it ( Tilak's Gītārahasya, Hindi translation by Sapre, p. 514, 1917 edn. ). Kapila, the pioneer of Sāṁkhya philosophy has been described by Lord Kṛṣṇa as an example of his own glory; e. g. “सिद्धानां कपिलो मुनिः” ( Bh. G. X, 26 ). Here the Sāṁkhya path without *karman* is only a synonym of *Jñāna*. Therefore S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *kr̥tānta* as “कृतमिति कर्मोच्यते । तस्यान्तः परि-समाप्तिर्यत्र स कृतान्तः कर्मान्त इत्येतत् ॥” ( Bh. G. XVIII, 13 ). S'āṅkarācārya explains the word *guṇasāmkhyāna* ( Bh. G. XVIII, 19 ) as the system of Kapila the subject-matter of which is the exposition of the three *guṇas*, viz. *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*.

Again in the 3rd chapter of Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Sāṁkhya doctrines in detail tend to propound devotion to Viṣṇu. Among the Purāṇas also, the various traditional schools interpret Sāṁkhya doctrines in their own way ( see V. P. VI. 5, 2-8; VI. 4, 35 Sk. P. Prabhāsa-khaṇḍa, 18, 13-15; Brah. P. ch. 213 ff ).

In the Manu-smṛiti also which is contemporary with the Mbh. ( S. S, p. 52 ) there is a detailed description of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* ( XII. 24-52 ) and reference to the three *pramāṇas* ( ibid, 105 ). But the word Sāṁkhya is not found



in it. Medhātithi, commenting on " आकाशतु विकुर्वाणात् सर्वगन्ध-  
वहः शुचिः । (1. 76), says—विकुर्वाणादहङ्कारादाकाशस्तस्माद्वायुः—, and thus  
indicates the presence of Sāṁkhya doctrine. In Viṣṇusmṛti, the distinction of Puruṣa from the twenty-four categories,  
preceded by discrimination, has been clearly described. One of the stanzas ( XX, 25 ) of this Smṛti very closely corresponds  
with the comment on the second Kārikā by Gauḍapāda ( S. S. p. 52 ). In the S'ankha-saṁhitā we find twenty-five cate-  
gories, but Puruṣa is identified with Viṣṇu ( VII 21-25 ). Yājñavalkya Smṛti has also been influenced by Sāṁkhya, e. g.  
बुद्धेरुत्पत्तिरव्यक्ताततोऽहङ्कारसम्भवः । तन्मात्रादीन्यहङ्कारादकोत्तरगुणानि च ॥ "  
( III, 179 ff. ). We have already said that the Sāṁkhya cate-  
gories expounded in these books give prominence to Īśvara  
( See also Bh. Com. pp. 183-4, where Belvalkar points out  
five stages of the evolution of Sāṁkhya doctrines. )

#### IV. Sāṁkhya Teachers

Names of twenty-six Sāṁkhya teachers are met with in  
the Smṛtis, the Mbh., the Kārikās, etc. They are as follows:—

(1) Kapila, (2) Āsuri, (3) Pañcaś'ikha, (4) Vindhya-  
vāsa, or Vindhya-vāsaka or Vindhya-vāsin, (5) Vārṣaganya,  
(6) Jaigīṣavya, (7) Voḍhu, (8) Asitadevala or Devala, (9)  
Sanaka, (10) Sanandana, (11) Sanātana, (12) Sanatkumāra,  
(13) Bhṛgu, (14) S'ukra, (15) Kās'yapa, (16) Parās'ara, (17)  
Garga or Gārgya, (18) Gautama, (19) Nārada, (20) Ārṣṭiṣeṇa  
(21) Agastya, (22) Pulastya, (23) Hārīta, (24) Ulūka, (25)  
Vālmiki and (26) S'uka.

#### 1. Kapila

Mentioned in the S'v. Up. ( 5, 2 ) for the first time,  
Kapila is known everywhere as the founder of the Sāṁkhya  
philosophy. Many people think that he was not a historical  
personage. But Garbe, criticising the views of Max-Müller  
and Colebrooke, believes that the traditionally handed down  
name of Kapila cannot be regarded as fictitious; there is

another support in the name of the town Kapilavastu of the  
Buddhists ( S. Y., 2, § 3 ). Keith, on the other hand, opines  
that Kapila was not a historical person as he is found identi-  
fied with Agni or Viṣṇu or S'iva, and is, therefore, another  
name for Hiranyagarbha ( S. S. 9, In; Mbh. S'ānti. 339, 66-67;  
342. 92-93 ). Kaviraja Gopinatha also agrees with this opinion  
as expressed by him in the introduction to Jayamaṅgalā pub-  
lished by me ( p. 3 ). Bālarāma Udāsina, in his footnotes  
to Yogabhāṣya 1. 25; " आदिविद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान्  
परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय तन्त्रं प्रोवाच । " says :—

" (1) आदिविद्वान् = सर्गादावाविर्भूतो हिरण्यगर्भः स्वयंभूः, निर्माणचित्तं  
= योगबलेन स्वनिर्मितं चित्तमधिष्ठाय = स्वांशेन प्रविश्य कपिलाख्यपरमर्षिर्भूत्वा  
कारुण्याजिज्ञासवे आसुरये तन्त्रं प्रोवाचेत्यर्थः ॥ (2) ' ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे  
ज्ञानैर्बिभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत् ' इति श्रुत्या कपिलस्य जायमानस्य ज्ञानप्राप्तिः  
श्रूयते ॥ (3) पञ्चमे कपिलो नाम सिद्धेशः कालविन्दुतम् । प्रोवाचासुरये सांख्यं  
तत्त्वग्रामविनिर्णयम् । (Bhāgavata Purāṇa, 1. 3. 11). इति स्मृतौ पञ्चमावतार-  
त्वोक्तेर्विष्णोस्वतारः कपिल इति भावः । ' अग्निः स कपिलो नाम सांख्यशास्त्र-  
प्रवर्तकः ' इति महाभारतं तु कल्पभेदेन नेयम् । कल्पभेदेनैव च कपिलो ब्रह्मपुत्र  
इति स्मर्यते ॥ (4) भास्कराचार्यप्रभृतयस्तु ' ऋषिं प्रसूतं कपिलं ' इति कपिलपदे-  
नापि हिरण्यगर्भ एव गृह्यते ॥ ' यो ब्रह्माणं इत्यादिबहुपूर्वोत्तरमन्त्रसंवादादित्याहुः ॥ '  
( Ch. S. S. p. 62 ).

From a quotation in the Baudhāyana ( 2, 6, 30 ), we learn  
that an *asura* Kapila divided the four āśramas. There is an-  
other Kapila also who wrote a Kapilasmṛti dealing with the  
*s'rādha*, *vivāha*, *prāyas'citta* ceremonies (H. Dh. I, pp. 25, 525).  
S'ankarācārya also thinks that the Kapila of Sāṁkhya is  
different from the Vedic Kapila ( Br. S. Bhāṣya II, 1, 1 ).  
Anandagiri, commenting on this says that the Vedic Kapila  
is that one who reduced the sixty-thousand sons of Sagara to  
ashes. He is quite different from the Sāṁkhya teacher. But  
we find in the Padmapurāṇa that one Kapila *alias* Vāsudeva  
taught the Sāṁkhya doctrines to Brahman, Bhṛgu, etc., sup-  
ported by the Vedas; another Kapila taught ( the Sāṁkhya )  
as opposed to all the Vedic tenets ( quoted in N. B. S., II 1, 1,

p. 4). But according to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa ( 3. 25. 1 ) Vāsudeva himself was born as Kapila from the womb of Devahūti कपिलस्तत्त्वसंख्याता भगवानात्ममायया । जातः स्वयमजः साक्षा-  
द्वात्मप्रसूतये नृणाम् ॥ ”

Thus, we find no strong proof for believing Kapila a historical person.

## 2. Āsuri

There is a difference of opinion also with regard to the reality of Āsuri, the first disciple of Kapila. Kaviraja Gopinatha thinks him to be a historical person ( Jay., Int., p. 3 ). But Garbe and Keith are opposed to this view ( S. S. pp. 47-48; S. Y. pp. 2-3 : Garbe adds that if Āsuri is really historical then he is different from his namesake mentioned in the S'atapatha-Brāhmaṇa ). The two interesting accounts as to how Kapila taught Āsuri are found in the Jayamaṅgalā and the Mātharavṛtti. In the Mbh., Āsuri is made the teacher of Pañcas'ikha “ तत्र पञ्चशिखो नाम कापिलेयो महामुनिः ।... आसुरेः प्रथमं शिष्यं etc. ” ( S'ānti, 218. 6. 10 ). We find only one quotation ascribed to Āsuri, viz. “ विविक्ते दृक्परिणतौ बुद्धौ भोगोऽस्य कथ्यते । प्रतिबिम्बोदयः स्वच्छो यथा चन्द्रमसोऽम्भसि ॥ ” in the commentary of Haribhadra on the Saddars'anasamuccaya ( p. 36 ).

## 3. Pañcas'ikha

Pañcas'ikha, the disciple of Āsuri is found quoted in the following works :

### A. Y. Bh.—

( अ ) “ एकमेव दर्शनं ख्यातिरेव दर्शनम् ” [ १. ४ ] । ( आ ) “ आदि-  
विद्वान् निर्माणचित्तमधिष्ठाय कारुण्याद्भगवान् परमर्षिरासुरये जिज्ञासमानाय  
तन्त्रं प्रोवाच ” । [ १. २५ ] ( इ ) “ तमणुमात्रमात्मानमनुविद्याऽस्मीत्येवं  
तावत्संप्रजानीते ” [ १. ३६ ] । ( उ ) “ व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेना-  
भिप्रतीत्य तस्य सम्पदमनुनन्दत्यात्मसम्पदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशोचत्यात्म-  
व्यापदं मन्वानः स सर्वोऽप्रतिबुद्धः ” [ २. ५ ] । ( ऊ ) “ बुद्धितः परं

पुरुषमाकारशीलविद्यादिभिर्विभक्तमपश्यन् कुर्यात्तत्रात्मबुद्धिं मोहेन ” [ २. ६ ]  
( ऋ ) “ स्यात् स्वल्पः सङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः कुशलस्य नापकर्षयालम्  
कस्मात्, कुशलं हि मे बह्वन्यदस्ति यत्रायमावापं गतः स्वर्गोऽप्यपकर्षमल्पं  
करिष्यति ” [ २, १३ ] । ( ऋ ) “ रूपतिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च परस्परेण  
विरुध्यन्ते, सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते ” [ ३. १३ ] । ( ल )  
“ तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतित्वं भवति ” [ ३. ४१. ] ॥

Vyāsa does not give the name of Pañcas'ikha, but it is Vācaspati who says so.

### B. S. Sū.—

( ए ) “ आधेयशक्तियोगः पञ्चशिखः ” [ ५. ३२ ] । ( ऐ ) “ अविवेक-  
निमित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः [ ६. ६८ ] ”

### C. S. S. B.—

( ओ ) “ सत्त्वं नाम प्रसादलाघवाभिष्वङ्गप्रीतितितिक्षासन्तोषादिरूपान-  
न्तभेदं समासतः सुखात्मकम्, एवं रजोऽपि शोकादिनानाभेदं समासतो  
दुःखात्मकम्, एवं तमोऽपि निद्रादिनानाभेदं समासतो मोहात्मकम् ” ।  
[ १. १२७ ] ।

### D. Bhāmati.—

( औ ) “ तत्संयोगहेतुविवर्जनात्स्यादयमात्यन्तिको दुःखप्रतीकारः ” [ ब्रह्म-  
सूत्र, २. २. १० ] ।

### E. Gauḍa. ( Kār. 1 ) and Māth. ( Kār. 22 )—

( क ) “ पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः । जटी मुण्डी शिखी वापि  
सुच्यते नात्र संशयः ॥ ”

This verse is ascribed to Pañcas'ikha by Bhāvāgaṇes'a in his Tattvayāthārthyadīpana and by Haribhadrasūri in S'āstravārtasamuccaya ( see Int. to Mātharavṛtti ). Bhāvāgaṇes'a was the disciple of Vijñānabhikṣu and flourished in the 17th century A.D. The time of Haribhadrasūri is about 725 A.D.

## F. Bāla.—

(ख) “उभयथा चास्य प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानव्यवहारं लभते ।” (p. 153).

We find no account of this Pañcas'ikha born in the family of Parāś'ara (Mbh. S'anti. 320, 23). All the quotations ascribed to him are in prose except the “E”. It is just possible that he wrote a prose treatise. According to Garbe Pañcas'ikha flourished in the first century A.D. (S. Y. p. 3). Vyāsa, the author of the Yogabhāṣya, flourished in the 4th century A.D. (I. P. II, 342). It is possible that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were very common in the 4th century A.D., and, therefore, Vyāsa did not give his name while quoting. As Vācaspati frequently mentions his name, we can safely infer that the writings of Pañcas'ikha were known to him. Was it the Commentary on the Samāśasūtras which fell into the hands of Vācaspati? Vijñanabhikṣu refers to Pañcas'ikha as the author of a commentary on the Samāśasūtras or the Tattvasamāsa; Bhāvāganeśa also says the same thing: “समाससूत्राण्यालम्ब्य व्याख्यां पञ्चशिखस्य च ।” (Int. to Māth. p. 2). According to Chinese tradition, Pañcas'ikha is the author of Śaṣṭitantra (S. S. 48). But this account is not to be believed, as is proved by many writers. Vācaspati, on the other hand, thinks that Śaṣṭitantra is a book on Yogaśāstra and its author was Vārṣaganya (see Tattv. V. on Y. S. IV. 13; and Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtra II. 1, 3). Kaviraja Gopinatha is of opinion that Vācaspati never saw the Śaṣṭitantra (Jay. Int. pp. 4-7). But, according to the late M. M. P. Rāmāvatāra S'armā, Vācaspati knew Śaṣṭitantra (Bāla. p. 226). That this Pañcaśikha is different from his namesake in the Mahābhārata is evident from their views; he is different from Gandhabba Pañcas'ikha also (S. S., pp. 48, 51).

## 4. Vindhyavāsa

The view that Vindhyavāsa is to be identified with Īśvara-kṣṇa is not sound (Jay. Int. pp. 6-7). We find one quotation

from him in the Rājamārtanḍa of Bhoja: “सत्त्वतप्यत्वमेव पुरुषतप्यत्वम्. (Y. S. IV 23). Medhātithi also quotes his opinion in his Bhāṣya on Manu I. 55: “सांख्या हि केचिन्नान्तराभवमिच्छन्ति विन्ध्यवास-प्रभृतयः।”. This seems to be derived from the S'loka-vārtika: “अन्तराभवदेहस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना।” (p. 704). Also in the Śaddarśanasamuccaya we find a quotation from him: “पुरुषो-ऽविकृतात्मैव स्वनिर्भासमचेतनम्। मनः करोति सांनिध्यादुपाधेः स्फटिको यथा॥” (p. 36). Vallālasena, king of Bengal (12th century A.D.), has given a list of works which he consulted while compiling his Adbhutasāgara. There we find a work of a certain Sāmkhya teacher named Vindhyavāsin (H. Dh. I, 341, 793n). This proves that the work of Vindhyavāsin was available as late as the 12th century A.D. Tanusukharāma, in his introduction to the Mātharavṛtti (Ch. S. S.), has established an identity between Vindhyavāsin and Vyāḍi on the basis of quotations from the Trikāṇḍaśeṣa, the Haimakośa and the Saṁyamināmamālā. He says: स च भगवतो वर्षस्य शिष्यो नन्दसम-कालीनः (Kathāsaritsāgara, I. 2) पाणिनिसूत्राणां संग्रहाख्यटीकायाः कस्यचित् कौशस्य कर्ता, दाशायणेः पतञ्जलेरपि पुरोगामी सांख्ययोगाचार्यश्च॥” (p. 3). This leads us to suppose that Vindhyavāsin *alias* Vyāḍi, flourished in the 4th century B.C. According to a Chinese tradition Vindhyavāsin wrote a Sāmkhya work called Hiranyasaptati (Bh. Com. p. 175). According to Dr Belvalkar, Hiranyasaptati is a commentary on the Sāmkhya-kārikā (ibid 177). But Kaviraja Gopinatha says: “The Anuyogadvārasūtra of the Jainas preserves a list of Brahmanical works, which contains the name of Kanagasattari (Kana-saptati), which I take to be equivalent to the Suvarṇa-saptati or Hiranyasaptati, the name of Sāmkhya-saptati familiar in China.” (Jay. Int. p. 7, 12n). But it must be noted here that along with the Kanagasattari, we find Mādhara also in the list of the Anuyogadvārasūtra. If Mādhara stands for the Mātharavṛtti then it is impossible to conclude that Anuyogadvārasūtra was written in the 1st

century A.D. ( F. O. Schrader in a letter to me from Kiel, March 1, 1927 ). In the Mātharavṛtti we find : “ यथा दर्पणाभाव आभासदानौ ” a quotation from the Hastāmālakastotra which is of the age of Sāṅkarācārya ( i. e. 780-812 A.D., See Int., Māth., p. 5 ). Therefore, it is wrong to decide the age of Vindhyavāsa or Īśvarakṛṣṇa on the basis of the Kanagasattari. And, if Vyāḍi *alias* Vindhyavāsin, is the author of the Hiraṇyasaptati, then the latter is certainly different from the Sāṅkhyakārikā, and Vindhyavāsin is different from Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Otherwise the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa will have to be pushed back to the 4th century B. C. Therefore, it is safe to conclude, as Keith also says, that there are more than one Vindhyavāsins and that their dates are uncertain ( S. S., 79 in; also, Karma., p. 59 ).

### 5. Vārṣagaṇya

We are as uncertain about Vārṣagaṇya as about the former teachers of Sāṅkhya. We find two quotations from him in the Vyāsabhāṣya: (1) “ मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूल-पृथक्त्वं इति वार्षगण्यः । ” ( III 53, (2) “ गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति । यत्तु दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥ ” ( Ibid. IV, 13 ) Vācaspati thinks that the latter quotation is taken from the Śaṣṭitantra. This very verse is quoted by Vācaspati in his Bhāmatī with the remarks : “ अत एव योगशास्त्रं व्युत्पादयिता आह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः । ” ( on the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, II 1, 3 ). Another quotation from Vārṣagaṇya, “ पञ्चपर्या अविद्या इत्याह स्म भगवान् वार्षगण्यः । ” is found in the Tatt. K. ( on Kārikā 47 ). The quotation—“ पुरुषाधिष्ठितं प्रचानं प्रवर्तते । ” found in the Gauḍ., and the Māth. ( Kārikā 17 ), is ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya by Keith ( S. S. 73, 3n ). All these lead us to the conclusion that the Chinese tradition ascribing the authorship of the Śaṣṭitantra to Pañcaśikha is not trustworthy. There is also considerable doubt as to Vārṣagaṇya being the author of the Śaṣṭitantra ( Jay. Int. pp. 4-6; Hiriyanā: “ Śaṣṭitantra and Vārṣagaṇya ”.

*Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112 ). This has been discussed in detail below.

### 6. Jaigīṣavya

According to the Kūrmapurāṇa, Jaigīṣavya was a class-fellow of Pañcaśikha ( S, S. 51 ). This Jaigīṣavya is quoted as an authority on Yoga ( Y. Bh., II. 55 and III. 18 ). Vācaspati also refers to him in his Nyāyavārtikatātparyāyikā as the author of Dhāraṇāsāstra ( on Nyāyasūtra III. 2. 43 ). But, according to the Buddhacarita ( 12. 67 ), Arāḍakalāma refers to Jaigīṣavya, Janaka and Parāsāra as persons who obtained salvation through Sāṅkhya ( Jay., Int. p. 2, 2n. ) In the present state of our knowledge, we can say nothing more about Jaigīṣavya.

### 7. Voḍhu

Voḍhu is also familiar by name alone. We have not come across any of his writings or quotations. In the list of the names of the sages pronounced in the Ṛṣitarpaṇa, we find the name of Voḍhu after that of Āsuri, and before that of Pañcaśikha. The opinion of Weber that it is the Brahmanised form of Buddha's name, is quite untenable ( see S. Y. p. 6 ). Keith has, however, discovered Voḍhu's name before that of Āsuri in one of the *paris'isṭas* of the Atharvaveda ( S. S. 51 ).

### 8. Devala

We find a dialogue between Asitadevala and Nārada in the Mahābhārata ( S'ānti., Ch., 274 ). There we find eight kinds of *bhūtas* ( *bhāva*, *abhāva*, *kāla*, *pṛthhvī*, *āpas*, *vāyu*, *ākāś'a* and *tejas* ); and *kāla* impelled by *bhāva* creating all the five elements, *viz.*, earth, air, water, wind and glow. The senses themselves are not the knowers but produce knowledge for the *kṣetrajña*. Higher than the senses is *citta*, higher than the latter is *manas*, higher than it is *buddhi* and the highest of all is *puruṣa*. The ear, the skin, the eye

the nose, the tongue, the *citta*, the *manas* and the *buddhi* are the eight instruments of knowledge, etc. It is said there : पुण्यपापक्षयार्थं हि सांख्यज्ञानं विधीयते । तत्क्षये ह्यस्य पश्यन्ति ब्रह्मभावे परां गतिम् ॥ ” ( Verse 39 ). Thus we see that this dialogue deals with theistic Sāṁkhya. The quotations from Devala, as found in the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, resemble the Tattvasamāsa very much ( See Yājñavalkya-smṛti, Ānandāśrama, Edn. II, pp. 986-7 ). Kane, in his H. Dh. Vol. I, p. 121, says that Devala was a contemporary of the Smṛtikāras, viz., Bṛhaspati and Kātyāyana. And the age of Kātyāyana according to him is between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. ( see p. 218 ). But Udayaviraśāstri says that as Devala is frequently alluded to in the Mahābhārata, his age must be determined by the age of the epic in its present form. The Mahābhārata according to western scholars ( says Mr. Śāstri ), assumed its present form by the 2nd century B.C. ( P. O. C. Lahore, II p. 865 ). But according to Prof. Winternitz, the epic assumed its present form by the 4th century A.D. ( See H. I. L. I. pp. 465-475 ). Devala does not seem to be much older than Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The theory to the contrary does not seem to be convincing. It is based on the following quotation from the Mātharvṛtti : “ कापिलादासुरिणाः प्राप्तमिदं ज्ञानं ततः पञ्चशिखेन तस्माद् भार्गव-उलूक-वाल्मीकि-हारीत-देवळ-प्रभृतीनागतम् ”, ( p. 84 ), where the word *prabhṛti* is taken to indicate a wide gap between Devala and Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But the traditional list found in the Mātharavṛtti does not tally with any other such list. Therefore, Māthara's quotation can only establish Devala's priority to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and nothing else.

#### 9-26. Sanaka, etc.

Gauḍapāda ( on Kār. I ), quotes a verse and a half in which he enumerates the names of the seven sons of Brahman. They are : Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana, Āsuri, Kapila, Voḍhu and Pañcaśikha. But in the Mahābhārata, the list is different ( Śānti. 340, 67-69 ), viz., Sana, Sanatsujāta, Sanaka,

Sanandana, Sanatkumāra, Kapila and Sanātana. Unfortunately we find no information about Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana, Sana, Sanatsujāta and Sanatkumāra, except a reference to Sanandanācārya in लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः । ( S. Su. VI, 69 ). There is a reference to a Sanatkumāra, author of some Smṛti, in the Nirṇayasindhu and the Tristhalisetu ( H., Dh., I, 656 ). Similarly we find Bhṛgu, Śūkra, Kāśyapa, Parās'ara, Garga, Gautama, Nārada, Ārṣiṣeṇa, Agastya, Pulastya and Hārīta mentioned as writers of Smṛtis ( Ibid, index ). The dialogue between Parās'ara and Janaka named the Parās'ara-gītā, and found in the Mahābhārata ( Śānti., Chs., 290-299 ), deals with the duties of the *varṇas* and *āśramas* and has no vestige of Sāṁkhya teaching in it. It is just possible that Parās'ara came to be regarded as a teacher of Sāṁkhya because he happened to be born in the same family as Pañcaśikha ( Mbh., Śānti., 320-23 ). Ulūka is a synonym for Kaus'ika. In the Chinese translation of the Sāṁkhya Kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa is referred to as born in the Kaus'ika family ( Jay. Int. p. 2. 2n ). We know absolutely nothing of Vālmiki and Śūka as teachers of Sāṁkhya.

#### V. Standard Works on Sāṁkhya

##### A. Available :—

Of the standard works on Sāṁkhya, only three are available. They are “ Sāṁkhya-Sūtras ”, “ Tattva-samāsa ” and “ Sāṁkhya-Kārikā ”.

Some scholars are of opinion that S. Sū. are not written by Kapila. The reason is that we find many passages from other works in them. For example, “ आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ” ( Br. S., IV. 1, 1 ) = S. Sū., IV. 3; “ वृत्तयः पञ्चतम्यः क्रिष्टाक्रिष्टाः ” ( Y. S., II. 46 ) = S. Sū., III 34 and VI. 24. Again, in the *sūtras* establishing the authority of the Vedas ( S. Sū., V. 40-51 ), the influence of the Vedānta is clearly visible. Again, we find many passages from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, quoted in the

Sūtras. Mādhavācārya of the 14th century A.D., quotes from the Kārikās and not Sūtras in his S. D. S. The oldest commentator on the Sūtras is Aniruddha who flourished in about 1500 A.D. Therefore, the Sūtras must have come into existence between 1380 and 1450 A.D. (See S. Y., pp. 8-9). Moreover, the commentator on the *Sarvopakāriṇī*, a commentary on the Samāsa-Sūtra, opines that Kapila, the author of "Sāṁkhya-Sūtras" is different from Kapila, the author of Samāsa-Sūtra (Ch., S. S., No. 246, pp. 93-94). But as the author of the S. D. S. does not quote from the Tattva-samāsa even, so the antiquity of the latter also is doubtful. And if the author of the S. Sū., is Kapila, then how did he quote Pañcaś'ika, etc., who were his grand-disciples and who, therefore, must have flourished much later (See S. Sū., VI. 68-69)?

But Udayavīra S'āstri has tried to prove that Kapila himself is the author of the S. Sū., in his article "Antiquity of the Sāṁkhya Sūtras" (P. C. C., Lahore, II, pp. 855-882). He is of opinion that several sūtras have been interpolated in the original of Kapila. For example, in the I chapter, the sūtras 20-54 are interpolated, because the 19th sūtra is literally the same as the 55th sūtra, and because the 53rd and 54th sūtras are identical with the 15th and 16th sūtras. And as we find the names of *Srughna* and *Pāṭaliputra* in these interpolated sūtras, the interpolation must have been made when these towns were famous (from 4th century B. C., to the 5th century A.D.). The sūtras 79, 80 and 84-115 of the V chapter are also interpolations; the interpolation of these (84-115) is obvious as they discuss the principles opposed to Sāṁkhya Philosophy.

Thus Mr. S'āstri thinks that 68 sūtras are interpolated. I, on the other hand, think that the entire book was written by some later writer and therein some interpolations might have been made. Mr. S'āstri does not give any weighty or conclusive argument in support of his thesis. On the other

hand, when S'āṅkarācārya and others quote from Sāṁkhya-Kārikā only, there is no doubt that the Sūtras did not exist in their time. Had the S. Sū., been existent, then S'āṅkarācārya and others would not have deliberately left aside the composition of a ṛṣi and quoted from the work of an ordinary mortal like Is'varkṛṣṇa

Mr. S'āstri further tries to prove that V. Bh., and others have borrowed from the S. Sū. His contention is:—

(1) "प्राङ्निष्पत्तेर्निष्पात्तिधर्मकं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् = कस्यचिदुत्पत्तये किञ्चिदुपादेयम्" (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48)—here उपादाननियमात् is borrowed from "उपादाननियमात्" (S. Sū., I, 115). This very sūtra has been quoted again by Vātsyāyana in his gloss on the next N. S., viz., "यत्पुनरुक्तं—प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात् इति". Here the insertion of the word इति shows that it is a quotation from some other work. That other work is S. Sū.

To this we reply—If the word इति is a sure sign of quotation from another work then why did not Vātsyāyana put it after "उपादाननियमात्" in the first passage (V. Bh., on N. S., IV. 1, 48) quoted above? And as regards the presence of इति in the second passage, it should be noted that this word is not connected with only "उपादाननियमात्" but the whole passage, viz.,—"प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यं नाऽसत् उपादाननियमात्." Here Vātsyāyana merely repeats his own words with slight change. Therefore, it does not show that V. Bh. has borrowed from the S. Sū., rather, it may be just the reverse.

(2) In the Aparārka, a commentary on the Yājñavalkya-Smṛti (Prāyaś'cittādhyāya, v. 109), we find quotations from Devala which resemble the sūtras in S. Sū. very much. Therefore, Devala must have borrowed them from the S. Sū.

Mr. S'āstri starts here on the presumption of the priority of the S. Sū., to Devala, a fact which he has to prove.

(3) Patañjali, in his Mahābhāṣya, lays down the six causes of non-perception thus—"षड्भिः प्रकारैः सतां भावानामनु-

पलब्धिर्भवति — अतिसन्निकर्षादतिविप्रकर्षान्मूर्त्यन्तरव्यवधानात्तमसावृत्तत्वादि-  
न्द्रियद्वैवेल्यादतिप्रमाणादिति ॥” On this, Kaiyyaṭa says in his gloss  
Pradīpa—इतरो विद्यमानस्यापि लिङ्गस्य सौक्ष्म्यमनुपलब्धिकारणं दर्शयितुमाह-  
चहभिरिति ।”—According to Kaiyyaṭa, Patañjali here quotes  
from some other work. It seems that he took this view from  
“सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः” (S. Sū., I. 109) and “कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः”  
(S. Sū., I, 110). Moreover, we find only five causes of non-  
perception in the S. Sū., but in the Mahābhāṣya, there are six  
causes of non-perception and in the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, there  
are eight. Therefore, the S. Sū. are the oldest of these  
three. Moreover, the passage of Kaiyyaṭa viz., “सदपि लिङ्गं  
सूक्ष्मत्वात् प्रत्यक्षेणाशक्यं ग्रहीतुं, तत्कृतकार्यदर्शनादनुमीयते ।” seems to be  
based on the two sūtras quoted above.

In reply to Mr. S’āstri’s arguments, the following may  
be stated. In the first place, the word इति is not a necessary  
and sure sign of quotation from some other work or author.  
Here, the word इति denotes conclusion of his remarks. How  
can one deny the possibility of these remarks being Patañ-  
jali’s own? In the second place if, depending upon the  
word इतर used by Kaiyyaṭa, it is even admitted that Patañjali  
quotes the actual words of another, what is there to prove  
that it is the S. Sū., wherefrom, he borrowed? It is most  
probable that he borrowed the view from some other work.  
(See H. I. P., I, 218-219<sup>1</sup>). Again, there is nothing to oblige  
Kaiyyaṭa, who flourished in the 13th century A.D. (H. S. L.,  
p. 431), to borrow from the S. Sū. He might have borrowed  
from the Sāṁkhya-Kārikā. Moreover, the causes of non-per-  
ception as given by Patañjali tally more with those in the  
Sāṁkhya-Kārikā than in the S. Sū.

(4) The following sūtras agree verbatim with the Kārikās  
(a) “हेतुमदमित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्” (S. Sū., I. 124 =  
Kār., 10). (b) “सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात्” (S. Sū., II.  
18 = Kār., 25). (c) “सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायामा वायवः पञ्च” (S. Sū.,  
II. 31 = Kār. 29). In (a) and (b) we find different readings.

*Avyāpi* in (a) has not been commented upon by Aniruddha.  
The word *pravartate* in (b) is not found in the Ms. in Mr.  
S’āstri’s possession.

The arguments of Mr. S’āstri do not stand a close exami-  
nation. If Aniruddha did not comment upon the word  
*avyāpi*, then it alone does not mean that the word did not  
exist formerly. Moreover, Vijñānabhikṣu has commented  
upon this word. Again, what is there to prove that the Ms.  
in Mr. S’āstri’s possession is the oldest and the only correct  
Ms., whose one reading should decide so important a question  
as the authorship of Kapila. In his zeal to disprove the  
theory that “the Sūtras were composed on the basis of the  
Kārikās,” Mr. S’āstri says that if we change the order of words  
in “सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणायामा वायवः पञ्च” and read it as “सामान्य-  
करणवृत्तिः प्राणायामाः पञ्च वायवः” we attain *anuṣṭubh* metre in  
place of *āryā*. But this flight of imagination, viz., changing  
the reading itself, is too much to be swallowed even by  
ordinary people. Therefore, Mr. S’āstri has failed to disprove  
that the S. Sū. are based upon the Kārikās.

There is a tradition that Paramārtha translated the  
Kārikās into Chinese in 557-569 A.D., (Bh., Com., pp. 175-178).  
According to Paramārtha, Buddhāmītra the teacher of Vasu-  
bandhu, was vanquished in debate by Vindhyavāsa, the  
Sāṁkhya-teacher; Vindhyavāsa died before Vasubandhu.  
Thus, Vindhyavāsa and Vasubandhu were contemporaries.  
There is another tradition, according to which Vindhyavāsa  
was a contemporary of king Bālāditya and pupil of Vārṣa-  
ganya. A third tradition tells us that the pupil of Vārṣa-  
ganya composed Hiraṇyasaptati. But all these traditions  
should be taken as having no historical value. Otherwise, if  
Vindhyavāsa, the author of Hiraṇyasaptati and Īsvarkṛṣṇa,  
the author of Sāṁkhya-Kārikā are both identified then it  
would lead to a historical confusion, as stated above. [Das  
Gupta also thinks Īsvarkṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsa as two

different persons, see H. I. P., I, 218, 3n ]. The only definite conclusion that we can arrive at is that Īs'varakṛṣṇa is older than Vasubandhu [in 300 A.D., see V. A. Smith: *Early History of India*, 3rd edn., pp. 328-334; also Kalipada Bhattacharya : "Some Problems of Sāṃkhya Philosophy and Sāṃkhya Literature", J. H. Q., Sept., 1932, pp. 519-520. According to Bhattacharya Īs'varakṛṣṇa flourished in the 1st century A.D. ] and flourished in the second or the third century A.D. The remark of Svapnes'vara, identifying Īs'varakṛṣṇa with Kālidāsa, should be rejected as mistaken ( See I. P., II, 255, In. ).

The work of Īs'varakṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it. But now, finding the *bhāṣya* of Gauḍapada running upto the 69th verse only and finding that the verses following the 69th have nothing of Sāṃkhya in them, it is believed that one of these verses is missing. The question has been discussed in detail in the foot-note to 61st Kārikā. Mr. S. S. Pathak has also attacked this problem ( see, "The Problem of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikās", I. A., Vol. LII, 1923, pp. 177-181). He says— (1) In the 72nd Kārikā we read the phrase "परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि" which means "free from the opinions of others". This goes against the Kārikā found by the late B. G. Tilak, as the latter expounds the opinions of others in the shape of God, Soul, Time, or Nature being the causes of Creation.—To this we reply : In the Kārikā of Mr. Tilak, the opinion of others has been merely *referred to* and not *expounded*. The phrase परवादविवर्जिता: means the exclusion of *the expounding* of others' opinions and not the exclusion of mere reference even. Otherwise, "दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिज्ञयातिशययुक्तः" would also be open to fault, for, here there is *no exclusion* of the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas. (2) Īs'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha in his own 'āryās'. Now in the Śaṣṭitantra, there is a mention of five alternative opinions ( viz., making one of *Brahman, Puruṣa S'akti, Niyati,* and *Kāla*, the cause of creation ) which are to be rejected. But in this

Kārikā of Tilak, we find only four. There is nothing to represent *S'akti*—To this we reply : Īs'varakṛṣṇa has summarised the work of Pañcas'ikha. But in the first place, it is not as yet definite that Śaṣṭitantra is the work of Pañcas'ikha. Secondly, even if it were so, yet it is not binding upon Īs'varakṛṣṇa to give every detail in his summary. The other points raised by Mr. Pathak are covered by the footnote alluded to above.

### B. Unavailable.

(1) *Śaṣṭitantra*. Something has already been said with regard to the controversy of regarding Pañcas'ikha or Vārṣaganya as the author of *Śaṣṭitantra*. Here, the question is examined further. Following are the references to *Śaṣṭitantra* in Jay.

(a) "तेषु च षष्टितन्त्रादिख्यातेष्विति । विस्तरत्वात् षष्टितन्त्रस्य संक्षिप्त-रुचिसत्त्वानुग्रहार्थं सप्ततिकारम्भः ।" ( p. 1 ). (b) " 'त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम्' इति षष्टितन्त्रे व्याख्यातम् । पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतोदृष्टमिति ।" ( p. 7 ). (c) " एते षष्टि [ : ] पदार्थाः । तदर्थं शास्त्रं षष्टितन्त्रमुच्यते ।" ( p. 56 ). (d) " 'तेन' इति । पञ्चशिखेन मुनिना बहुया कृतं तन्त्रम् । षष्टितन्त्राख्यं षष्टि-खण्डं कृतमिति । तत्रैव हि षष्टिरथा व्याख्याताः ।" ( p. 68 ). (e) " ननु च षष्टितन्त्रमेवास्तु किं सप्तत्येति ।" ( p. 69 ). (f) " अत्र षष्टितन्त्रे बहवोऽर्थाः तेऽत्र नोक्ता इत्याह ।" ( p. 69 ).

From the above passages, Prof. Hiriyanna infers the following facts ( See—" *Śaṣṭitantra and Vārṣaganya*", J. O. R., April-June, 1929, pp. 107-112 ).—(a) *Śaṣṭitantra* has 60 parts, (b) its author is Pañcas'ikha and (c) it deals with 60 topics, and is, therefore, called " *Śaṣṭitantra*". Vārṣaganya is not its author, as others think. As regard the verse—

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।

यत्तु दृष्टिपथं यातं तन्मायेव सुतुच्छकम् ॥

which is quoted in Y. Bh., and Bhāmatī, Vācaspati alludes it to *Śaṣṭitantra* in Tatt. V., and to Vārṣaganya in Bhāmatī. On the basis of these two references, people have come to



the conclusion that Vārṣaganya is the author of Śaṣṭitantra. But the reading in the Y. Bh. is मायेव सुतुच्छकम्, while as the reading in the Bhāmātī is मायैव सुतुच्छकम्. The reading cannot have been deliberately altered by Vācaspati, for a scholar of his reputation would not commit such a crime. On the other hand, from the opinions of Vārṣaganya as found quoted in Buddhistic works, it seems that he altered the reading. Moreover, from Bhāskara's remark, viz., "कपिलमहर्षिप्रणीतषष्टितन्त्राख्यस्मृतेः" (on Br. S., II, 1, 1). we can infer that Kapila was the author of a Śaṣṭitantra. (See also P. O. C., Lahore, II, p. 882, where Mr. S'āstri states Śaṣṭitantra is the real Sāmkhya-dars'ana written by Kapila. Mr. Bhattacharya also holds this view. See I. H. Q., Sept., 1932, p. 518). This old Śaṣṭitantra of Kapila has been enlarged by Pañcas'ikha in his Śaṣṭitantra.

To this we reply—One should not put implicit faith in commentators when they refer to the names of writers. For example, we see that Bhaṭṭa-Utpala, in his commentary on Bṛhat-Saṁhitā, quotes the verses (22-30) from Sāmkhya-Kārikā, preceded by the remark "तथाह कपिलाचार्यः". As regards the alteration of मायेव into मायैव, if it is considered impossible in the case of Vācaspati, it should be still more impossible in the case of Vārṣaganya whom Vācaspati refers to with great reverence as भगवान् वार्षगण्यः. The opinion of Vārṣaganya, as quoted in the Buddhist work Abhidharmakośa (viz., nothing new comes into existence, nor anything born is ever destroyed; that what is existent, is ever existent; that what is non-existent can never become existent) is simply a statement of the sat-kārya theory. It is futile to read from it the difference between the theories of modification according to Sāmkhya and Yoga, as Mr. Hiriyanna does. His arguments can be valid only when it is admitted that Vārṣaganya altered मायेव into मायैव. But that requires proof.

Therefore, the question of authorship of Śaṣṭitantra is still undecided.

(2) *Rājavārtika*. In the Tatt. K., we find the following three verses from Rājavārtika—

“ प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।  
पारार्थ्यं च तथाऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥  
शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।  
विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥  
करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।  
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः ” ॥

The first verse is quoted also in the Sarvopakāṣiṇī (Ch. S. S., No. 246, p. 100). These sixty categories resemble the sixty categories treated of in the Ahirbudhnya Saṁhitā (Jay., int., p. 5; S. S., pp. 70-73). It is impossible to determine the authorship of Rājavārtika. Garbe thinks Bhoja is the author (S. Y. p. 7). These *maulikārthas* are enumerated with slight variations in Jay., Māth., Sāmkhya-tattva-vivecana (Ch., S. S., No. 245, p. 22), Tattva-yāthārthya-dīpana (ibid, p. 80) and Tattva-samāsa-sūtra-vṛtti (ibid, p. 135).

#### VI. The Teachings of Sāmkhya

It has already been pointed out that the activity of all rational beings is directed towards acquiring happiness and avoiding misery. Thoughtful people, on the other hand, avoid happiness even as it is mixed up with misery. Now the nature of this misery, although known generally, is still outside the purview of ordinary people. Īśvarkṛṣṇa has broadly divided that misery into three classes; viz. (1) intrinsic, (2) extrinsic, and (3) superhuman. (1) The intrinsic misery is due to the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and is also caused by passion, anger and so on. (2) The extrinsic misery is caused by men, beasts, reptiles and the rest. (3) The superhuman is the outcome of evil influences of spirits, stars and so on.

It may be asked—Why should we engage in philosophical remedy, when we see that ordinary and obvious remedies can very well remove all the miseries? We see that intrinsic miseries in the shape of various diseases are removed by physicians by means of medicines; as regards miseries due to passion, anger and the rest, they are removable by the acquisition of desires for objects in the shape of flowers, scent, women and so on. The extrinsic miseries can also be removed by the knowledge of Politics, residence in safe places and the rest. Similarly superhuman miseries can also be avoided by charms, incantations and the rest. Thus, when obvious means can uproot all the kinds of miseries, it is useless to engage in inquiring into the philosophical remedies.

We reply, yes; but these remedies are not absolute or final. Nobody can take the guarantee that the obvious remedies suggested above will remove the miseries certainly and absolutely.

Thus, as we see, the obvious remedies are not helpful to us, and we should, therefore, enquire into extraordinary remedies for removing the miseries.

If it be said,—‘ Well, granted that the obvious remedies are not of any help to us; but there are means revealed by the Vedas. By performing the various sacrifices prescribed by the Vedas, we can get over the miseries and acquire heaven and other higher regions,—then our reply is the same as above. We know that stay in the higher regions even is of temporary character. After enjoying the fruits of good actions performed on this earth the dwellers in heaven have to revert back to this earth and undergo all the miseries again. Moreover, there is impurity in the Vedic rites. One has to kill animals in performing some of them. Again, the heaven-dwellers are not free from jealousy. If one particular sacrifice leads to bare residence in heaven, the

other leads to supremacy over there. This must give rise to jealousy in the minds of the people over there. Thus, we see even the Vedic rites are not absolute or final means for releasing one from misery. Therefore, we should enquire after some other means.

That means is the discriminative knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Knower. The Sāmkhya Philosophy divides the objects into four kinds *viz.*, (1) Root-matter, (2) Evolvent and Evolute, (3) Evolute and (4) the Spirit.

(1) The Root-matter or Nature is not a modification. It is the root-cause of all matter. Intellect and the rest are the evolutes of this Nature. Intellect, which is the product of Nature, produces Ego. Ego, born out of Intellect, produces the five subtle elements and the organs of sense and action. The five subtle elements, which are produced from Ego, produce the five gross-elements. The five gross-elements and the eleven organs produce nothing, and they are, therefore, Evolutes only. The Spirit is neither produced from anything nor itself produces anything; so it is neither an Evolute nor an Evolvent. Among these, the Nature has been termed as Unmanifest, the Spirit as the Knower and the rest as Manifest. So, by the discriminative knowledge of these three, one attains salvation.

The means of Right cognition (or *Pramāṇas*) recognised in this Philosophy are Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. The other *Pramāṇas* recognised by the rival schools are included under these three. The process of Perception may be stated thus :—

Suppose there is water in a tank. On account of the absence of any outlet, this water, the very nature of which is to flow, is tranquil. But now a small channel is dug. Then water flows through this channel and assumes the form of the object into which it flows. It will be rectangular if it

enters a rectangular field and so on. Similarly, intellect, the very nature of which is to apprehend all the objects, is at a stand-still, being enveloped by the Attribute of *Tamas* or Darkness. But after the contact of an organ of sense with any object, this darkness is removed. Then this intellect flows through the channel of an organ of sense and assumes the form of the object with which the organ of sense is in contact. This assuming of a particular form of an object by the intellect is called Perception or determination or knowledge. Of course, the result of this perception is experienced by the Spirit. For, intellect being a modification of matter and non-intelligent can produce only a non-intelligent determination. And the phrases like "I am happy" refer to the Conscious Spirit. So what really happens is this :—A part of intellect runs out through an organ of sense to assume the form of an object. The other part reflects the image of the Conscious Spirit. Now, the out-going part of intellect, having assumed the shape of an object presents itself to the part remaining behind and reflecting the Conscious Spirit. So the Spirit, which in reality is free from activity, contact, agency and such other qualities, becomes active or agent through its image reflected in the intellect. The real enjoyer or agent is the reflected image of the Spirit.

Inference is based upon Perception. The materialists like Cārvāka deny the authenticity of Inference. But, they may be asked—suppose you talk to a man. After his departure if you are asked about that man, you will very readily say about him that he is intelligent or ignorant. Now, how can you *perceive ignorance or knowledge* of another man? You will have to infer them. Therefore, inference will have to be recognised as a means of Right Cognition. Inference leads to conclude the presence of Major term in the Minor term on the basis of the concomitance of Middle and Major

terms and the cognition of the presence of Middle term in the Minor term. For example,—we see smoke (Middle term) on the Hill ( Minor term ). Now we remember the concomitance of smoke ( Middle term ) and fire ( Major term ). Thus we conclude that there is fire ( Major term ) on the Hill ( Middle term ).

The Inference is of three kinds viz., *Pūrvavat*, (*A priori*), *S'eṣa'vat* (*A posteriori*) and *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa* (commonly seen). These are defined and explained in the notes on the 5th Kārikā.

Valid testimony is the assertion of a reliable person. A reliable person is that, who ascertains facts on the basis of strong proofs; and when he states a fact exactly as he has seen it, then his assertion is Valid Testimony. The other means of Right Cognition are included under these three. This has been exhaustively explained in the notes on the 4th and 5th Kārikās.

Thus, Nature, Spirit and the rest are cognised by Inference or Valid Testimony. It may be asked—why should not the non-perception of these lead us to conclude their total non-existence? We reply—Mere non-perception of an object cannot lead to its total non-existence in every case. We see that even existent objects are not perceived for various reasons. For example, a man in Conjeevram cannot perceive the Himalayas; one cannot see a piece of straw fallen in one's own eye; a deaf person does not apprehend the sound of music; a person absorbed in something does not perceive anybody seated near him; one who is not a *yogin* cannot perceive an atom which is existent; people cannot see the moon or stars during the day-time because their light is overcome by the sun; drops of water, falling in water cannot be differentiated afterwards. Therefore, the non-perception of Nature and the rest is due to their minuteness and not total non-existence. For, when we see the effects of Nature,

in the shape of intellect, ego and so forth, we infer Nature as the cause of these effects.

Now, we state the theory of cause and effect according to the Sāmkhyas. They state that an existent effect is produced from an existent cause. The Buddhists proclaim that the existent Effect is produced from the cause which is non-existent. The Vedāntins assert that there is no existence of Effects, but they are illusory forms of one existent. The followers of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika say that the non-existent Effect is produced from the existent cause.

The Theory of the Buddhists is:—"The existence comes into being from non-existence, for without destruction nothing can be produced." ( N. S. IV. I. 14 ) We observe that a sprout is produced out of the destruction of seed, curds are produced from the destruction of milk. Thus, we see that destruction ( = non-existence ) produces an object.

But, really speaking, the Buddhists have missed the point. It is not the destroyed seed that produces sprout. It is simply the modification of the structure of particles of a seed that we see in a sprout. That is, when particular kinds of particles are in a particular form, they constitute a seed. When that particular form is changed, then those particles constitute the sprout. If non-existence in shape of destruction were to produce existence, then it will lead to great confusion. The point has been clarified by S'āṅkarācārya ( Br. S. Bh. II. 2. 26 ) as follows :—

" If entity did spring from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For, the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of the horns of hares and the like, *i. e.*, non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no

sense ( on the doctrine of origination from non-existence ) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, etc., originate from the horns of hares, etc.,—a thing certainly not observed." ( S. B. E. XXXIV, p. 416 ).

The view of the Vedāntins, *viz.*, the cause alone is existent, the effect being only an apparent change, is also untenable. They say that as the cognition of silver in pearl-oysters is false, for it is contradicted by the subsequent cognition of the real pearl-oyster, so the superimposition of this inanimate world on the intelligent *Brahman* is also false. To this we reply:—The cognition of silver in pearl-oyster is contradicted by perception; we subsequently cognise pearl-oyster and thus our first cognition of silver is contradicted by the second cognition. But we do not find any such thing in the case of this world. There is no subsequent cognition which could render our first cognition of this world false. Therefore, this world cannot be regarded to be mere illusion. Moreover, we find a similarity between silver and pearl-oyster. Both are white. But what similarity is there between the non-intelligent world and the intelligent *Brahman*, both being poles asunder? How can the world now be superimposed on *Brahman*?

[The Vedantin replies—For the sake of illusion it is not necessary that only similarity between two objects can lead to superimposing of one on the other. We see that people whose minds are highly excited by passion, experience the illusion of embracing their wives in dream. The same can be said of waking state also. Moreover, when ignorant people superimpose dark colour on the sky which is beyond perception, then the question of similarity does not arise at all.]

The *Naiyāyikas* assert that the effect is non-existent before the causal operation. Non-existence is produced out of existence. From the existent lump of clay is produced a jar which is non-existent in that lump of clay.

Their view is not correct. For, non-existence cannot be produced. Nobody can bring non-existence into existence. Who can produce yellow colour out of the blue wherein the yellow colour does not exist? It may be argued:—People use phrases like ‘The jar is non-existent,’ with regard to the lump of clay from which jar has not yet been produced, and ‘The jar is existent,’ after it is produced from that clay. Therefore, the jar has the quality of *existence* at times and *non-existence* at other times; otherwise, these phrases cannot be used—To this we reply:—All agree to the view that a quality exists in the qualified. According to the objector’s view-point, the jar was non-existent before it was produced. That is, the qualified (jar) did not exist then. Then, where did the quality of non-existence reside in the absence of the qualified? Therefore, the objector will have to admit the existence of jar even against his will in the lump of clay. Moreover, the objector had stated, *non-existence* is a *quality* which resided in the jar before its production; for, otherwise one cannot use such phrases as ‘The non-existent jar.’ To this we reply:—How can you use such a phrase,—‘The jar is *non-existent* before its production? Before its production, the qualified (jar) being non-existent, how can the quality of non-existence be appended to it? For example, we say ‘A blue lotus.’ Here lotus is the substratum of the quality of blueness. Similarly, ‘A non-existent jar’ means that the jar is the substratum of the quality of non-existence. Now, when the jar is not existing before its production, then how can it become the substratum of any quality as the lotus is of blueness; therefore, an effect does exist even before the operation of cause.

It may be asked :—If the effect does exist even before the operation of cause, then, wherein lies the utility of the causal operation? To this we reply :—In the stage of cause an object remains latent and minute. The causal operation simply makes that object gross and patent. Thus the causal operation brings about the manifestation of an effect which is already existing in the cause. For example, the pressing of sesamum seeds manifests the oil which is already existent in those seeds.

Again, the effect is existent in its material cause, because the former is related to the latter. A lump of clay is related to a jar even before its production. If the jar were non-existent, then it could not have any relation with the lump of clay. A lump of clay cannot produce anything which is not related to it. If unrelated things could be produced out of anything, then why not produce cloth out of a lump of clay? Or for that matter, why not produce everything from everything. But this is not so. On the other hand, wherever cause is patent enough to produce a particular effect, that cause will produce only that effect. The sesamum seeds have the potency to produce oil and not jar or cloth. The yarns have the potency to produce only cloth. This potency is always related to a potent effect. Had there been no existence of jar before its production, then who can instil the *potency* to produce it in a lump of clay.

Again, it is observed that an effect is of the same nature as its cause. An effect is not different from its cause. A jar is not different from a lump of clay, but is of the nature of clay. If the jar were different from clay, then the jar could not be of the nature of clay. Only those things differ from each other which are produced out of different materials, as a jar and the yarns. The objects which are different can have conjunction or separation. A jar and a piece of cloth can be brought together. The Himalayas

are always separated from the Vindhya. But in clay and jar there can be neither separation nor conjunction. Moreover, the weight of clay from which a jar is made is the same as the weight of the jar.—For example, a seer of clay will produce a jar weighing neither more nor less than a seer. Therefore, jar is not different from clay.

An objector says :—Well, jar is different from clay, because (1) We find that with regard to *jar*, we say it is born, and not with regard to clay ; (2) It is the jar which is destroyed and not the clay ; (3) The notions about the jar and clay are also different ; (4) One is named jar, the other clay ; (5) The jar serves the purpose of bringing water which clay does not ; (6) We say that the jar exists in clay and not the reverse.

To this we reply that these arguments for proving a difference between a cause and its effect, do not prove the real difference. For, these apparent differences can be explained away by “attributing the notions to be *appearance* and *disappearance* of certain factors.” For instance, the limbs of a tortoise appear from its body and again disappear into it. Nobody on this basis can call these phenomena to be the birth and death of its limbs ; similar is the case of a jar etc., which are said to be produced when they emanate from clay, etc., and destroyed when they merge into clay, etc. The difference of notions also can be similarly explained ; we call clay as clay as long as jar has not emanated from it. As regards the usage of such expressions as, jar exists in clay, it is like the usage of such phrases as, “Tilaka trees exist in forest.” Really speaking the whole forest is made up of Tilaka trees only, still we use a phrase like that. With reference to the difference of purposes served by a cause and an effect (e. g., by clay and jar), we reply that the same things serve different purposes collectively or singly. The atoms of clay collected in the form of a jar, can bring water :

they cannot do so when they are single. “Each individual bearer performs the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying the palanquin, while collectively they carry the palanquin.” If the Naiyāyika were to say again :—

You say that an effect already existing in its cause is manifested by the operation of the cause. Now, tell us, does this manifestation exist before the causal operation or not? If it does, *i. e.*, if manifestation exists before causal operation then what is the use of the latter? If, on the other hand, you say that manifestation does not exist before causal operation, then it would mean that causal operation produces a non-existent thing. This goes against your *sat-kārya* theory.

We reply.—

The *Naiyāyika* has overlooked his own fault. For the same fallacy can be shown to exist in his theory also. He says that a non-existent effect is produced from its cause. Now, we ask—does this production exist before the cause or not? If it does then what purpose does your cause serve? If it does not, then that production must have another production and the latter another and so on *ad infinitum*.

If, on the other hand, it is said that this production of jar is nothing else but jar itself, then “jar is produced” would be tantamount to *production is produced*, which is absurd. It will be still more absurd when we say, “jar is destroyed,” for, it would then mean *production is destroyed*.

Thus it is proved that the effect is always *existent*.

*Pradhāna*, *Prakṛti* and *Avyakta* are the synonyms of Nature. It is uncaused as it is not produced out of any other thing, eternal, one, of the nature of three Attributes and pervades all its products. The three Attributes are *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*. *Sattva* is of the nature of pleasure and illumination, and is light. *Rajas* is of the nature of pain

and activity, and is mobile. *Tamas* is of the nature of delusion and enveloping, and is heavy. These Attributes are able to bring this world into being, and carry on its business by their nature of being mutually subjective, and supporting and productive, and co-operative. Sometimes, *Sattva* subjugates the *Rajas* and *Tamas*; sometimes, *Rajas* subjugates *Sattva* and *Tamas*; sometimes, *Tamas* subjugates *Rajas* and *Sattva*. These Attributes have no power of creation singly; they become productive by taking the support of each other. They are always found in union, all three together. And for the purpose of serving the end of the Spirit, they are seen to co-operate, although they are mutually opposed. The end of the Spirit is the worldly enjoyment or emancipation.

It may be argued that under these circumstances, every existing entity should have all the three qualities of pleasure, pain and delusion, as it is composed of the three Attributes. Vācaspati argues—If these external objects themselves are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, then sandal should impart pleasure in winter even. Sandal never ceases to be sandal. Similarly, paste of saffron should be pleasant even in summer. Saffron-paste never ceases to be what it is. In the same way, thorns which are pleasant to a camel should be pleasant to men also. They do not change their nature in the case of any particular individual. Therefore, sandal, saffron, etc., are not of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. They give rise to these different feelings on account of the difference of individuals, times, and condition, etc. ( Bhāmātī on Br. S. II 2·1 ),

To this Bāla replies ( p. 141 )—Although pleasure, pain and delusion are common to all objects, still they do not spring up accidentally, so as to affect everybody uniformly. They require certain conditions for their generation. Pleasure for its generation, depends upon virtue, and stands in need of *Sattva*. Pain, for its generation, depends upon vice

and stands in need of *Rajas*. Delusion, for its generation, depends upon vice and stands in need of *Tamas*. Vācaspati has also explained it well (Tatt. K., Kār, 13)—“A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband,—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Pleasure; she pains her co-wives—why?—because for them, she appears in the form of Pain; and lastly the same girl deludes or stupefies another man who is unable to get her—why?—because for him she appears in the form of Delusion. The case of this woman illustrates the nature of all things.” ( Dr. Jha's translation, pp. 49-50 )

Thus, the Nature also is made up of the three Attributes, because it is the cause of all the manifest objects which are made up of the three Attributes. The Attributes in the Nature are in equilibrium. Of course, the Attributes are not free from modification even at this stage, for modification is their very nature; but the modification of each Attribute is similar. *Sattva* is modified into *Sattva*, *Rajas* into *Rajas* and *Tamas* into *Tamas*, till the Nature does not come into contact with the Spirit. The moment Nature comes into contact with the Spirit, the equilibrium of the Attributes is disturbed. On account of this disturbance, diverse forms in this world are created from the Attributes. For example, one and the same water produces different kinds of juices in cocoanut, lemon, grape, etc.

It has already been pointed out that all this creation by Nature is for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Now, the existence of the Spirit is proved. We observe that all composite objects are for another's use. Bed, seat, etc., do not serve any end of their own, but are meant for a man. Similarly, the composite *Pradhāna*, *Mahat*, etc., being composed of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, much exist for another's use. This another cannot be a composite object. For, the latter would then require to serve another composite, and

this another and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, this another, viz., the Spirit, whose purpose is served by *Pradhāna*, etc., must be recognised to exist. Again, all what is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion is seen to require a controller, as a chariot does. Therefore, *Buddhi*, etc., also require a controller. And that controller is the Spirit. Moreover, Pleasure, Pain and Delusion presuppose the existence of an enjoyer who enjoys them. This enjoyer is the Spirit. Pleasure, etc., cannot be enjoyed by anything of the nature of Pleasure, etc. For, nothing can operate upon itself. Therefore, we must admit an entity devoid of Pleasure etc. And that entity is the Spirit. There is also another argument, which proves the existence of the Spirit. The scriptures tend to bring about Isolation, which is the final cessation of the three kinds of pain. *Buddhi*, etc., cannot be isolated, because, they are of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion. Pain is one of their ingredients from which they cannot be separated. Therefore, we have to admit the existence of something distinct from *Buddhi*, etc. And that is the Spirit.

There are as many Spirits as the bodies, and not one Spirit. *Īśvarakṛṣṇa* establishes the plurality of Spirits in the following verse (18)—“(1) Because there is definite adjustment of birth, death and the organs, (2) because there is non-simultaneity of activity and (3) because there is diversity due to the three Attributes—the plurality of the Spirits is established.” (Dr. Jha's translation, p. 64).

We see in this world that one man dies, the other is born, one is blind, the other sees well,—one is deaf, the other listens well. All this can be explained only when we admit different Spirits in different bodies. If there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then, when the Spirit renounces one body, all beings should die; or when the Spirit takes up a new body, all beings should be born. Similarly, when one

becomes blind, all should be blind. Therefore, there is a plurality of Spirits.

If it be argued that just one *Ākāśa* appears many on account of coming into contact with jar, house, etc., similarly, one Spirit appears many on account of coming into contact with different bodies, then it would not be correct. For, as body is the *upādhi* (condition) of the Spirit, so the limbs are the *upādhis* of a body. And when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, would such phenomena be called the births and deaths of the same body?

Moreover, if there is only one Spirit in all the bodies, then when that Spirit moves one body all the bodies should move simultaneously. Again, we see that beings are divided into gods, men, beasts etc. on the basis of the three Attributes. Those abounding in *Sattva* are gods, those in *Rajas* are men and those in *Tamas* are demons. If there were only one Spirit, then these differences would never arise, but the whole creation would be uniform. Thus, the plurality of the Spirits is established.

The Spirit, being devoid of the three Attributes, is the seer or witness of this creation, which is of the nature of the three Attributes. The Spirit is isolated, inactive and indifferent, again because it is free from the three Attributes. This different Spirit appears to be active, although the activity really belongs to the three Attributes. This illusion arises out of the union of the insentient Nature with the Sentient Spirit. As a result thereof, the activity belonging to the insentient Nature is transferred to the Sentient Spirit.

A question arises—why should there be a union between the Nature and the Spirit? The reply is:—The Nature is an object of experience; it stands in need of the Spirit, the experiencer. Therefore, one cause of union is that the Spirit may experience the Nature. But, when the Spirit imagines



itself as suffering on account of its union with the Nature, then it desires isolation. This isolation is the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. And as this discrimination is impossible without the Nature, the second cause of union between the Nature and the Spirit is the purpose of bringing about the Spirit's isolation.

The Nature, having exhibited itself to the Spirit, desists like an actress who has shown her skill on the stage. The Spirit then attains isolation. And as a delicate and newly-wedded girl when seen by a stranger does not appear again before that stranger, so the Nature also, when seen by a Spirit does not come into union with that particular Spirit.

Thus, bondage and isolation which really belong to the Nature are ascribed to the Spirit by mistake. By practising such discriminative wisdom, a person never errs about bondage or emancipation. That is, he attains isolation or salvation.

Har Dutt Sharma

## अथ कारिकाणां सूची.

( अकारादिक्रमेण. )

कारिकाङ्काः	पृष्ठाङ्काः	कारिकाङ्काः	पृष्ठाङ्काः
७ अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् ... ८		५५ तत्र जरामरणकृतम् ... ५०	
२३ अध्यवसायो बुद्धेर्धर्मो ज्ञानम् २५		३८ तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः ... ३६	
३३ अंतःकरणं त्रिविधम् ... ३३		१९ तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् ... २२	
२४ अभिमानोऽहंकारः ... २७		२० तस्मात् तत्संयोगात् ... २२	
१४ अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिः ... १७		६२ तस्मान्न बध्यतेऽद्धा ... ५७	
५३ अष्टविकल्पो दैवः ... ४९		६५ तेन निवृत्तप्रसवाम् ... ५८	
९ असदकरणात् उपादान- ग्रहणात् ... १०		११ त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः ... १२	
५० आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः ... ४६		१ दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् ... १	
५६ इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतौ ... ५१		२ दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः ... ३	
२७ उभयात्मकमत्र मनः ... २८		४ दृष्टमनुमानमासवचनम् ... ५	
५४ ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालः ... ४९		६६ रङ्गस्थ इत्युपेक्षक एको ... ५९	
५१ ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनम् ... ४७		४४ धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम् ... ४१	
४९ एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः ... ४५		५२ न विना भावैर्लिङ्गम् ... ४८	
अ एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यम् ... ६१		६० नानाविधैरुपायैः ... ५३	
३६ एते प्रदीपकल्पाः ... ३५		४७ पञ्च विपर्ययभेदाः ... ४४	
६४ एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासात् ... ५८		२१ पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थम् ... २३	
४६ एष प्रत्ययसर्गो ... ४३		६९ पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदम् ... ६१	
५८ औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम् ... ५८		४२ पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदम् ... ४०	
३२ करणं त्रयोदशविधं ... ३३		४० पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तम् ... ३८	
१६ कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम् ... १९		२२ प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारः ... २४	
४१ चित्रं यथाऽऽश्रयमृते ... ३९		६१ प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरम् ... ५३	
१८ जननमननकरणानाम्प्रति- नियमात् ... २१		५ प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् ७	
		६८ प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे ... ६०	
		१२ प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः ... १४	

## Kārikā Ā

Handed down by tradition of disciples, this was summarised in Ārya verses by Īs'varakṛṣṇa of noble mind, having fully understood the demonstrated truth.

## Kārikā I

The topics of these seventy verses are those of the entire Ṣaṣṭitantra; they are devoid of anecdotes and also omit discussions of rival views.

SĀMKHYA KĀRIKĀ  
NOTES

## I

About the sons of ब्रह्मा, कपिल, आसुरि, पञ्चशिल् and ईश्वरकृष्ण see Introduction. The quotation 'पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वः,' etc., is taken from पञ्चशिल्; see Introduction.

आधिभौतिक. The word भूत stands for living beings, according to चन्द्रिका.

आधिदैविक, according to गौड०, includes miseries due to cold, heat, wind etc., because these are due to supernatural powers. On देवानामिदं दैवं, Davies remarks—" But in old time, gods of higher class, and not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with disease and pain. In the Rig-Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gṛtsamada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the Devas or gods ( *daivya* ). " ( p. 15 ).

The reading adopted by गौड०, *viz.*, तदभिघातके is more expressive of the सांख्य idea of complete cessation of pain, than तदपघातके of वाच० ( See, S. N. S., 1, 1n. ). cf. तत्र त्रिविध-दुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ( सां. सू. १. १ ). The reading of जय० *viz.*, तदवघातके does not materially differ from तदपघातके. Compare also Wilson, pp. 6-7; Davies, pp. 13-14, note on this reading.

विष्णुपुराण describes the three दुःखs in the following verses :

अध्यात्मिकोऽपि द्विविधः शारीरो मानसस्तथा ।

शारीरो बहुभिर्भेदैर्भिद्यते श्रूयतां च सः ॥ २ ॥

शारीरोगप्रतिश्यायज्वरशूलभगन्दरैः ।

गुल्मार्शःश्वयथुश्वासछर्द्यादिभिरनेकधा ॥ ३ ॥

तथाक्षीरोगातीसारकुष्टांगामयसंज्ञितैः ।

भिद्यते देहजस्तापो मानसं श्रोतुमर्हसि ॥ ४ ॥

कामक्रोधभयद्वेषलोभमोहविषादजः ।  
 शोकासूयावमानेर्ष्यामात्सर्यादिमयस्तथा ॥ ५ ॥  
 मानसोऽपि द्विजश्रेष्ठ तापो भवति नैकधा ।  
 इत्येवमादिभिर्भेदैस्तापो ह्याध्यात्मिको मतः ॥ ६ ॥  
 मृगपक्षिमनुष्याद्यैः पिशाचोरगराक्षसैः ।  
 सरीसृपाद्यैश्च नृणां जायते चाधिभौतिकः ॥ ७ ॥  
 शीतवातोष्णवर्षाम्बुवैद्युतादिसमुद्भवः ।  
 तापो द्विजवरश्रेष्ठैः कथ्यते चाधिदैविकः ॥ ८ ॥ ( ६. ५ )

## II

अपाम सोमममृता अभूम etc., is from ऋग्वेद VIII. 48. 3., and is fully quoted and explained by गौड०, माठर and जय०. माठर reads तृणवत् (perhaps a mistake) in place of कृणवत्. Following are the principal points of difference:—

कृणवत्	=	कर्ता	according to	गौड०.
( तृणवत् )	=	"	"	माठर.
कृणवत्	=	मृत्युः	"	जय०.
अराति	=	शत्रुः	"	गौड०.
"	=	शत्रुः = मृत्युः	"	माठर.
"	=	व्याधिः	"	जय०.

According to Principal V. Bhattacharya of Santiniketan (in a letter to me), the reading अमृतमर्त्यस्य, which is common to all the commentators, cannot be accepted; for the accent on the word अमृत shows that it is a vocative case and should, therefore, be written separately from मर्त्यस्य. Moreover, जय०'s interpretation of कृणवत् = मृत्यु cannot be accepted, as this word never means मृत्यु.

According to the editor of माठरवृत्ति (Chow. S. S., No. 296, p. 2), 'षट् शतानि नियुज्यन्ते' etc., is quoted in the भाष्य of महीधर on the last verse of the 24th chapter of यजुर्वेदसंहिता, the second line of the verse there being—'अभमेवस्य यज्ञस्य नवभिश्चाधिकानि च ।'

With the sense of this कारिका, cf. श्रीमद्भागवत—

श्रुतं च दृष्टवद्दुष्टं स्वर्धासूयात्ययव्ययैः ।  
 बहन्तरायकामत्वात् कृषिवच्चापि निष्फलम् ॥ ( ११. १०. २१ )  
 एवं लोकं परं विद्यान्नश्वरं कर्मनिर्मितम् ।  
 सतुल्यातिशयध्वंसं यथा मण्डलवर्तिनाम् ॥ ( ११. ३. २० )

The reconciliation of वैदिकी हिंसा with the श्रुति text—मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि—, is an interesting topic which has taxed the ingenuity of all the orthodox systems of philosophy ( See, S. N. S., p. 5, 1n. ; Sovani, p. 400 ). बालराम has discussed this question at length, quoting extensively from the standard authors ( See pages 24–36 ).

The order of व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञान is based on the procedure of cognition. The same order is observed in the following सां. सू. —स्थूलान् पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य ( १. ६२ ); बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहङ्कारस्य ( १. ६३ ); तेनाहङ्कारस्य ( १. ६४ ); ततः प्रकृतेः ( १. ६५ ); and संहतपरार्थत्वात् पुरुषस्य ( १. ६६ ).

Sovani is quite pertinent in pointing out the confusion with regard to the meaning of the word व्यक्त. Some call the महाभूतस्य as व्यक्त, whileas, the author of कारिकास seems to regard everything व्यक्त ( and, therefore, प्रत्यक्षयोग्य ), except the प्रधान and पुरुष. वाच० agrees with the latter explanation, in his commentary on this कारिका, but, changes his opinion in the comment on the 6th कारिका. At the latter place he says—सामान्यतो दृष्टानुमानात् अतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनाम् प्रतीतिः. He would seem to include महत्तत्त्व etc., by the word आदि ( See बालराम p. 16 1n. ). In order to avoid the contradiction, we should interpret the word आदि, according to वंशीधर, to mean the union between प्रकृति and पुरुष. cf. आदिना तत्संयोगग्रहः । प्रकृतिपुरुषतत्संयोगा नित्यानुमेया इत्युक्तेः ( वंशीधर, p. 183 ) 1 See Sovani, pp. 401 and 405, and notes 36 and 37.

## III

In connection with Jacobi's remark that it is very strange that intellect should be regarded as a form of matter by the Sāmkhyas (See Ent. Gott. Ind. p. 32), it is interesting to compare Davies (p. 17, 3n)—Modern Science, like the system of Kapila, makes intellect, a mere form of matter. "Mind, used in the sense of substance or essence, and brain, used in the sense of organ of mental function are at bottom names for the same substance." (Maudsley's Physiology of Mind, 3rd Ed., p. 38).

The nature of पुरुष is explained by चन्द्रिका as अजनकत्वे सत्यजन्य इत्यर्थः । आद्यविशेषणेन प्रकृतिनिरासः, द्वितीयेनेन्द्रियसामान्यादिनिरासः । Unlike the नैयायिकs, the सांख्यs maintain that सामान्य is a product.

On पुरुष as pure inward light, Davies quotes (p. 18, 1n.) Hegel on Thought (Das Denken), in connection with the Absolute:—"It is that light which lights; but it has no other content except that light." (Phil. der Rel., i. 117) [Translated from German by H. Sharma].

From अहङ्कार (Ego) proceed not only the इन्द्रियs, but everything material cognised by them. That is, the Ego (which is the I-principle) is the 'base of the reality of all our sense-perceptions' (Davies, p. 21, note 1), and consequently of all the existence. Davies quotes Schelling (System des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60) in support of this idea—"If at all there exists *Something Real* as opposed to *ideal*, then that *Something Real* must be I, because it is the principle of all reality." (Translated from German by H. Sharma). This position, of course, differs from that of the वेदान्तिन्, who does not regard the reality of the I-principle (अहङ्कार) even, but that of the Pure Consciousness (शुद्धब्रह्म),—the I-principle itself being imaginary and due to माया. Distinction should be drawn from the विज्ञानवादी-बौद्ध also, who denies the existence of everything external, except consciousness. The सांख्यवादिन्

does not deny the external existence, but considers it to be a modified product of consciousness, in which it lies latent, cf. न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः (सां. सू. १. ४२.).

## IV

Apart from the three Means of Right Cognition, viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द, recognised by the सांख्यकारिका, the commentators discuss the other Means of Right Cognition, recognised by other schools. The चार्वाक materialist recognises only प्रत्यक्ष, the जैन and वैशेषिक schools recognise प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the माध्वs also recognise only two प्रमाणs, but they are प्रत्यक्ष and शब्द according to them. The followers of रामानुज, the जरनैयायिकs, and the सांख्य and the योग systems recognise प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द. The oldest and the most modern नैयायिकs and the followers of the महेश्वर school recognise उपमान in addition to the three named above. The मीमांसकs of प्रभाकर school add अर्थापत्ति as the fifth. The मीमांसकs of कुमारिलभट्ट school and the अद्वैतवेदान्तिन्s recognise one more, viz., अनुपलब्धि or अभाव. The number of प्रमाणs reaches eight in the case of the पौराणिकs who add संभव and ऐतिह्य to the list. Some तान्त्रिकs recognise चेष्टा also in addition to the above; others add प्रतिभा to the list, and thus the total reaches ten. The commentators have tried to show that all the seven प्रमाणs, apart from the three recognised by the कारिका, fall under the latter.

## 1. उपमान—

वाच० splits it up into प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and शब्द;

माठर regards it to be अनुमान;

जय० includes it under अनुमान and शब्द;

गौड० includes it under शब्द;

and चन्द्रिका under अनुमान.

## 2. अर्थापत्ति—

All the commentators include it under अनुमान.

## 3. अभाव—

वाच० and जय० regard it as प्रत्यक्ष; माठर includes it under अनुमान. Although गौड०'s remark—सम्भवाभावप्रतिभैतिह्योपमाश्राप्तवचने, suggests its inclusion under शब्द, yet another remark of his, viz., शुष्कधान्यदर्शनाद्बृष्टेरभावो गम्यते, would lead us to infer that he will have it under अनुमान; चन्द्रिका regards it as a help-mate of प्रत्यक्ष, and, therefore, no independent प्रमाण.

## 4. संभव—

वाच०, जय० and माठर include it under अनुमान; गौड० and चन्द्रिका include it under शब्द.

## 5. ऐतिह्य—

वाच० opines that if it is pronounced by a reliable person, then it is शब्द, otherwise it is no प्रमाण; गौड० and चन्द्रिका also include it under शब्द; माठर includes it under अनुमान.

## 6. प्रतिभा—

वाच० and चन्द्रिका do not mention it; जय० includes it under प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, when it is correct, otherwise it is no प्रमाण; माठर includes it under अनुमान; and गौड० includes it under शब्द.

## 7. चेष्टा—


Noticed only by चन्द्रिका and माठर, and included under अनुमान.

Wilson is right in remarking that although the मीमांसकः do recognise six प्रमाणः, yet गौड०'s remark that they are अर्थापत्ति, संभव, अभाव, प्रतिभा, ऐतिह्य and उपमान, is not correct; for संभव, ऐतिह्य and प्रतिभा are nowhere recognised as प्रमाणः by the मीमांसकः; rather, "the author of शास्त्रदीपिका excludes expressly संभव, प्रतिभा and ऐतिह्य from the character of proofs." ( p. 28 ). जैमिनि nowhere mentions the प्रमाणः, but the six प्रमाणः ( viz., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, शब्द, उपमान, अर्थापत्ति and अभाव ) are discussed by शबरस्वामिन् in his भाष्य on मीमांसासूत्र 1. 1. 5. प्रभाकर does not recognise अभाव, but कुमारिल does.

प्रमाण has been defined as the instrument of प्रमा. प्रमा is that state of mind which is free from doubt, mistake, indecision and memory—, and which arises from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. The result is the cognition by mind. But वाच० says—बोधश्च पौरुषेयः फलं प्रमा. This might mean that the result of the mental state is cognition in the Spirit. Does it mean that the cognition arises in the spirit? No, we reply—what happens is that when the Spirit is reflected in the mind, which has assumed the shape of the object with which the sense-organs come into contact, it (the Spirit) also appears to be cognising. This is a kind of misapprehension arising from the mistaken identity between the Spirit and the mind. This is what is expressed in the योगसूत्र—' द्रष्टा दृशिमात्रः शुद्धोऽपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः ' ( II. 20 ) and ' चित्तेरप्रतिसंक्रमायास्तदकारापत्तौ स्वच्छदिसंवेदनम् ' ( IV. 22 ).

## V

Following the न्यायसूत्र—तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतोद्दृष्टं च । ( 1, 1, 5 ), वाच० first divides अनुमान into three kinds. Again he gives another classification :



The commentators differ in the explanation of these terms. वात्स्यायन himself proposes two alternative explanations.

(1) (a) पूर्ववत्—*A priori* or inference of effect from cause,—as of rain from the clouds in the sky.

(b) शेषवत्—*A posteriori*, or an inference of cause from effect,—as of rain from the flood in a river.

(c) सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट—Commonly seen, or based on Analogy,— e. g., we observe that a particular man in one town now, is seen in another next day, because he has moved. Similarly, the Sun must also move, as he is seen at different places in the sky at different times.

Or

(2) (a) पूर्ववत्—If we have seen two things together in the past, then when we see one of them now, we infer the existence of the other also. For example, from smoke on the hill, we infer fire.

(b) शेषवत्—Inference by exclusion (प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्रा-प्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः परिशेषः). The question is—, under which of the seven categories (द्रव्य, गुण etc.) should we include शब्द (sound)? Now, शब्द cannot come under सामान्य, विशेष and the rest, and its inclusion under द्रव्य has been denied. Therefore, by the law of the residue, शब्द falls under गुण.

(c) सामान्यतोद्दृष्ट—Where the relation of the व्याप्ति is not within ordinary perception, there we take another object within ordinary perception and similar to the हेतु in question; and on this similarity or Commonness, we transfer the व्याप्ति from the perceived to the unperceived instance. For instance, we have got to infer the existence of the Spirit. We do so on the basis of the qualities like the desire, etc. The desire, etc., are qualities. Qualities always reside in objects (as we perceive in the case of form, taste and the rest). Therefore, the desire etc., must also reside in some object; and that object is the Spirit.

The two alternative explanations given by वात्स्यायन show that the meaning of these terms had become doubtful at his time. Cf. Principal A. B. Dhruva's paper—'Trividham anumānam', POC., Poona, pp. 251-280.

वाच० agrees with the second explanation of वात्स्यायन. But अवति or शेषवत् according to वाच०, is a negative reasoning. वात्स्यायन's instance of शेषवत्, viz. शब्द is a गुण, is rejected by

वाच० in his तात्पर्यटीका (p. 183, काशीसंस्कृतसीरीज). According to him शेषवत् or परिशेष stands for व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. The inference of शब्द being a गुण is not a व्यतिरेक्यनुमान but अन्वयव्यतिरेकि. The correct example of शेषवत्, therefore, is that the qualities—desire etc., reside in the आत्मन्. These qualities cannot reside in पृथिवी, जल, तेजस् and वायु; nor can they reside in आकाश, because the qualities of the latter are perceived by the external sense—organ (ear). Similarly the desire etc. being विशेषगुण cannot be the qualities of दिशा, काल and मनस्—for the qualities of the latter three द्रव्य are साधारण. Thus ultimately the desire etc., reside in the ninth द्रव्य, viz., आत्मन्. So there being no सपक्ष of आत्मन् it is an instance of व्यतिरेक्यनुमान. जय० and गौड० agree with the first explanation of वात्स्यायन. गौड० and माठर explain शेषवत् differently—समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाय शेषस्याप्यस्ति लवणभाव इति (गौड०) ॥

लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्—वाच० would read one more लिङ्गि i. e. लिङ्गलिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्. गौड० has a curious explanation to offer—तदनुमानं लिङ्गपूर्वकं यत्र लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी अनुमीयते, यथा दण्डेन यतिः। लिङ्गिपूर्वकं च यत्र लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते, यथा दृष्ट्वा यतिं, अस्येदं त्रिदण्डमिति। जय० agrees with it. It enumerates seven kinds of सम्बन्ध which ought to exist between the लिङ्ग and the लिङ्गिन्. They are—

- |                      |            |         |     |               |
|----------------------|------------|---------|-----|---------------|
| (1) स्वस्वामिभाव     | as between | राजा    | and | पुरुष.        |
| (2) प्रकृतिविकार     | .. ..      | यव      | ..  | सक्तु.        |
| (3) कार्यकारणभाव     | .. ..      | धेतु    | ..  | वत्स.         |
| (4) पात्रपात्रिक     | .. ..      | परिवृद् | ..  | त्रिविष्टम्ब. |
| (5) साहचर्य          | .. ..      | चक्रवाक | ..  | चक्रवाकी.     |
| (6) प्रतिद्वन्द्वि   | .. ..      | शीत     | ..  | उष्ण.         |
| (7) निमित्तनैमित्तिक | .. ..      | भोज्य   | ..  | भोजक.         |

As pointed above, the Buddhists and the followers of the वैशेषिक school do not recognise शब्द as a separate प्रमाण, but include it under अनुमान. वाच० says that the relation between a वाक्य and its अर्थ is not that of लिङ्ग and लिङ्गिन्, as between धूम and वह्नि. वाक्यार्थ, being only an object of cognition cognised by the वाक्य, cannot be known by inference.

It will be interesting to know how वाच० has tried to bring the other प्रमाणs under the three recognised by the सांख्यs.

उपमान. According to the नैयायिकs ( प्रसिद्धसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधन-  
उपमानम्—न्या० सू० 1. 6), उपमान is that sentence which estab-  
lishes a relation between a word and its sense. But, ac-  
cording to the सांख्यs, a वाक्य is not a प्रमाण, but the knowledge  
(ज्ञान) derived from the वाक्य. It is the चित्तवृत्ति alone which is  
प्रमाण. So, उपमान cannot be a separate प्रमाण, but is included  
under अनुमान. According to the मीमांसकs, उपमान is the सादृश्य-  
ज्ञान (or the cognition of similarity, as of गो residing in the direct-  
ly perceived गवय). A man who saw a cow in the town, now  
observes a गवय in the forest. At this moment he is reminded  
of the cow which is qualified by the similarity of गवय directly  
perceived. This is the फल of उपमान. वाच० replies that this  
उपमान and its फल are both included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, सादृश्य  
is like the सामान्य. Just as we have गोत्व in गो, so we have  
गोसादृश्य in गो. And as we directly perceive गोत्व along with गो,  
so we perceive गोसादृश्य and गवयसादृश्य along with गवय. There-  
fore, गोसादृश्यज्ञान ( उपमान ) and गवयसादृश्यज्ञान ( उपमानफल ) both  
are प्रत्यक्ष. सादृश्य is not a relation ( like संयोग ) which should  
reside on two objects; it is only भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोग, that is, *the*  
*existence of a large number of qualities of one object in another.*  
This सादृश्य is, thus, one like गोत्व; and if it is perceived in गो,  
then it is perceived in गवय also.

अर्थापत्ति is Presumption. We presume the existence of  
living चैत्र outside the house, if he is not visible inside the  
house. But, the मीमांसक objects—देशसामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपोऽपि  
पाक्षिकः etc. He says that when we hear जीवन् चैत्रः क्वचिदस्ति,  
then the substratum of the existence of चैत्र is देशसामान्य (or  
space in general), which includes the particular space of गृह  
also. Thus, चैत्र's non-existence in the गृह is opposed to his  
existence in देशसामान्य. And, in order to remove this opposi-  
tion, we have to resort to अर्थापत्ति. वाच० replies that गृह (in

which the non-existence of चैत्र has been established by means  
of Right Cognition) cannot be included in देशसामान्य. Similarly  
चैत्र's non-existence in गृह ( which is opposed to his existence  
in गृह ) cannot be a case of opposition to his existence  
everywhere.

अभाव is no प्रमाण, but is included under प्रत्यक्ष. For, घटाभाव-  
वद्भूतल is merely a modification of भूतल. But, says an objector,  
how can अभाव (a negation) be a परिणाम (something positive)?  
Answer. Under एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः  
यो० सू० III. 13), व्यास has defined परिणाम as अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य  
पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति—i. e. modification is the  
manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the  
previous characteristic of an object, which (object) always  
remains constant. So, when घट was on the भूतल, then it was  
सद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल; and when there is no घट, then it is the  
केवल or अद्वितीयपरिणाम of भूतल.

## VI

Things directly perceived by the senses need not be  
taught by the शास्त्र, as they can be easily cognised by even an  
ordinary person. Now " things beyond the senses are not  
only those which are too subtle for organs of the sense,  
but those which are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in  
a mountain that smokes " ( Davies, p. 27 ). The latter is an  
instance of पूर्ववत् अनुमान, which वाच० regards to be as un-  
important for our inquiry as the प्रत्यक्ष. The most important  
kind of अनुमान, from our point of view, is सामान्यतोदृष्ट ( and  
शेषवत्, which is not mentioned by the कारिका, but added by  
वाच० ), which leads us to infer things which are too subtle  
for the organs of sense. But जय० rejects पूर्ववत् and शेषवत्  
both ( p. 9 ).

## VII

पतञ्जलि lays down six causes of अनुपलब्धि (महाभाष्य IV. 1. 3). See Introduction. The eight causes of अनुपलब्धि mentioned in the कारिका are reduced to four by जय०—

- (1) देशदोष includes अतिदूर and अतिसामीप्य.
- (2) इन्द्रियदोष ,, इन्द्रियघात and मनोऽनवस्थान.
- (3) विषयदोष = सौक्ष्म्य, and
- (4) अर्थान्तरदोष includes व्यवधान, अभिभव and समानाभिहार.

Sovani is right in remarking that all these can be reduced to two— इन्द्रियदोष and विषयदोष ( See p. 405 ). माठर lays down the causes of अनुपलब्धि of असत् ( non-existent ) things even— इदानीमसतां चतुर्धा भवति । तत्रोच्यते—प्राक्प्रध्वंसेतरैरात्यन्ताभावभेदात्..... एवमियं द्वादशानुपलब्धिः । सतामष्टधा ह्यसतां चतुर्धा ॥

## VIII

On the reading प्रकृतिसरूपं, Davies remarks—'Lassen has in the text स्वरूपं ( having its own form ), from the सांख्यकौमुदी, which must be referred to intellect ( महत् ). All the Mss. but one have सरूपं ( like ), which the sense requires. In his translation he has " dissimile et simile ". ' ( p. 27. 1n ).

## IX

वाच० here lays down the opinions of ( 1 ) the बौद्धs, ( 2 ) the नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs, and ( 3 ) the वेदान्तिन्s as पूर्वपक्ष.

( 1 ) The बौद्धs maintain that *existence* comes into being from *non-existence* ( असत्तः सजायते ).

( 2 ) The नैयायिकs and the वैशेषिकs maintain that an *existent* cause produces a *non-existent* effect ( सतोऽसज्जायते ).

( 3 ) The वेदान्तिन्s maintain that the cause alone is *existent*, the effect being only an apparent change ( एकस्य सतो विवर्तः न कार्यजातं वस्तु सत् ). All these views are fully discussed in the Introduction.

उपादानग्रहणात्—वाच० interprets ग्रहणात् as सम्बन्धात्. But जय०, गौड०, माठर and चन्द्रिका explain it as taking or seeking. S. N. S. observes that although गौड०'s explanation is simpler, yet apparently, the same idea is repeated in शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्. वाच०'s explanation is also included in सर्वसम्भवाभावात्. "It is also to be noted that while उपादानग्रहणात् emphasises the adequacy of the cause to the effect, शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् looks at the adequacy of the effect to the cause; hence, the latter does not merely repeat the idea of the former." ( S. N. S. p. 28, 1n ).

कारणभावाच्च—जय० gives two explanations of this phrase— कारणस्य सत्त्वादित्यर्थः । यस्यसत्कार्यमुत्पद्यते किमिति कारणभावेन कार्यस्य भावो भवति । भवति च । तस्माच्छक्तिरूपेणावस्थितमिति गम्यते । अथवा—कारणभावादिति कारणस्वभावात् । यत्स्वभावं कारणं तत्स्वभावं कार्यम् । यथा स्निग्धस्वभाव्यास्तिलेभ्यः स्निग्धमेव तैलम्, मृदो मृत्स्वभावो घटः ॥ ( p. 12 ). माठर and गौड० agree with the latter explanation. वाच०, on the other hand, explains it as कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात्—on account of the identity of cause and effect.

## X

हेतुमत्—, *i. e.*, caused. व्यक्त or the evolved is caused. Cause, according to माठर, is of two kinds : कारक (producer) and ज्ञापक (illuminator or indicator). प्रधान, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्रा's are the कारकहेतु's, as they produce effects. That is, बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and पञ्चतन्मात्रा's are हेतुs and हेतुमत्s both, whileas, अव्यक्त ( *i. e.* प्रधान ) is only a हेतु. The ज्ञापक हेतुs are five-fold, *viz.*, विपर्यय, अशक्ति, तुष्टि, सिद्धि and अनुग्रह. Now, विपर्यय, अशक्ति तुष्टि and सिद्धि are the प्रत्ययसर्गs ( *i. e.* creations of Intellect ), and thus they pervade all the twenty-three तत्त्वs. ( But what is this अनुग्रह ? ) Thus अव्यक्त is only a कारक हेतु.

अनित्यम्—non-eternal, destructible. Destruction is the return of a product to its cause. cf.—नाशः कारणलयः ( सां० सू० १. १२१ ). For, according to the theory of सत्कार्य, there can be no real destruction or annihilation. प्रधान is नित्य, because it has no कारण to which it could return.



अव्यापि— The twenty-three तत्त्वs are not all-pervading, like प्रधान and पुरुष; "each of these principles (tattwa) is not found in every form." (Davies, p. 34). But, is not the महत्त्व all-pervading? To this वंशीधर replies—महदादेः स्वस्वकारणाव्यापक-सत्रादुपचरितव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थः (p. 201),—the pervading-ness of महत्, etc., is secondary, as they do not pervade their causes. And as प्रधान has no cause to pervade, it is व्यापि.

सक्रियम्—वाच० explains the word क्रिया as परिस्पन्द which means the action of leaving one body and entering another. विज्ञान०, on the other hand, says—सक्रियत्वमध्यवसायादिरूपनियतकार्य-कारित्वम्। प्रधानस्य तु सर्वक्रियासाधारण्येन कारणत्वान्न कार्यैकदेशमात्रकारित्वम्। न च क्रिया कर्मैव वक्तुं शक्यते। प्रकृतिक्षोभात् सृष्टिश्रवणे न प्रकृतेरपि कर्मवत्तयात्र सक्रियत्वापत्तेरिति (१. १२४). On this बालराम remarks—क्षोभादि-परिणामलक्षणाक्रियायाः प्रधानेः सत्त्वेऽपि गमनागमनलक्षणपरिस्पन्दात्मकक्रियाया असत्त्वान्न प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तिरिति व्यर्थोऽयं भिक्षोः प्रयास इति बोध्यम् (p. 121).

अनेकम्—i. e. सजातीयभेदवत्, having a variety of similar objects; as a mango-tree has सजातीयभेद, several other mango trees of the similar type. So, बुद्धि, etc., although alike, are different in different individuals. But विज्ञान० explains it otherwise—अनेकत्वं सर्गभेदेन भिन्नत्वम्—सर्गद्वयसाधारण्यमिति यावत्। न पुनः सजातीयानेकव्यक्तिकत्वम्, प्रकृतावतिव्याप्तेः। प्रकृतेरपि सत्त्वाद्यनेकरूपत्वात्. The fallacy of विज्ञान० is pointed out by बालराम—प्रकृतेरनेकरूपत्वेऽप्यनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभावेन प्रकृतिप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावस्य प्रकृतावसम्भवात्, किञ्च—'अजामेकाम' इति श्रवणादप्रामाणिकं प्रकृतेरनेकव्यक्तिकत्वाभिधानमित्यस्थान एव व्यामोहो भिक्षोरिति। (pp. 121-122).

लिङ्गम्—According to गौड० and माठर, it means, that which merges into its primary cause. In addition to the above explanation, जय० and विज्ञान० give another alternative explanation, viz., that which indicates, or which is the characteristic of प्रधान. This is the sense taken by वाच० also. But प्रधान itself is a characteristic ( लिङ्ग ) of पुरुष. It is for this reason that वाच० remarks—प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं पुरुषस्य लिङ्गं भवदपीति भावः. On this, S. N. S. remarks that it "seems hardly adequate to the

contrast intended between the evolved and the unevolved." (p. 32, 1n.)

सावयवम्—वाच० explains it as अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि Why can there be no अवयवावयविसंयोग between प्रधान and बुद्धि, etc.? Because, between these, the relation is समवाय (=identity or तादात्म्य), and not संयोग. There can be no संयोग between the तन्तुs and the पट produced out of them. But, will there be any संयोग between बुद्धि and अहङ्कार, etc.? No commentator answers this, although, here also we can show that अहङ्कार, being a product of बुद्धि, stands in समवाय relation to बुद्धि. It is for this reason that गौड०, माठर and जय० explain the word अवयव as शब्द, रूप, स्पर्श etc.,. But they land themselves in another difficulty; for, the entire व्यक्त (viz., बुद्धि, अहङ्कार etc.) cannot be called as शब्दस्पर्शादिसम्पन्न. If it be urged that these शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in बुद्धि and the rest, then it may be pointed out that शब्द and the rest do reside in a latent form in प्रधान also. Even वाच०, who tries to avoid this difficulty, has illustrated this संयोग as—तथा हि पृथिव्याद्यः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते एवमन्येऽपि।

परतन्त्रम्—Although, each of the twenty-three तत्त्वs is subordinate to the other in the ascending order, yet, ultimately, all are subordinate to प्रकृति. Again, although बुद्धि is independent in producing अहङ्कार, and the latter in producing the इन्द्रियs and the तन्मात्रs, yet each one is ultimately dependent upon प्रकृति, the fountain-head of all energy.

## XI

त्रिगुणम्—The three गुणs or Attributes are the essence of प्रकृति; प्रकृति is nothing but these three गुणs in equilibrium. The kinds of temperaments observed in living beings may broadly be divided into three—spiritual, passionate and dull. Therefore, the सांख्य theory of three गुणs, although a mere hypothesis, is yet a very useful and appropriate hypothesis. Davies remarks—"In the system of Valentinus the

Gnostic, all men and all substances are divided into three classes: (1) spiritual, (2) the vital and (3) the material (Hylic). This corresponds to the *guṇas* of *kapila* and is probably an importation from India." ( p. 37, 2n. )

**विषयः**—The view-point of the *विज्ञानवादिन्* *बौद्ध* is that there is no existence of the external objects, except in mind. That is, concept and the object denoted by the concept are identical, because both are comprehended simultaneously. Things, which are not identical, are not necessarily comprehended simultaneously; cf. 'सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्वियोः । भेदश्च भ्रान्ति-विज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्द्राविवाद्भये ॥' (सर्वदर्शन०, p. 32), *वाचस्पति*'s refutation of this view has been thus illucidated by *बालराम*—*यत्र किलैकस्मिन्नेव योषिद्रूपे वस्तुनि रक्तद्विष्टविमूढानां जनानां विभिन्नानि सुखादिज्ञानानि जायमानान्युपलभ्यन्ते तत्र प्रमातृणां परस्परप्रतिसन्धानाद् वस्त्वैक्येऽपि ज्ञानानानात्वं दृश्यते । यदि हि वस्तु विज्ञानात्मकं भवेत् तर्हि विज्ञानस्यासाधारण्यादनेकविज्ञानालम्बनमेकं साधारणं वस्तु न सम्भवेत् । अतः वस्तुसाधारण्योपपत्तये विज्ञानातिरिक्तं तदभ्युपेयमिति ।* ( p. 128 ).

**अचेतनम्**—*बुद्धि* ( intellect ) is merely an instrument of Pure Intelligence or *चैतन्य*, and not identical with it, because *बुद्धि* is a material product of *प्रकृति*.

The phrase *तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान्* means that in some respects the Spirit is similar to *व्यक्त* and *अव्यक्त*, and in other respect it is different from *व्यक्त* and *अव्यक्त*.

Difference of *पुरुष* from *व्यक्त* and *अव्यक्त*—

व्यक्त and अव्यक्त	पुरुष
त्रिगुण	अगुण
अविवेकि	विवेकी
विषय	अविषय
सामान्य	असामान्य
अचेतन	चेतन
प्रसवधर्मि	अप्रसवधर्मि

Similarity of *पुरुष* to *व्यक्त* and *अव्यक्त* and difference of *व्यक्त* from *अव्यक्त*—

व्यक्त	अव्यक्त	पुरुष
हेतुमत्	अहेतुमत्	अहेतुमान्
अनित्य	नित्य	नित्य
अव्यापि	व्यापि	व्यापि
सक्रिय	निष्क्रिय	निष्क्रिय
अनेक	एक	अनेक
आश्रित	अनाश्रित	अनाश्रित
लिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग	अलिङ्ग
सावयव	निरवयव	निरवयव
परतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र	स्वतन्त्र

It should be noted that *गौड* and *माठर* say *पुरुष एकः*, which is opposed to the doctrine of *पुरुषबहुत्व*. *जय* and *वाच*, therefore, rightly point out that *पुरुष* is similar to *व्यक्त* with regard to *अनेकत्व*. After discussing this point, *Wilson* concludes— "Either, therefore, *Gaurapāda* has made a mistake, or by his *eka* is to be understood, not that soul in general is one only, but that it is single, or several, in its different migrations; or, as *Mr. Colebrooke* renders it ( *R. A. S. Trans. Vol. I., p. 31* ), 'individual'. So in the *Sūtras* it is said, 'that there may be various unions of one soul, according to difference of receptacle, as the ethereal element may be confined in a variety of vessels' ( *I, 150* ). This singleness of soul applies, therefore, to that particular soul which is subjected to its own varied course of birth, death, bondage and liberation; for, as the commentator observes 'one soul is born, not another (in a regenerated body)'. The singleness of soul, therefore, as asserted by *Gaurapāda*, is no doubt to be understood in this sense." ( p. 65 )

## XII

*गुण*s do not mean qualities residing in a substance, as understood in the *न्याय* and *वैशेषिक* systems. They are of the

nature of substance; they are the constituent elements of प्रकृति. Hence, वाच० says—गुणा इति परार्थाः. That is, they are called गुण (secondary), because they exist for the Spirit and not for themselves.

गौड०, माठर and जय० mention अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः also, while वाच० and चन्द्रिका add अन्योऽन्य before and वृत्ति after अभिभव, आश्रय, जनन and मिथुन each. वृत्ति according to वाच०, means क्रिया (operation). जय० explains वृत्ति as सुखादिरूपेण परिणतिः. According to गौड०, अन्योऽन्यवृत्तयः means परस्परं वर्तन्ते, i. e. are reciprocally present. माठर, however, seems to take वृत्ति in the sense of function. In a note on this word, Davies remarks—“ वृत्ति means state, condition, or manner of being, and the meaning is that each गुण may, in some circumstances, assume the nature of the others or be the same in effect.” (p. 36, 1n.)

गौड०, माठर and जय० quote one verse, viz., रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं, etc.; जय० ascribes this verse to विष्णुगीता, which it is difficult to identify, unless it stands for हरिगीता=भगवद्गीता. But there is no such verse in the भगवद्गीता. The verse found there is—रजस्तमश्चाभिभूय सत्त्वं भवति भारत । रजः सत्त्वं तमश्चैव तमः सत्त्वं रजस्तथा ॥ (XIV. 10). We find a similar verse in the अश्वमेध-पर्वन् of the महाभारत—तमसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः । रजसश्चापि सत्त्वं स्यात् सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं तमः ॥ (३६. ६).

### XIII

अर्थतः—जय० and वाच० explain it as पुरुषार्थतः, but गौड० takes it in the sense of साधना, and माठर explains it as कार्यवशात्.

Now, these गुण, on account of their having the characteristics of अन्योऽन्याभिभव, etc., assume different shapes. But, how do these गुण perform functions of so different a nature? In reply to this वाच० gives an example of a woman, who, according to him, illustrates all the different functions of the गुण. गौड०, माठर and जय०, on the other hand, illustrate सत्त्व by a lady, रजस् by warriors and तमस् by clouds. A virtuous

woman ( and therefore, a सात्त्विक type ) pleases her husband, pains her rivals and deludes the passionate people. The brave soldiers ( and therefore, representing रजस् ) of a king please their master, pain their opponents and delude the fugitives. The dark clouds covering the sky ( and therefore, a तामस type ) please the people suffering from heat, rouse activity among the peasants and delude the lovers in separation. But, there is one difficulty. The 3 गुण ( =प्रकृति or मूलकारण ) assume various shapes by permutation and combination. This amounts to saying that the मूलकारण is not one but many. Now, how does this position differ from that of the वैशेषिक who also assume the plurality of causes? Cf.—नन्वेवं मूलकारणस्य परिच्छिन्नासंख्यव्यक्तिकत्वे वैशेषिकमतादत्र को विशेष इति चेत्—The reply is कारणद्रव्यस्य स्पर्शादिराहित्यमेव ॥ ‘शब्दस्पर्शविहीनं तु रूपादिभिरसंयुतम् । त्रिगुणं तज्जगद्योनिरनादिप्रभवाप्ययम् ॥’ इति विष्णुपुराणादिभ्यः ॥ विज्ञान० ( I. 128 ).

But are not these गुण opposed to one another? The reply is—yes. Still they unite for पुरुषार्थ, as wick, oil and lamp. The illustration is not a happy one, as we do not find any apparent opposition between तैल, वर्ति and दीप in spite of the attempt of चन्द्रिका; cf.—दीपोपरि तैलपतनेन दीपनाशात् तैलमपि दीप-विरोधि, एवं वर्तिरपि स्वल्पकेन दीपनाशिकेति ॥ For this reason वाच० gives another example of this विरोध,—viz., यथा वा वातपित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्यकारिणः. बालराम quotes a parallel passage from the देवीभागवत ( 3. 9 )— “ प्रदीपश्च यथा कार्यं प्रकरोत्यर्थदर्शनम् । वर्तिसत्तैलं यथार्चिश्च विरुद्धाश्च परस्परम् ॥ २९ ॥ विरुद्धं हि तथा तैलमग्निना सह सङ्गतम् । तैलं वर्तिविरोध्येव पावकोऽपि परस्परम् ॥ ३० ॥ एकवस्थाः पदार्थानां प्रकुर्वन्ति प्रदर्शनम् ॥ ” ( pp. 139-140 ). Really speaking, there can be no विरोध of these गुण in any evolved thing ( say, a human body ). If at all there could be any विरोध, then it would be in the साम्यावस्था i. e. प्रकृति. In no परिणाम of प्रकृति are the गुण in equal quantity. On the other hand, there is predominance of one over the others. So, there is no तुल्यबलत्व in the विकार. Cf. रूपातिशया वृत्त्यातिशयाश्च परस्परेण विरुध्यन्ते सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते—( व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 15 ).

## XIV

The difficulty lies in the expression तद्विपर्ययाभावात्. गौड० and माठर explain it as—'on account of the absence of the contraries of त्रैगुण्य in the प्रधान, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान.' वाच० offers an alternative explanation—'on account of the absence of अविवेक्यादि in the contrary of व्यक्त, i. e., पुरुष, अविवेक्यादि resides in the प्रधान and its constituents.' चन्द्रिका adopts the second explanation. जय० also agrees with it. cf. त्रैगुण्यस्याभावेऽविवेक्यादयोरभावात् (?) । न हि निर्गुणस्य पुरुषस्याविवेक्यादिः संभवति । तस्मात् त्रैगुण्यादेवाविवेक्यादिः सिद्धः ॥ ( p. 20 ). The explanation of गौड०, as rightly pointed out by S. N. S. ( See p. 41, 1n. ), renders the other half of the कारिका redundant, because, it simply repeats the same argument.

## XV and XVI

The term भेद stands for the diverse forms of the evolved which differ from one another. As compared with its effects, a cause is unlimited and thus unmanifest. जय० uses a curious expression, ( संसर्गिन् ) for cause. It seems that the word संसर्ग stands for the union or contact of different effects in their cause; cf.—तस्मादेतेषामेकेन संसर्गिणा भवितव्यम् । यत्रैतेषां संसर्गस्तदव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति ( p. 21 ).

समन्वय = एकरूपता, similarity, or एकजात्यनुगम ( i. e. belonging to one genus ), according to जय०. गौड० understands समन्वय in the sense of 'inference—' यथा व्रतधारिणं बद्धं दृष्ट्वा समन्वयति, नूनमस्य पितरौ ब्राह्मणाविति । The explanation of समन्वयान् ( सां. सू. I. 131 ) as offered by विज्ञान०, viz., उपवासादिना क्षीणं हि बुद्ध्यादितत्त्वमन्नादिभिः समन्वयेन समनुगतेन पुनरुपचीयते ( i. e. intellect and the rest, emaciated by fast, are again strengthened by food, etc. ), 'does not directly fit in this Kārikā,' as rightly pointed out by Sovani ( p. 411 ).

कारणकार्यविभागात्—वाच० understands the word विभाग as 'emergence',—just as the jar, etc., emerge from the clay.

etc. जय०, माठर and गौड० explain it as 'separation' or 'distinction' between the functions of the cause and the effect;—just as you can bring water in a jar but not in clay. Thus, there is a distinction between a cause and its effect, because both serve different purposes ( पृथगर्थक्रियाकरणात् ). But, it is difficult to understand how one can conclude from this argument that तस्मादस्य कारणेन भवितव्यम्. जय० here quotes the explanation of some other commentary ( which is not traceable ) :—अस्मिन् व्याख्याने, 'कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेर्महदादि तच्च कार्यम्' इत्यनेनैवसिद्धत्वादन्यैरन्यथा व्याख्यायते—यदुपकरोति तत् कारणम्, यदुपक्रियते तत्कार्यम्, तयोर्विभागात्, उपकार्योपकारकभावादित्यर्थः । यथाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां चोपकार्योपकारकभावो बुद्धिकृत इव दृश्यते तदस्य कश्चिद् व्यवस्थापिता [पयिता] स्यात्, कुतोऽयं विभाग इत्यन्यथानुपपत्तेः ॥ ( pp. 21-22 ).

अविभागात् वैश्वरूप्यस्य—According to वाच०, गौड० and माठर, the term अविभाग means 'merging';—because this diverse evolved merges into the unevolved. जय० also quotes the opinion of some unknown commentator who adopts the reading आविभागे, where अविभाग means लय. जय०'s own explanation is different. It takes अविभाग in the sense of अविभक्त, and explains the phrase as—'because this diversity is produced out of unity.' cf. इह लोकेऽविभक्तादेकस्मादिक्षुद्रव्याद्रसफाणितगुडखण्डशर्करादिवैश्वरूप्यं नानात्वं दृश्यते..... एवमाध्यात्मिकानां बाह्यानां च वैश्वरूप्यम् । तस्मादेपामविभक्तेनैकेन भवितव्यम् । ( p. 22 ).

प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च—According to वाच० and जय०, these two expressions indicate the two kinds of प्रवृत्ति of गुणस, because गुणस are in constant modification—cf. परिणाभिनित्यता गुणानाम् ( व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. IV. 33 ). The first kind of modification is that सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् modify themselves as सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्. Here, the साम्यावस्था is intact; there is no creation. But, when there is a विषमपरिणाम ( or समुदय ), we have creation. Here सत्त्व and the rest combine with one another in different proportions, one predominating over the others. The other commentators take त्रिगुणतः and समुदयान् both, as referring only to the creative activity of प्रकृति.

## XVII

The reading *संहतपरार्थत्वात्*, adopted by Wilson, is not supported by गौड०, who reads *संघातपरार्थत्वात्*. Wilson's reading of the text is an obvious mistake (based upon, perhaps, the सां. सू.—*संहतपरार्थत्वात्*, I. 140), as it is not supported by any commentary.

*अधिष्ठानात्*—पुरुष is the *अधिष्ठानात्* of *प्रकृति*, as a charioteer is that of a chariot. *Question*:—But, a charioteer is active, and your पुरुष, being *निर्गुण* = *निष्क्रिय*, is not active; how can he become an *अधिष्ठानात्*? *Reply*:—It is not essential that only an active entity can move or urge anything. Sometimes mere proximity or contact brings about activity, as we see in the case of iron and load-stone. Cf. *तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठानत्वं मणिवद्* (सां. सू. I. 96). Or, mere presence also can bring about an activity, as in the case of a King. Cf.—

न च सर्वत्र तुल्यत्वं स्यात्प्रयोजककर्मणाम् ।

चलनेन ह्यसिं योद्धा प्रयुक्ते च्छेदनं प्रति ॥ ८५ ॥

सेनापतिस्तु वाचैव भृत्यानां विनियोजकः ।

राजा सान्निधिमात्रेण विनियुङ्क्ते कदाचन ॥ ८६ ॥

तस्माच्चलतोऽपि स्याच्चलने कर्तृतात्मनः ।

( कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक on मी. सू. I. 5,

Chowkhamba edn., p. 710 ).

बालराम thinks that this argument about the *अधिष्ठानत्व* of पुरुष answers all the criticisms brought forward by शङ्कराचार्य in his भाष्य on *रचनादुपपत्तेश्च* and *प्रवृत्तेश्च* ( ब्र. सू. II. 2. 1 and 2 ).

*कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च*—माउर assigns this *प्रवृत्ति* to *प्रधान*, whileas, वाच० and others take this *प्रवृत्ति* as belonging to the शास्त्र and the sages—*आगमानां महाधियां च* ॥

## XVIII

On जन्म and मरण, विज्ञान० says—जन्ममरणे चात्र नोत्पत्तिविनाशौ पुरुषनिष्ठत्वाभावात् । किन्त्वपूर्वेदेहेन्द्रियादिसंघातविशेषेण संयोगश्च वियोगश्च भोगतदभावनियामकाविति ( सां. सू. I. 149 ).

The view of the वेदान्तिन् is that one and the same आत्मन् assumes plurality on account of being conditioned by the different bodies. Cf. 'उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्यैव घटादिभिः ।' "उपाधिभिर्भयते न तु तद्धान् ।" "एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः ।' (सां० सू० I 150-152). माउर sets the पूर्वपक्ष in the following words:—इह केचिदाचार्या वेद्वादिन इति मन्यन्ते—, एकोऽयं पुरुषः सर्वशरीरेषूपलभ्यते मणि-सूत्रवत् । इह रसनायां यावन्तो मणयस्तेषु सर्वेष्वेकमेव सूत्रं प्रवर्तते । एवं मणिभूतेषु शरीरेषु किमेकः सूत्रभूतः परमात्मा, आहोश्चित् जलचन्द्रवत् पुरुष इत्येक एव बहुषु नदीकूपतडागादिष्विवोपलभ्यते इति ॥ Cf. पिमानन्द (सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन, p. 13, Chow. S. S. No. 246):—“आकृतिगर्भाशयभावसङ्गतिशरीरविभागाद्विभक्तवत्त्वात् सांख्याचार्याः कपिलासुरिपञ्चशिखपतञ्जलिप्रभृतयः पुरुषबहुत्वं वर्णयन्ति । वेद-वादिन आचार्या, हरिहरहरिष्यगर्भव्यासादय एकमात्मानं, तथा च श्रुतिः..... एक एव हि भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः । एकधा बहुधा चैव दृश्यते जलचन्द्रवत् ॥” ( This verse from ब्रह्मविन्दूपनिषद्, १. २, is quoted by विज्ञान० also on सां. सू. I. 153 ).

But, does not this doctrine of पुरुषबहुत्व contradict the श्रुतिः which lay down the unity of soul ( *i. e.* आत्मैक्य )? The सां. सू. says, No.—“नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो जातिपरत्वात् ” ( I. 154 ).—These scriptures speak of one आत्मन् in the sense of class notion. वाच० also tries to reconcile the अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोध as follows—“एकत्वश्रुतीनां च प्रमाणान्तरविरोधात् कथंचिदेशकालविभागाभावेन भक्त्याप्युपपत्तेः । प्रकृत्येकपुरुषनानात्वयोश्च श्रुत्यैव साक्षात् प्रतिपादनात् । 'अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बहीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः । अजो ह्येको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां मुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥' ( तै. आ. ६. १० ) ॥ ” तत्त्ववैशारदी, on यो. सू. II. 22.

Further on, says the सांख्य, if you are going to explain away this नानात्व by उपाधिस, then you will land yourself into another absurdity. For, as शरीर is the उपाधि of आत्मन्, so the limbs ( अवयव ) are the उपाधिस of a body ( a संघात ). And

when we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the वेदान्तिन् call these phenomena the births and deaths of the same body ?

### XIX, XX and XXI

माध्यस्थ्य or औदासीन्य is of seven kinds according to जय०—सप्तविधं चास्यौदासीन्यम् । तथा चोक्तम्—पश्यति शृणोति सर्वं करोति स्थितिं प्रसङ्गं च नापि । स्वतो न परतो...नोभयतश्चाप्युदासीनः ॥ जय०, further raises the question that if पुरुष is मध्यस्थ and अकर्ता, then how is he a भोक्ता ?—ननु च यद्यकर्ता तत्कथं भोक्तृभावादास्ति पुरुषः ? तथा चाहुः—बालहुताशनतरवः स्वयमकृतानां यथा हि भोक्तारः । पुरुषोऽपि विषयफलानां स्वयमकृतानां तथापि भोक्ता ॥ इति ।

अचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् etc. Intellect and the rest, although non-intelligent, seem to be intelligent, on account of the proximity of the Spirit. Thus alone can the experience—' I know ' be explained. Although the entire activity belongs to the Attributes ( transformed into महत्, अहङ्कार and the rest ), yet, on account of its reflection in the Intellect, the really indifferent Spirit seems to be active. Cf. उपरागात् कर्तृत्वं चित्सांनिध्यात् ( सां. सू. I, 164 ). The Spirit in its turn transfers its intelligence to matter. This transference is thus illustrated by various commentators—' यथाग्निसंयोगात् लोहमणिरित्युच्यते । ' ( जय० ) ' अनुष्णाशीतो घटः शीताभिरग्निः संसृष्टः शीतो भवति, अग्निना संयुक्त उष्णो भवति । ' ( माठर ) ॥ ' यथान्ययसोः परस्परं संयोगविशेषात् परस्परधर्मव्यवहार औपाधिको यथा वा जलसूर्ययोः संयोगात् परस्परधर्मारोपस्तथैव बुद्धिपुरुषयोरिति भावः । ' ( विज्ञान०, सां. सू. I, 164 ) ॥

अकर्तृत्व of पुरुष is further supported by जय० by the following quotation—प्रवर्तमानान् प्रकृतेरिमान् गुणांस्तमोऽभिभूतो विपरीतदर्शनः । अहं करोमीत्यनुधोऽभिमन्यते तृणस्य कुब्जीकरणेऽप्यनीश्वरः ॥ This quotation is found in the तत्त्वसमाससूत्रवृत्ति ( Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 124 ) and सांख्यतत्त्वविवेचन also ( ibid, p. 12 ) with slight variants.

वाच० connects दर्शनार्थं ( in पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ) with प्रधानस्य, and कैवल्यार्थं with पुरुषस्य. The other commenta-

tors take the line as it stands, i. e. पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं and प्रधानस्य कैवल्यार्थम्. While explaining ' त्रिसुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा ' ( सां. सू. II, 1 ). विज्ञान० also connects कैवल्य with प्रधान.

### XXII

In his भाष्य ( on यो. सू. II 19 ) व्यास describes the तन्मात्रs as the products of महत्त्व (—एते सत्तामात्रस्यात्मनो महत्तःपदविशेषपरिणामाः). But there the महत् should not be taken as the immediate cause ( i. e. producer ) of these तन्मात्रs. व्यास has himself said at another place ( यो. सू. I. 45 ) that these तन्मात्रs are the products of अहङ्कार.

माठर and गौड० hold that these तन्मात्रs singly produce the महाभूतs. The other commentators hold that each succeeding महाभूत is produced from the combination of the preceding तन्मात्रs. For example, शब्दतन्मात्र and स्पर्शतन्मात्र produce वायुः शब्दतन्मात्र, स्पर्शतन्मात्र and रूपतन्मात्र produce तेजस् and so on. But this theory of वाच० violates the orthodox पञ्चीकरण theory of the वेदान्तिन्s. The point is noticed by कल्पतरुकार, who says—

सम्प्रदायाध्वना पञ्चीकरणं यद्यपि स्थितम् ।  
तथापि युक्तिदृष्टत्वाद्वाचस्पतिमतं शुभम् ॥  
पृथिव्यनलात्मत्वं गगने पवने ऽपि चेत् ।  
रूपवस्त्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां चाक्षुषत्वं प्रसज्यते ॥  
अर्द्धभूयस्त्वतः क्षित्याद्यविभावनकल्पने ।  
व्यवहारयथाप्राप्ता मुग्धा पञ्चीकृतिर्भवेत् ॥  
अनपेक्ष्य फलं वेदसिद्धेत्येवेत्येते यदि ।  
त्रिवृत्कृतिः श्रुता पञ्चीकृतिर्न कचन श्रुता ॥

( quoted by वंशीधर in his comm. on तत्त्वकौमुदी, p. 293 Chow. S. S. ).

माठर gives a queer and fantastic derivation of the word अहङ्कार—चतुःषष्टिवर्णैः पराद्वैखरीपर्यन्ताभिधेयैर्यत्किमप्यभिधीयते बुद्ध्या समर्थं तत्सकलमायन्ताकारहकारवर्णद्वयग्रहणेनोपरिस्थितपिण्डानुकारिणा विन्दुना भूयितः प्रत्याहारन्यायेनाहङ्कार इत्यभिधीयते ॥

## XXIII


गौड० and माठर० curiously divide ज्ञान and वैराग्य into two kinds—internal and external. Sovani is right in criticising this classification ( p. 414 ), as ज्ञान means only प्रधानपुरुषान्यताज्ञान in this कारिका, and not the knowledge of the वेद and the rest. Similarly, the आभ्यन्तर-वैराग्य ( viz., प्रधानमप्यत्र स्वप्नेन्द्रजालसदृशमिति विरक्तस्य मोक्षेप्सोर्येदुत्पद्यते ) is the principal वैराग्य which leads to the बाह्यवैराग्य also. For, who will be indifferent towards the worldly objects unless he is मोक्षेप्सु ?

बालराम० does not read गरिमा in his text of तत्त्वकौमुदी. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी, जय०, माठर० and गौड० mention nine kinds of ऐश्वर्य's although each one ( except वाच० ) says अष्टविधमैश्वर्यम्. It seems, therefore, that बालराम's text is the correct one. Our edition of तत्त्वकौमुदी and वंशीधर's edition, however, combine ईशित्व and वशित्व and thus make the total eight.


जय० reads यत्रकामावशायित्वम् in place of यत्रकामावसायित्वम्, and derives it as—कामेनेच्छयावशेतुं शीलं यस्य स यत्रकामावशायी । तस्य भावः यत्रकामावशायित्वम् । अनेकार्थत्वात् धातूनां ' शी ' तिष्ठतौ वर्तते ।

## XXV

अहङ्कार is divided into three kinds —



This is the scheme adopted by वाच० and others. But विज्ञान० ( on सां. सू. II. 18 ) would have—



In support of his classification, विज्ञान० quotes from some स्मृति—

वैकारिकस्तैजसश्च तामसश्चेत्यहं त्रिधा ।  
अहंतस्वाद्विकुर्वाणान्मनो वैकारिकाद्भूत् ॥  
वैकारिकाश्च ये देवा अर्थाभिव्यञ्जनं यतः ।  
तैजसादिन्द्रियाण्येव ज्ञानकर्ममयानि च ॥  
तामसो भूतसूक्ष्मादिर्यतः खं लिङ्गमात्मनः ।

But this explanation is wrong; for सत्त्व and तमस् are inactive by themselves, and cannot produce anything unless helped by the mobile रजस्. वंशीधर's explanation, viz.,—' सम- इन्द्रियाणि मनोऽपेक्षयाऽल्पसत्त्वत्वेन राजसकार्यत्वेनैव स्मृतिषु निर्दिष्टान्यत्र तु व्यष्टीन्द्रियापेक्षयाऽधिकसत्त्वत्वेन सात्त्विकाहङ्कारकार्यतयोक्तानीत्यविरोधः । ' is very lame ( See सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदीटीका of वंशीधर. Chow. S. S., p. 343; see further बालराम, pp. 177-178 and Sovani, p. 415 ).

## XXVII

The first phrase उभयात्मकं, gives the general characteristic of the mind and the second phrase संकल्पकं मनः gives the proper function of the mind. गौड० interprets संकल्पकं as प्रवृत्तिं कल्पयति, i. e., which determines the functioning ( of the two sets of इन्द्रिय's ). वाच० understands संकल्पकं as विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन कल्पयति i. e. perceives the definite properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. जय० and चन्द्रिका agree with वाच०. What वाच० means is that all the senses of perception cognise their respective objects vaguely, and this is निर्विकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or simple-perception. But as mere simple-perception of an object is of no use in our every-day life, so the help of mind is

sought to give a definite and concrete shape to that percept. This is what is called सविकल्पकप्रत्यक्ष or complex-perception. The first is नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं आलोचनज्ञानं, and, therefore, निर्विकल्पक; the second is नामजात्यादिसंयुक्तं ज्ञानं, and, therefore, सविकल्पक. In his support, वाच<sup>०</sup> cites अस्ति ब्वालोचितज्ञानं etc., from कुमारिल's श्लोकवार्तिक (on मी. सू. I. 4., verses 112 and 120, pp. 168 and 172, Chow. S. S.).

The reading adopted by भट्टोत्पल is—संकल्पकमत्र मनः, तच्चेन्द्रियसुभयथा समाख्यासम् । (See S. N. S., p. 126; but he quotes संकल्पकमत्र मनः, उभयात्मकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् in J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 631). The Chinese version of the Sāmkhya Kārikā also reads "Manas is that which discerns" and thus agrees with भट्टोत्पल's reading. उभयात्मकत्व has been thus illustrated by परमार्थ—“It is in the same manner that a man can pass for an artisan or an orator at the same time.” (Tak. S. K., p. 35).

इन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्—जय<sup>०</sup> remarks :—यथान्यदिन्द्रलिङ्गं तथा मनोऽपीत्यर्थः. But वाच<sup>०</sup> criticises this view :—इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम्, न त्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् । महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात् । तस्माद्बुधुत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वं, न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ।

माठर reads ग्राह्यभेदाच्च in place of बाह्यभेदाच्च. This is noted by चन्द्रिका also. माठर's reading is preferable, because the second line of the कारिका lays down the reasons of the नानात्वं of इन्द्रियस, the two reasons being, गुणपरिणामविशेषात् and ग्राह्यभेदात्.

The question is—how can one अहङ्कार create these manifold इन्द्रियस whose functions differ? This question is raised by उद्योतकर in his न्यायवार्तिक (Chow S. S., p. 70)—यदि पुनरिन्द्रियाप्येकात्मकानि स्युः, कारणस्वभावानुविधानादैकात्म्याद्विषयव्यवस्था न स्यात्, सर्वे सर्वार्थमेकं वा सर्वार्थमिति स्यात् । The reply to it is—गुणपरिणामविशेषात्. Although अहङ्कार is one, yet the three गुणस, accompanied by धर्म and अधर्म, act and react upon one another; therefore, the modified effects of अहङ्कार (i. e. the इन्द्रियस) differ in their functions.

इह सांख्यानं स्वभावो नाम कश्चित् कारणमस्ति । This seems to be an interpolation or a mistake. In the first place, स्वभाव is not

recognised as a cause in the सांख्य philosophy. माठर, in his वृत्ति on the 31st कारिका says—इह सांख्ये पुरुषेश्वरस्वभावा न कारणम् । Secondly, even गौड<sup>०</sup> himself says so in the भाष्य on the 61st कारिका—सर्वकर्तृत्वात् कालस्यापि प्रधानमेव कारणम् । स्वभावोऽप्यत्रैव लीनः । तस्मात् कालो न कारणं, नापि स्वभाव इति । Whosoever is responsible for the mistake, he has continued his notion of स्वभाव being a कारण, further in the भाष्य. cf. अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण, नाहङ्कारेण, न बुद्ध्या न प्रधानेन; न पुरुषेण, स्वभावात् कृतगुणपरिणामेनेति ।

But if we compare माठर on the 31st कारिका, we find—अथैतन्नानात्वं नेश्वरेण न बुद्ध्या नाहङ्कारेण न प्रधानेन न पुरुषेण न स्वभावेन कृतम्, गुणपरिणामेनेति । On the basis of माठर's reading, I propose that we ought to read न स्वभावात्, कृतं गुणपरिणामेनेति । That is, this, नानात्वं is not caused by God.....or Spontaneity, but by the modification of the Attributes.

Wilson has translated it—“but from modification of qualities produced by spontaneity.” Keeping the text as it is, I have tried to steer clear of *spontaneity* as the cause. My translation is—“but is caused by the spontaneous modification of the Attributes.” But to have this sense even we ought to read स्वभावकृतगुणपरिणामेनेति.

परमार्थ seems to translate the word स्वभाव by 'Special Being' or 'a Special Dharma', which may be called "Being".

The reading गुणानामचेतनत्वान्न प्रवर्तते; प्रवर्तत एव is also faulty. I think we ought to read गुणानामचेतनत्वान्न प्रवृत्तिः; अस्त्येव प्रवृत्तिः ।

The following classification of the organs by परमार्थ, has no parallel in any commentary.

“Among the organs, there are those which apprehend objects close by while others perceive things from afar. Their object is double; (1) to avoid danger, (2) to protect the body. 'To avoid danger' (relates to the eyes and ears, which) in seeing and hearing from afar, avoid the danger. 'To protect the body' (relates to the eight other organs, which) perceive the eight species of objects, from each of the objects



approaching the corresponding organ; that permits us to regulate our body, according to these objects." (Tak. S. K., p. 37).

माठर reads रूपादिषु in place of शब्दादिषु in the text. बालराम also adopts this reading and observes :—चक्षुरादिक्रमेण पूर्वमिन्द्रियाणामभिधानात् ' शब्दादिषु ' इति पाठो न सन्निवेशितः । (p. 184, 1n.)

The word मात्र stands in the sense of "uniqueness" according to गौड° and माठर; but, according to वाच°, this word means "bareness." परमार्थ, seems to waver between the two senses. [See, Tak. S. K., pp. 37-38; S. N. S., p. 63, 1n. and J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632 (1)].

### XXIX

स्वालक्षण्यम् । गौड° and माठर read स्वालक्षण्यम् ।

सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च । Does the word करण stand for त्रिविध अन्तःकरण or त्रयोदशविध करण? While वाच° adopts the former view, all the other commentators agree to the latter interpretation, although माठर curiously says at one place—समस्तस्यान्तःकरणस्येत्यर्थः । विज्ञान° also explains the word करण as अन्तःकरण in his भाष्य (on सां. सू. II 31). But वाच°, while commenting on समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनम् (योगभाष्य on III 39), has given a different interpretation, viz., स हि प्रयत्नभेदः शरीरोपगृहीतमारुतक्रियाभेदहेतुः सर्वकरणसाधारणः यथाहुः ' सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ' इति । बालराम correctly points out the discrepancy. He suggests that योगभाष्येऽपि समस्तेन्द्रियशब्देनान्तःकरणत्रयमेव ग्राह्यं, न तु बाह्येन्द्रियमपि, because in deep sleep when all the external sense-organs are dormant, we see the five vital airs functioning. Therefore, these vital airs cannot be said to be the function of external sense-organs.

### XXX

Cognition has been divided into three kinds in the सांख्य philosophy, viz., perception (प्रत्यक्ष), inference (अनुमान) and valid testimony (शब्द). Now, in प्रत्यक्ष, the three अन्तःकरणस and one of the organs of sense,—all four seem to function

simultaneously and gradually. But, according to the नैयायिकस there are only gradual stages, which, however, are not observable on account of the swiftness of the different functions. Cf. ज्ञानायौगपद्योदकं मनः (न्या. सू. III. 2. 57), न युगपदनेकक्रियोपलब्धेः (ibid, III. 2. 58), अलतचक्रदर्शनवत् तदुपलब्धिवराशुसञ्चारात् (ibid, III. 2. 59). For, according to the नैयायिकस, the mind is अणुपरिमाण. The followers of सांख्य, on the other hand, regard the mind to be of मध्यमपरिमाण, and, therefore, there can be a युगपद्वृत्ति.

In the case of अनुमान and शब्द, only the three अन्तःकरणस function. They can operate simultaneously and gradually both, but they do not depend upon the cognition of senses at that particular moment.

### XXXI

आकूत—Davies observes :—' Ākūta is glossed in the Petersb, Lexicon by Absicht (= purpose), Antrieb (= motive). Colebrooke's translation is " incited by mutual invitation." ... ..The meaning of " incitement to activity," mentioned by Wilson, expresses more nearly the sense of ākūta.....It is composed of ā, to, towards, and kū, to cry. Gaudapāda says that it means ādarasambhrama ( respectful eagerness in action ). ' ( p. 68, 1n ).

Davies is wrong in considering that गौड° is correct in applying this verse to the three internal organs only ( See Davies, p. 68, 1n ). All the other commentators apply it to all the organs, for each and every इन्द्रिय functions for पुरुषार्थ.

The spirit of the सां. सू., " स हि सर्ववित् सर्वकर्ता " ( III. 56 ) and " ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा " ( III. 57 ), goes directly against the theory of the कारिकास, where no ईश्वर is mentioned. Nor is the position helped by विज्ञान°'s remark, viz., प्रकृतिहीनस्य जन्येश्वरस्य सिद्धिः ' यः सर्वज्ञः सर्वविद् यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः सर्वसम्मतेव, नित्यस्येश्वरस्यैव विवादास्पदत्वादित्यर्थः ॥.....नन्वेवमीश्वरप्रतिषेधविरोधस्तत्राह—' ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा ' । सांख्यमात्रेणेश्वरस्य सिद्धिस्तु सर्वसम्मतेत्यर्थः । ( सां. सू. III. 57 ).

The word पुरुषार्थ has been rendered as "The will of Spirit" by परमार्थ. The idea of the Spirit having a will is further strengthened by परमार्थ—"Spirit has this will: 'you have to manifest yourself, and find for me a solitary existence'. To obey this will of Spirit, the three guṇas produce all the organs. It is in accord with the will of Spirit that each one acquits itself of its appropriate function; besides the will of Spirit, there is not any other instigator." (Tak. S. K., p. 41) This soul of परमार्थ is more akin to the ईश्वर of the नैयायिकs who is endowed with इच्छा (and other गुणs); such a soul is foreign to सांख्य [ See also, J. R. A. S., July 1931, p. 632, (m) ].

### XXXII

The three functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting are, as Davies rightly points out ( pp. 69-70 ), common to all the organs. Thus " the organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed by an external object and manifests it to *manas*." ( *ibid* ). According to गौड०, आहरण and धारण belong to कर्मेन्द्रियs and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. माठर ascribes आहरण to इन्द्रियs in general, and धारण and प्रकाशन to अहङ्कार and बुद्धि respectively. वाच० followed by चन्द्रिका, would relegate आहरण to कर्मेन्द्रियs, धारण to बुद्धि, अहङ्कार and मनस्, and प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs. According to परमार्थ, आहरण belongs to अन्तःकरण, प्रकाशन to बुद्धीन्द्रियs and धारण to कर्मेन्द्रियs [see Tak. S. K., p. 42].

The word दशधा in the second half of this verse presents a difficulty. वाच० takes दशधा with आहार्य, धार्य and प्रकाश्य each. The objects *seized* by the इन्द्रियs, being only five, are doubled by dividing them into दिव्य and अदिव्य. Similarly, the body which is *retained* by the अन्तःकरण, is made up of five vital airs; but these are also दिव्य and अदिव्य, and so tenfold. The objects *manifested* by the बुद्धीन्द्रियs are also tenfold because of being divided into दिव्य and अदिव्य varieties. I think there is another and better way of explaining the कारिका. The objects

*seized, retained and manifested* are altogether ten, *viz.*, five objects of organs of action and five objects of organs of sense. These ten are supervised by the three internal organs.

### XXXIII

वाच० explains why काल is not recognised as a separate category in the सांख्य philosophy. According to the वैशेषिकमूत्र "अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपच्चिरं क्षिप्रमिति लिङ्गानि" (II. 2. 6), काल is one category which is divided into three parts—past, present and future—, according to different circumstances. प्रशस्तपाद् clarifies this point—" एकत्वेऽपि सर्वकार्याणामारम्भक्रियाभिनिर्वृत्तिस्थिति-निरोधोपाधिभेदान्मणिवत्पाचकादिवद्वा नानात्वोपचारः; that is, just as one and the same man is called a पाठक or a पाचक in different circumstances, or just as one and the same piece of crystal assumes different colours according to the objects placed near it, so all the effects, though of one nature, become different under the different circumstances of beginning, ending, remaining and perishing. Thus, there is only one काल. To this वाच० replies— Why should we first assume one काल and then assume different circumstances or उपाधिस to make this काल multifarious? Why should we not recognise the उपाधिस only? Cf. स खल्वयं कालो वस्तुशून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवाभासते—योगभाष्य on III, 52.

### XXXIV

अविशेष = non-specific, *i. e.*, तन्मात्रास. विशेष = specific, *i. e.*, पञ्चमहाभूतस.

### XXXV

The word द्वारि has been translated by S. N. S., as 'principal'. The translation is based upon जय०'s phrase द्वाराण्यस्य सन्तीति. I think that 'warder' expresses the sense of द्वारि better than 'principal'. For, in spite of the fact that all the sense-organs bring their percepts to the अन्तःकरण, the latter itself receives these percepts for delivering them to पुरुष, as

is clear from the next कारिका. The criticism of S. N. S. would have been right if अन्तःकरण were to retain these percepts for itself and not present them to the Spirit. Therefore, the three-fold अन्तःकरण acts as a warder for the Spirit and not as the principal (one). परमार्थ renders त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि as "the three internal organs master the gate." ( Tak. S. K., p. 44 ).

### XXXVII

वाच० interprets both the lines of this कारिका as the causes of the superiority of बुद्धि. गौड०, on the other hand, interprets the first line as the cause of the second;—because intellect brings about the entire enjoyment of the Spirit, therefore, it brings about also the discrimination between the Spirit and the Nature. माठर quotes the following speech of अहङ्कार.—

अहङ्कारो धियं ब्रूते मैत्रं सुप्तं प्रबोधय ।  
प्रबुद्धे परमानन्दे न त्वं नाहं न तज्जगत् ॥  
मयि तिष्ठत्यहङ्कारे पुरुषः पञ्चविंशकः ।  
तत्त्ववृन्दं परित्यज्य स कथं मोक्षमिच्छति ॥  
योऽसौ सर्वेश्वरो देवः सर्वव्यापी जगद्गुरुः ।  
देहीति पदमुच्चार्य हा मयात्मा लघुः कृतः ॥

माठर further remarks—न हि भगवतः कपिलस्य मते किमपि कर्तव्यमनुष्ठेयतया, किं तु सांख्यानां पञ्चविंशतितत्त्वज्ञानमेव साधर्म्येण वैधर्म्येण च निःश्रेयसहेतुः । उक्तं च—

इस पत्र लल मोद नित्यं विषयानुपभुञ्ज कुरु च मा शङ्काम् । यदि विदितं ते कपिलमतं तत्प्राप्त्यसे मोक्षसौख्यं च ॥ This verse is more of tirade against the सांख्य philosophy than an exposition.

### XXXVIII

Why तन्मात्राs are called अविशेषs?—This has been explained by गौड० and माठर as देवानामेते सुखलक्षणा विषया दुःखमोहरहिताः, which is wrong. For, तन्मात्राs, being evolved out of त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृति, cannot be said to be devoid of दुःख and मोह (= रजस् and

तमस्). Therefore, the explanation of वाच०, viz., न चैषां शान्तत्वादिस्त्युपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः, is better. That is, all the Attributes are present in the तन्मात्राs, but they are not patent enough to be enjoyed.

### XXXIX

The specific elements are divided into three divisions—“(1) Subtle body; (2) those which are born of father and mother; and (3) gross substances or inorganic matter..... It (subtle body) becomes 'specific' by the aggregation of the subtle elements which in themselves are 'non-specific' or diversified.” (Davies, p. 76). But, according to वाच०, सूक्ष्मशरीरं शान्तयोरमृदैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्दिशेषः ( Kār. 40 );—the subtle body is called specific because it is endowed with the sense-organs possessed of the qualities of calmness, violence and delusion.

### XL

पूर्वोत्पन्नम्—According to वाच०, each Spirit is endowed with a subtle-body at the beginning of the creation. But according to सां. स. सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम् ( III. 9 ), there is an aggregate of subtle-bodies which is created in the beginning. Cf. विज्ञान०. लिङ्गशरीरं, तच्च सर्गादौ समाष्टिरूपमेकमेव भवति, इत्यर्थः. Then, how do the subtle bodies separate? To this, the सूत्र replies—व्यक्तिभेदःकर्मविशेषात् ( III. 10 )—they are separated or differentiated according to particular actions. On this विज्ञान० comments—यद्यपि सर्गादौ हिरण्यगर्भोपाधिरूपमेकमेव लिङ्गम्, तथापि तस्य पश्चाद्द्वयक्तिभेदो व्यक्तिरूपेणांशतो नानात्वमपि भवति । But, is not this idea of हिरण्यगर्भ foreign to सांख्य ?

The word लिङ्ग is explained as प्रलयकाले महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं करणोपेतं प्रधाने लायते by गौड०. वाच० and माठर agree with it. But, परमार्थ means by it, “endowed with the mark of subtlety”, and explains it as:—“The subtle body migrates through the existences and it is what the sages alone see. (That is why one says it has the mark of subtlety).” ( Tak. S. K. P. 50 ).

According to this कारिका, the number of the constituents of लिङ्गशरीर is eighteen, but according to सूत्र, it is seventeen. विज्ञान० has ingeniously removed this discrepancy by saying—  
अहङ्कारस्य च बुद्धावेवान्तर्भावः ।

### XLI


A distinction should be made between लिङ्ग and लिङ्गशरीर. The latter is the vehicle of the former, which consists of thirteen principles, viz., intellect, ego, mind, five organs of sense and five organs of action, and which is referred to as अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः in the authority quoted by वाच०.

The reading of गौड० and माठर is विना अविशेषैः, whileas वाच० has विना विशेषैः. वाच० calls the सूक्ष्मशरीर as विशेष in Kārikā XL. So विना विशेषैः means विना सूक्ष्मैः शरीरैः. But this is confusing because, to say that the लिङ्ग (composed of thirteen principles) cannot exist without सूक्ष्मशरीर (composed of लिङ्ग and पञ्चतन्मात्राः) is not logical. गौड०'s explanation is better when he says that लिङ्ग cannot exist without अविशेषः viz., the five subtle elements.

The reading of परमार्थ also seems to be विना अविशेषैः, and he agrees with गौड० in explaining अविशेष as the five subtle elements. (Tak. S. K. p. 50). चन्द्रिका gives a different opinion of some commentator :—केचित्तु स्थूलशरीरावश्यकत्वाभिप्रायकामिदमिति वर्णयन्ति । तथा हि, लिङ्गं समुदायात्मकं लिङ्गशरीरं विशेषैः स्थूलदेहैर्विना निराश्रयं सन्न तिष्ठति, किन्तु स्थूलशरीरमाश्रित्यैव तिष्ठति । अतो न लिङ्गशरीरेण स्थूलशरीर-स्यान्यथासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

### XLIII

According to वाच० and जय० dispositions may be divided like this—



The प्राकृतभावs, which are innate, are of four kinds, viz., धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य. They belong to कपिल only. Those depending on the instruments (करणाश्रयिणः) are eight viz., धर्म, अयर्म, ज्ञान, अज्ञान, वैराग्य, अवैराग्य, ऐश्वर्य and अनैश्वर्य. Those dispositions which depend on the effect or body (कार्याश्रयिणः) are also eight, viz., five when the body is in the womb and three, i. e., childhood, youth and old age, when the body is outside the womb. गौड० and माठर, however, divide the भावs into three kinds—सांसिद्धिक, प्राकृत and वैकृत. धर्म, ज्ञान, वैराग्य and ऐश्वर्य are born along with कपिल, so they are सांसिद्धिक or innate in his case; but they come to सनक, सनन्दन, सनातन and सनत्कुमार (the four sons of ब्रह्मन्) after their birth, and are therefore, प्राकृत or natural in their case. The वैकृत or acquired dispositions reside in ordinary human beings and depend upon the instruments and the effected body.

परमार्थ, however, explains सांसिद्धिक-भावs "as the state acquired by goodness", i. e. acquired by good deeds performed in previous birth. But this does not agree with the case of कपिल, whose भावs are सहोत्पन्न.

### XLIV and XLV

According to माठर, the सूक्ष्मशरीर rises to the eight states by practising virtue. The states are ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य, ऐन्द्र, पित्र्य, गान्धर्व, याक्ष, राक्षस and पैशाच. गौड० gives सौम्य for पित्र्य, and याक्ष has been dropped in Wilson's text and ours, but is given in the Benares edition. By practising vice, the सूक्ष्मशरीर sinks to the five states of पशु, पक्षी, मृग, सरीसृप and स्थावर. The प्राकृतिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is due to the identification of the Spirit with प्रकृति itself; but माठर includes the eight kinds of evolvents (प्रकृतिस) in this bondage. The वैकारिकबन्ध, according to वाच०, is the identification of the Spirit with the विकारs of प्रकृति (i. e. the evolutes); but according to माठर, this bondage is brought about by making the eight states, viz., the ब्राह्म, प्राजापत्य and others, as the *summum bonum*. These three

kinds of bondages are explained by वाच० at length in his तत्त्ववैशारदी on योगभाष्य I. 24.

The word प्रकृति in प्रकृतिलयः, stands for महद्दृक्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि, according to वाच०; but, according to गौड० and माठर, the word denotes प्रधानबुद्धयहङ्कारतन्मात्राः .

### XLVI

For the criticism of Keith, see Sovani ( p. 424 ). This creation of intellect or “the conduct of the human understanding” ( Davies, p. 84 ), distinguished by Ignorance, Incapacity, Contentment and Attainment, is divided into fifty kinds.

गौड० and माठर illustrate all these four states by means of an example of post. There is विपर्यय, when you are in doubt, whether you are seeing a man or a post. There is अशक्ति, when even after seeing the post clearly, you are not entirely free from the doubt. There is तुष्टि, when you do not want to remove the doubt as to the identity of the post. There is सिद्धि when you succeed in establishing the correct identity of the post. The explanation of वाच० is better. विपर्यय is that which obstructs the path of the Spirit to liberation. “Incapacity (अशक्ति) arises from the imperfection of senses. Acquiescence or Contentment (तुष्टि) is a passive state of intellect. Perfection (सिद्धि) means perfect knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue.” ( Davies, pp. 84-85 ).

### XLVII

विपर्यय or अविद्या is of five kinds :—अविद्या, अस्मिता, राग, द्वेष and अभिनिवेश, which are called तमस्, मोह, महामोह, तामिस्र and अन्वतामिस्र by the कारिका.

### XLVIII

तमस् or अविद्या is of eight kinds and arises on account of identifying the Spirit with Nature, Intellect, Ego, and the five subtle elements.

मोह or अस्मिता is also of eight kinds. The gods and the rest consider the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि as the *summum bonum*.

महामोह or राग is of ten kinds and arises from the attachment to the objects of five senses; these objects are ten, five belonging to gods and five to human beings.

तामिस्र or द्वेष is of eighteen kinds, and arises from the hatred towards one or the other of the ten objects of sense ( mentioned above ) and the eight varieties of Attainment or सिद्धि.

अन्यतामिस्र or अभिनिवेश is also of eighteen kinds and arises from the fear of losing the eight सिद्धि or the ten objects of sense. Or it may be the fear of death which might obstruct the enjoyment of these eighteen objects. Cf. स चायमभिनिवेशः क्लेशः स्वरसवाही कृमेरपि जातमात्रस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरसंभावितो मरणत्रास उच्छेददृष्ट्यात्मकः पूर्वजन्मानुभूतं मरणदुःखमनुमापयति ( व्यासभाष्य on यो. सू. II. 9 ). “ मरणत्रासोऽन्वतामिस्र उच्यते । ” ( जय० p. 51 ).

Thus, there are 62 kinds of विपर्यय.

### XLIX

The quotation in वाच०, enumerating the list of the injuries to organs, is found with a variant ( सुग्धताः for मन्दताः ) in the सांख्यसंग्रह ( Chow. S. S. No. 246, p. 77 ). गौड० uses प्रसुप्ति ( or paralysis ) for कुष्ठ, and उपजिह्विका for जडता. Cf. “ जिह्वाया जाब्जम्,” in जय०, p. 52. माठर and गौड० adopt गुदावर्त for उदावर्त ( = obstruction of bowels ).

### L

माठर ( and not गौड०, as S. N. S. says, page 91, 1n ) reads आध्यात्मिक्यः in place of आध्यात्मिकाः. आध्यात्मिकाः is grammatically wrong, as आध्यात्मिक is derived from अध्यात्म + ठञ् (“ अध्यात्मादेश्चिञ्च्यते ” वार्तिक on पाणिनि IV. 3, 60). आत्मनि = अध्यात्मं, is an अव्ययीभाव compound in the sense of locative case, according to “ अव्ययं विभक्ति० ” पाणिनि II. 1. 6. Then the feminine termination ङीप् ( and not

यप्) is added to आध्यात्मिक by the सूत्र of पाणिनि, “टिड्ढाणञ्” IV. 1. 15 and the form will be आध्यात्मिकी.

The names of external varieties of Contentment vary with different commentators:—

	वाच०	जय०	माठर	गौड०
1.	पारम्	सुतारम्	तारम्	सुतमः
2.	सुपारम्	सुपारम्	सुतारम्	पारम्
3.	पारापारम्	lost	सुनेत्रम्	सुनेत्रम्
4.	अनुत्तमांभः	अनुत्तमांभः	सुमरीचम्	अनुत्तमांभासकम्
5.	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभः	उत्तमांभसिकम्	नारीकम्

If अर्जन, रक्षण, क्षय, भोग ( or संग, according to गौड० ) and हिंसा are named in the order given above, then गौड० calls the last two as नारीक and अनुत्तमांभसिक respectively—, which is against the order observed by other commentators. My teacher, the late Mahāmahopādhyāya P. Rāmāvatāra S'arma has tried to explain these varieties of तुष्टि as follows:—  
धनार्जनदुःखपारप्रापयितृत्वात् पाराख्येयं तुष्टिः । ..... अर्जनदोषदर्शनेऽपि कदाचिद्भोगाभिलाषेण प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्, रक्षणभयार्तस्य तु प्रवृत्तेरतितरामसंभव इति तदीयायास्तुष्टेः सुपारता, क्षयं भावयतः कदाचित् प्रवृत्तिः कदाचिदप्रवृत्तिः इति तदीया तुष्टिः पारावाराख्या ( read पारापाराख्या? ), भोगे रोगभयं भावयतस्तुष्टिः स्वार्थपरेति तस्या उत्तरेतराम्भस्त्वम्, हिंसादोषतस्तस्यास्तुष्टेस्तु कारुण्यमूलकत्वादुत्तमांभस्त्वम् ॥ बालराम, pp. 219-220.

The nine तुष्टिs are thus translated into Chinese.

- (1) अम्भः = lubricating water.
  - (2) सलिलम् = moving water.
  - (3) ओषः = running water.
  - (4) वृष्टिः = lake water.
  - (5) सुतमः = water [which has] well penetrated.
  - (6) पारम् = water easy to cross.
  - (7) सुनेत्रम् = water which gushes well.
  - (8) नारीकम् = transparent water.
  - (9) अनुत्तमांभसिकम् = excellent and pure water.
- (Tak. S. K. p. 62)

I am tempted to quote the interesting explanation of these terms given by Fuji, the Japanese commentator, and quoted by Mr. Suryanarayana Sastri in Tak. S. K., p. 62, 1n.


(1) 'lubricating water,' because *Nature* penetrates all, as water lubricates all; (2) 'moving' because by the *necessary* objects one purifies oneself as water which is moving and of little depth purifies all; (3) 'running', because with *time* a river joins the ocean; (4) 'lake-water', because the *influence* of the acts committed in other existences is like the water of the lake which the rain refills; (5) 'well-penetrated' because one renounces the *acquisition* of riches, as a desiccated ground is irrigated by water; (6) 'easily crossed', because one has not to occupy oneself any more with *protecting*, as [in the case of a piece of] water that has been crossed; (7) gushes without ceasing; (8) 'transparent', for there is no more *attachment*; (9) 'excellent and pure', for not to *injure* others is like water of the purest and most excellent quality.

## LI

No commentator has given the names of असिद्धिः; जय० which gives them—तासां चासिद्धीनां मोषसुष्णमानरमित्यायाः (?) संज्ञाः—, has a defective reading.

वाच० criticises the view of some writer in para 237. This view, as has been shown by me in my article (“Jayamaṅgalā and other commentaries on the Sāṅkhya-Kārikās”, Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, iii, p. 429), belongs to जय०; this point is of great importance for the question of the relative chronology of the different commentaries. I have discussed it in my article referred to above.

Following is the scheme of the division of सिद्धि according to वाच०



The last three are the effects of all the remaining five together.

परमार्थ's original gives a very beautiful tale in explaining how दान secures सिद्धि.

“ A brāhmin is hated by others. and he sees it, he becomes an ascetic; when he has become an ascetic, his master and his fellow-disciples also hold him in hatred and do not communicate knowledge to him. Conscious of his little chance, he betakes himself to a distant village to remain there, saying to himself : ‘ In this village, there are no brāhmins; I can pass there my summer(varṣa)retreat.’ During his sojourn, one makes him many gifts. He gives the superfluous to his friends and to his acquaintances. He gives of it even to women and to shepherds. All the inhabitants of the village cherish him. At the end of the summer-retreat, everybody makes gifts to him : the triple staff, the water bowl, clothes etc.; at the approach of a festival of Śakra, he says to the villagers: ‘ Who wishes to accompany me to my native country to be present there at the festival? Those who wish to accompany me should bring each one a gift for

me.’ Arrived at his place, he betakes himself to his old master. Choosing the best gifts, he makes an offering of them to him. Then, the master, the fellow-disciples and the others commence to love him. His master, by way of gift, communicates knowledge to him. By that knowledge he arrives at absolute knowledge and final Deliverance. That perfection then is acquired by gifts.” (Tak. S. K. p. 65)

These eight सिद्धि, viz. तार, सुतार, etc. are thus translated by परमार्थ.

- (1) तार = Crossing by oneself.
- (2) सुतार = Crossing well.
- (3) तारतार = Crossing all.
- (4) प्रमोद = Crossing with joy.
- (5) प्रसुदित = Crossing with an excessive joy.
- (6) प्रमोदमान = Crossing with full joy.
- (7) रम्यक = Crossing by love.
- (8) सदाप्रसुदित = Crossing by universal love.

परमार्थ adds to it a lengthy explanation of his own which slightly differs from the original commentary at places. For instance, the दान-सिद्धि, which is equal to सदाप्रसुदित, is explained by परमार्थ thus:—

‘ Crossing by universal love’. A man of this class, after having been hated by all, gives in alms all his goods and thus makes himself loved by all. Since all wish him to attain Deliverance, one says in this case ‘ Crossing by universal love.’

While वाच० construes अङ्कुश as निवारक and refers by it to विपर्यय, अशक्ति and तुष्टि, विज्ञान० (on सां. सू. III. 44) explains अङ्कुश as आकर्षक and refers by it to the three सिद्धि, viz. ऊह शब्द and अध्ययन, leaving सुहृत्प्राप्ति and दान as of secondary importance. He criticises वाच० as follows—कश्चित्वेतासामग्रसिद्धीनामङ्कुशो निवारक-पूर्वस्त्रिविधो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिरूपो भवति बन्धकत्वादिति व्याचष्टे तत्र । तुष्टय-

भावस्याशक्तिया बाधिर्यादिवत् सिद्धिविरोधितालाभेन तुष्ट्यतुष्ट्योः सिद्धिविरोधि-  
स्वासंभवात्. In reply to this it may be said that तुष्टि and अतुष्टि  
are not mutually contradictory, but positive धर्मस. See Sovani  
p. 427.

## LII

The word लिङ्ग has been explained as महत्त्वं बुद्धिरिति by  
विज्ञान (on सां. सू. III 45). But this is not correct. वाच० is  
right in explaining it as referring to the objects of senses and  
the two bodies—subtle and gross. Davies remarks :—  
“Some commentators make the *līṅga* itself to be *Buddhi*  
(intellect) and *bhāvas* to be its conditions. The former  
interpretation (i. e. वाच० H.) is preferable, for the *līṅga*, though  
formed of intellect and other internal organs, is yet something  
different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the  
state of a former life, which is due to ‘intellect’. (p. 90).

Curiously enough, Colebrooke translates न विना लिङ्गेन भाव-  
निवृत्तिः as ‘without person there would be no *pause* of disposi-  
tions.’ This is accepted by Wilson also in his translation of  
the गौड०. But, the word in the text is निवृत्ति and not निवृत्ति.  
I have, therefore, translated it as ‘without *līṅga*, there can be  
no *elaboration* of dispositions.’ Because, virtue and the rest  
are acquired by the formation of gross and subtle bodies.  
The Spirit cannot experience or acquire virtue or vice. For  
this purpose, there is always the necessity of gross and subtle  
bodies. Therefore, Wilson’s explanation ‘but is equally  
necessary for their occasional *cessation*’ (p. 216) is quite beside  
the mark. (See also Davies, p. 89 with 1n; S. N. S., p. 97).

## LIV

सत्त्वविशाल means where सत्त्व predominates. It may be  
asked why this state should not be the human goal, why  
should men hanker after मोक्ष? To this the सूत्र replies :—  
आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्देयः (सां. सू. III 52). विज्ञान explains

it as—तत्राप्यूर्ध्वगतावपि सत्यामावृत्तिरस्त्यत्र उत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्दोषोऽधोयोनि-  
जन्मनः सोऽपि लोको हेय इत्यर्थः. This very idea is expressed in  
the next कारिका.

According to गौड० there are sixteen forms of creations—  
“that is, apparently, each of the four classes of beings  
proceeds from four modifications of nature; or from the invi-  
sible principles, from the subtle rudiments, from conditions  
or dispositions of intellect and from the gross elements.”  
(Wilson, p. 220). It seems that गौड० takes दैव, मानुष and  
तैर्यग्योन (= two, जङ्गम and स्थावर), and divides each of them  
into four classes, viz., अभौतिक, लिङ्ग, भाव and भूत.

The phrase ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः refers to all the three creations  
above, in the middle and below. Davies thinks (p. 90, 2n)  
that Wilson construes this phrase with मध्ये रजोविशालः. There-  
upon, Davies remarks, ‘Brahmā does not belong to it (i. e.  
midst), but to the region “above”’. I think Davies has  
misunderstood Wilson who does not distinctly join the two  
phrases given above. (See Wilson, p. 220). परमार्थ explains  
ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः as “Brahmā is at the commencement and pillar  
at the end.” He goes on to explain स्तम्ब—“Why is the last  
of all the creations called ‘pillar’? Because the herbs, trees,  
mountains, rocks etc., support the three worlds; that is why  
one calls it ‘pillar.’” (Tak. S. K., pp. 69-70).

## LV

पतञ्जलि also expresses the same idea—‘परिणामतापसंस्कार  
दुःखैर्गुणवृत्तिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः’ (यो. सू. II. 15). Compare  
also, समानं जरामरणजं दुःखम् (सां. सू. III. 53).

स्वभावेन is explained by चन्द्रिका as स्वत एव सर्गो दुःखरूपः,  
विवेकिनामिति शेषः।

माठर reads अत्र in place of तत्र, and समासेन in place of  
स्वभावेन in the text. The former term he explains as त्रिषु लोकेषु  
and the latter as संक्षेपेण.



## LVI

The illustration of a cook cited by वाच० and the ( सां. सू. III 63 )—विविक्तबोधात् मृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सूद्वत् पाके, has got this disadvantage that सूद्व is चेतन. The illustration of गौड० viz., यथा कश्चित् स्वार्थं त्यक्त्वा मित्रकार्याणि करोति, has the same disadvantage. The second illustration of गौड०, viz., तथा चोक्तं कुम्भवत् प्रधानं पुरुषार्थं कृत्वा निवर्तते, is better, because कुम्भ is non-intelligent.

चन्द्रिका quotes two योगसूत्रs in support of the purport of this कारिका—“ तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा ” ( II 21 ) and “ कृतार्थं प्रति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् ( II 22 ).

## LVII

माठर, गौड० and जय०, interpret this कारिका as illustrating the प्रवृत्ति and निवृत्ति ( of प्रधान ) both, while as वाच० speaks of प्रवृत्ति only.

## LVIII

औत्सुक्य means इच्छा; but it is only a blind instinct or activity, which is the nature of the three गुणs in सांख्य philosophy. It is not the इच्छा of the नैयायिकs according to whom it is the quality of a sentient being. परमार्थ explain औत्सुक्य as 'incertitude'. ( Tak. S. K. p. 72 ).

## LXI

This कारिका has given rise to a great controversy. With whom should we construe the word मे ? Is it पुरुष which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति or is it प्रकृति itself which feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than myself ? The first meaning is adopted by माठर ; वाच० and गौड० would seem to mean that it is the author of the कारिका who feels that there is nothing सुकुमारतर than प्रकृति.

The next difficulty is about the meaning of the term सुकुमारता. जय० explains it by 'subtlety', वाच० and माठर, by 'bashfulness', and गौड० by 'enjoyability'.

Again, in the 59th कारिका, प्रकृति is compared to a नदी but here to a कुलवधू.

As to the existence of another कारिका on the basis of गौड०, see my foot-note to the text of the कारिका and introduction

“ पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ”—वाच० explains it as—अप्रमत्तां यथैनां परपुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति । This is not a good interpretation. गौड० is much nearer the mark when he says—अहमनेन परपुरुषेण दृष्टास्मीत्यस्य पुंसः पुनर्दर्शनं नोपैति ।

## LXIII

Prof. Suryanarayana Sastri remarks ( see Tak. S. K. p.77 ), “ This verse is lacking in the Chinese text. That is perhaps an interpolation posterior to the time of Paramārtha ( 546 ), though I cannot give the special reason for it. One may, however, affirm that the original of the Chinese translation did not contain that verse, for there is no room to suppose that the translator had by error jumped over this verse and the commentary, if all the time there had been one. This verse is found in the Sūtra, III. 73. ”

On page 58 of our text, read एतानि सप्त प्रोच्यन्ते धर्मः, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यं in place of धर्मः, ज्ञानं, वैराग्यं, ऐश्वर्यम्.

## LXIV

The word तत्त्वाभ्यास, according to जय०, गौड० and माठर, means the अभ्यास or practice of the twenty-five तत्त्वs. वाच० clarifies this अभ्यास as तत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यास, which leads to the realisation of the distinction between पुरुष and प्रकृति.

The following scheme shows the different interpretations of the phrases नास्मि, न मे and नाहम्, as given by various commentators.—

	वाच०	माठर	गौड०	जय०
नास्मि	अहं क्रियावान् नास्मि ।	नास्मि तत्त्वानि ।	नाहमेव भवामि ।	सूक्ष्मशरीरे भौतिके च न भवामि, अपि तु प्रकृतिः ।
न मे	न मे स्वामिन्नास्ति ।	न मे तत्त्वानि ।	न मम शरीरम्, यतोऽहमन्यः, शरीरमन्यत् ।	न ममदमपि तु प्रकृतेः ।
नाहम्	अहं कर्ता न	नाहं तत्त्वानाम् ।	अहङ्काररहितोऽहम् ।	नाप्यहं प्रकृतिः ।

## LXVI

प्रयोजनं नास्ति सर्गस्य—The idea is that भोग and विवेक are for the purpose of the Spirit (*i. e.*, पुरुषार्थs). They urge the Nature into activity. But, after the Spirit has enjoyed the products of Nature and has attained the discriminative knowledge, there remains no other purpose of the Spirit. भोग and अपवर्ग are no more पुरुषार्थs. So, in the case of *this particular Spirit*, भोग and अपवर्ग cannot urge the Nature into activity.

## LXVII

S. N. S. remarks—“ Curiously enough, Paramārtha seems to understand this verse without importing any notion of *jivanmukti*. His rendering runs thus: Because of full and perfect knowledge, dharma, etc., have no longer any influence; transmigration is arrested like the body (or force) of the potter's wheel, whose motion one interrupts: see B. F. E. O., IV, 1056. This is, of course, hardly satisfactory.” (p. 116, 1n).

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