A LECTURE

ON THE

SA'NKHYA PHILOSOPHY,

EMBRACING THE TEXT

OF THE

TATTWA SAMA'SA.

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PREFACE.

This Lecture, delivered in the session of 1849, is a sequel to those on the Nyáya Philosophy delivered to the senior class of pupils in the English Department of the Benares College, in 1848, "with the view of introducing them to the philosophical terminology current among their learned fellow-countrymen the pandits."

For selecting the *Tattwa-samása* as the text-book, there were two motives—the simplicity of its arrangement, and the extreme rarity of the work. Mr. Colebrooke (at p. 233. vol. 1st of his Essays) speaks of it as being uncertain whether the work were still extant; and few of the pandits appear to know it except by name.

J. R. B.

Benares College, 31st July, 1850.

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A LECTURE

ON THE

SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

No. 1.—[The founder of the Sánkhya school of philosophy was Kapila. Two treatises are attributed to him—the Sánkhya-pravachana and the Tatwa-samása. The latter will form the text of the following observations. The commentary commences thus:—]

श्री गणेशाय नमः। श्री कपिलमुनये नमः। पष्चविंशिति त-त्वेषु जन्मना ज्ञानमाप्तवान्। श्रादिमृष्टी नमस्तसी कपिलाय मचर्षये ॥

चयातसन्वनमानाखनांखनृ चाणि व्याखास्यामः ॥

No. 2.—Salutation to Ganes'a! Salutation to the great sage Kapila! Salutation to that great sage Kapila who, at the first creation, obtained, merely by birth, a knowledge of the twenty-five principles (tatwa).

Now we shall explain the aphorisms of the Sánkhya, which constitute what is called the Compendium of Principles.

[In saying that Kapila obtained his knowledge "merely by birth," the author means that Kapila differed from those other tea-

chers who, after being born, received instruction before they were qualified to teach. Kapila is regarded as an incarnation of the deity.]

द्व कश्चिद्भाद्मणिस्त्रिविघेन दुःखेनाभिभूतः सांख्याचार्यः कपि-लमद्दि ग्ररणसुपागतः । खकुलनामगोचं खाध्यायार्थं निवे-द्याद्य । भगवन् किमिद्य परं। किं यायातथ्यं । किं छत्वा छत्रक्रयः स्थामिति । कपिल उवाच । कथियथामि ।

No. 3.—A certain bráhman, aggrieved by the three kinds of pain, had recourse to the great sage Kapila, the teacher of the Sánkhya. Having declared his family, his name and race, and his desire of instruction, he said—"Holy Sir! What is of all things the most important? What is actual truth? And what must I do in order that I may have done what is fitting to be done?" Kapila replied—"I shall tell you."

[The Aphorisms of Kapila here follow.]

श्रष्टी प्रक्रतयः ।१॥ षोडश विकाराः ।२॥ पुरुषः ।३॥ चेगुः एवं ।४॥ संचरः ।५॥ प्रतिसंचरः ।६॥ श्रध्यातमं ।०॥ श्रधिभूतं ।८॥ श्रधिदेवतं ।८॥ पश्चाभिबुद्धयः ।१०॥ पश्च कर्मयोनयः । ११॥ पश्च वायवः ।१२॥ पश्च कर्मात्मानः ।१३॥ पश्चपवीविद्या ।१४॥ श्रष्टविश्वातिधाश्रतिः ।१५॥ नवधा तृष्टिः ।१६॥ श्रष्टः ।१८॥ धा सिद्धिः ।१०॥ दश्या स्विकार्थाः ।१८॥ श्रत्युष्टसर्गः ।१८॥ चतुदश्विधो भूतसर्गः ।२०॥ चिविधो धातुसंसर्गः ।१९॥ चिविधो धातुसंसर्गः ।११॥ चिविधो बन्धः ।२२॥ चिविधो मोचः ।२३॥ चिविधं प्रमाणं ।२४॥

चिविधं दुःखं।२५॥ एतद्यायातव्यं।.एतत्सम्यक् ज्ञात्वा कतकः त्यः स्थात् न पुनिस्तिविधेन दुःखेनाभिभूत इति तत्त्वसमासास्य-सांस्थमूचाणि ॥

No. 4.—"(1) The eight 'producers' (prakriti); (2) the six-"teen 'productions' (vikára); (3) 'Soul' (purusha); (4) the "'triad of qualities' (traigunya); (5) 'emanation' or 'develope-"ment' (sanchara); (6) 're-absorption' or 'dissolution' (pratisan-"chara); (7) the 'ministers of Soul' (adhyátma); (8) the 'pro-"vince of an organ' (adhibhúta); (9) the respective 'presiding "deity' (adhidaivata); (10) the five 'perversities of understand-"ing" (abhibuddhi); (11) the five 'sources of action' (karmma-"yoni); (12) the five 'airs' (váyu); (13) the five 'which consist " of action' (karmmátma); (14) 'ignorance' (avidyá) under five "divisions; (15) 'disability' (as'akti) of twenty-eight kinds; (16) "'acquiescence' or 'indifference' (tushti) of nine kinds; (17) " 'perfectness' (siddhi) of eight kinds; (18) the 'radical facts' " (mulikártha) of ten kinds; (19) 'benevolent nature,' (anugra-"ha-sarga); (20) 'created existences' (bhúta-sarga) of ten des-" criptions; (21) 'parental creation' (dhátu-sansarga) of three dis-"criptions; (22) three-fold 'bondage' (bandha); (23) three-fold "'liberation' (moksha); (24) three-fold 'proof (pramána); (25) "three-fold 'pain' (du'kha):— in this consists all actual truth. " He who shall have thoroughly understood this, will have done " all that is to be done. He will not again be obnoxious to the "three sorts of pain."

Such are the Aphorisms of the Sánkhya, entitled the 'Compendium of Principles.'

[The commentator then proceeds to dilate on each of the foregoing topics.]

No. 5.—Now which are those eight 'producers'? To this it is replied—(1) the 'undiscrete' (avyakta); (2) 'intellect' (buddhi); (3) 'self-consciousness' (ahankara); and (4—8) the five 'subtile rudiments' (tan-matra);— these are the eight 'producers.'

[Each of these eight 'producers' is now taken up in its order.]

तचाव्यतं तावदुच्यते। यथा लेकि श्रव्यन्ते घटपटकुट श्रयनका-द्या न तथा व्यव्यते द्रत्यव्यतं । स्रोचादिभिरिन्द्रियेने गृद्यते द्रत्यर्थः। कसात्। अनादिमध्यान्तत्वा निरवयवत्वाच। श्रय-ब्दमस्पर्धमरूपमव्ययन्तयाच नित्यं रसगन्धविक्वतं । श्रनादिमध्यं महतः परं श्रुवं प्रधानमेतत्प्रयदन्ति द्वरयः। स्ट्रममिक्गंगमनादि-निधनं तथाप्रसवधामें निरवयवमेकमेव हि साधार स्रमेतदव्यक्तं।

No. 6.—Now the 'undiscrete' is described. As, in this world, jars, webs, vases, and couches are made manifest, not so is the 'undiscrete':—that is to say—it is not apprehended by the hearing or by any other sense. Why? Because it has neither beginning, middle, nor end; nor is it made up of parts. The inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, and likewise eternal, devoid of savour and odour,—without beginning or middle, anterior in order to mind, firm and chief—thus do the learned designate it. Subtile, devoid of characteristic attributes, unconscious, without beginning or end,—so too whose nature it is to produce, without parts, one only, the common [source of all]—such is the 'undiscrete.'

श्रयक्तस्थानी पर्यायश्रव्दा भवन्ति । श्रयक्तं । प्रधानं । ब्रद्धा । पुरं । ध्रुवं । प्रधानकं । श्रव्यरं । चेचं । तमः । प्रधानकं ।

No. 7.—Synonymes of the 'undiscrete' are the following—viz: the 'undistinguished,' 'unseparated,' or 'imperceptible' (avyakta); the 'chief' (pradhána); the 'source of emanation' (brahma): the 'receptacle' or 'abode,' (pura); the 'permanent' (dhruva); the 'chief,' or 'that in which all generated effect is comprehended' (pradhánaka); the 'indestructible' (akshara); the 'site' or 'field' (kshetra); 'darkness' (tamas); the 'productive source' (prasúta).

[Several of these terms are not, strictly speaking, synonymes, further than as they are all applicable to the 'undiscrete'. They are epithets employed for reasons which may appear in the sequel. A similar remark applies to the various lists of synonymes which will be met with further on.

We now come to the second of the eight 'producers' (No. 5)
—viz 'intellect'.]

का बुिंडरची खाते । अध्यवसायी बुिंडः । से ऽयमध्यवसायी वे डिंडा । से ऽयमध्यवसायी वे विद्या । से इयोषु यस्मात्प्रतिपत्तिः । एवमेतन्नान्यया । गौरे-वार्यं नास्तः । स्थाणुरेवायं न एक्षः । द्रत्येषा बुिंडः ।

No. 8.—What is 'intellect'? To this it is replied—'intellect' is 'ascertainment' (adhyavasáya). This it is from which, in regard to a cow or any other thing, there is the determination 'This is so and so, and not otherwise'—'This is a cow, not a horse'—'This is a post, not a man.' Such is 'intellect' or 'understanding.'

[The various aspects under which this faculty is regarded as presenting itself, are next specified.]

अस्यास्त बुद्धेरष्टी रूपाणि भवन्ति धर्मी ज्ञानं वैराग्यमैश्वर्याम-ति ।

No. 9.—Of this 'intellect' there are eight forms—(1) 'virtue' (dharma); (2) 'knowledge' (jnyána); (3) 'dispassion' (vairágya); (4) superhuman 'power' (aiswarya)—[the remaining four being the opposites or negatives of these. See No. 14.]

तच धर्मो नामाधर्मविषयंयः श्रुतिस्मृतिविष्टितः श्रिष्टाचारा-विरुद्धः श्रुभलचणः।

No. 10.—'Virtue' (dharma) is the opposite of 'vice' (adharma); it is what is enjoined in the 'scripture' (s'ruti) and in the 'law' (smriti); not opposed to the practice of the pious—of which the symptom is felicity [—prosperity being regarded as the fruit of former virtue, and adversity as that of former vice.]

ज्ञानं नामा ज्ञानविषयेयः । तत्वमावभूतानां सम्बोधः ।

No. 11,—'Knowledge' (jnyána) is the opposite of 'ignorance' (ajnyána)—an acqaintance with the 'principles' (tatwa), the 'forms' of intellect (bháva-No. 9.), and the 'elements' (bhúta-No 31.)

वैराग्यं नामावैराग्यविपयंयः । शब्दादिविषये ध्वप्रसितः ।

No. 12.—'Dispassion' (vairágya) is the opposite of 'passion' (avairágya):—it consists in not concerning one's self about sounds or any other 'objects of sense' (vishaya).

ऐश्वयं नामानैश्वयं विपर्धयः । श्रिषमादयो ऽष्टगुणाः। ए-तानि मालिकानि चलारि ।

No. 13.—Superhuman 'power' (aiswurya) is the opposite of 'powerlessness' (anaiswarya); it consists of the eight qualities,

[the capacity of assuming a form of the utmost] 'minuteness' $(anim\acute{a})$ &c.

These four [kinds of 'intellect'—Nos. 10.—13.] are [regarded as] 'partaking of the quality of goodness' (sátwika). [See No. 50].

अधर्मो ऽज्ञानमवैराग्यमनै अर्थमित । अधर्मो नाम धर्मविपर्य-यः । श्रुतिस्मृतिविरुद्धः । श्रिष्टाचारविरुद्धः । अश्रुभलच्चणः । अ-ज्ञानं नाम ज्ञानविषययः । तत्त्वभावभृतानामनवबोधः । अवैरा-ग्यं नाम वैराग्यविषययः । श्रब्दादिविषयेष्यभिनिवेशः । अनैश्व-ये नाम ऐश्वयं विषयेयः । अणिमादिरिहतत्वं । एतानि तामसा-नि चत्वारि ।

No. 14.—'Vice' (adharma), 'ignorance' (ajnyána), 'subjection to passion' (avairágya), and 'powerlessness' (anaiswarya), [are next described].

'Vice' is the opposite of 'virtue'—opposed to Scripture and Law—opposed to the practice of the pious—and of which the symptom is adversity. [See No. 10].

'Ignorance' is the opposite of 'knowledge'—the reverse of an acquaintance with the 'principles', the 'forms' of intellect, and the 'elements'. [See No. 11.]

'Subjection to passion' is the opposite of 'dispassion':—it consists in perseveringly concerning one's self about sounds and other objects of sense.

'Powerlessness' is the opposite of superhuman 'power':—it is the being destitute of [the capacity of] 'minuteness' &c.

These four [kinds of 'intellect'] are [regarded as] 'partaking of the quality of Darkness' (támasa). [See No. 52].

[What consequences severally appertain to the above-described modifications of 'intellect,' is next stated.]

तच धर्मेण निमित्ते ने ाध्वगमनं । ज्ञानेन निमित्ते न मोचः । वैराग्येण निमित्ते न प्रकृतिलयः । ऐश्वयनिमित्तेनाप्रतिष्ठतगति-भविति । एवमेषा त्वष्टरूपा बुद्धिः परिख्याता ।

No. 15.—Through 'virtue,' as a cause, there is 'elevation in the scale of being' (úrdhwa-gamana); through 'knowledge,' as a cause, there is 'liberation' from existence (moksha); through 'dispassion,' as a cause, there is 'absorption into nature,' (prakriti-laya); through superhuman 'power,' as a cause, there is 'unimpeded movement' [even through solid rocks and the like], (iapratihata-gati).

Thus has 'intellect,' in its eight forms [No. 9] been described.

बुद्वरमी पयायशब्दा भवन्ति ।

मनो मितमहान् ब्रह्मा खातिः प्रज्ञा श्रुतिधृतिः । प्रज्ञानय-नातिः सृतिधीर्बुद्धिः परिकथ्यते ।

No. 16.—The following words are synonymes—[See No. 7]—of 'intellect'—viz: 'mind' (manas); 'understanding' (mati); the 'great' principle (mahat); the 'Creator' (brahmá); 'familiar knowledge' (khyáti); 'wisdom' (prajnyá); 'intelligence through report' (s'ruti); 'resolution' (dhriti); a 'train of thought' (prajnyána-santati); 'memory' (smriti); and 'meditation' (dhí); in such terms is 'intellect' spoken of.

[We now come to the third of the eight 'producers' (No. 5)—viz 'self-consciousness'—that which is implied in a man's employing the pronoun 'I'—a pronoun the employment of which declares the speaker's belief that he possesses an individuality of his own.]

यवाद्य की ऽइंकार इत्युच्यते । अभिमानी ऽइंकारः । यो ऽयमभिमानः । अइं शब्दे अइं सार्शे अइं रूपे अइं रसे । अइं गन्धे अइं सामी धनवानइमीश्वरः । अइं भोगी अइं धर्मे ऽभि-षत्तो ऽसी मया इतः । अइं इनिध्ये बिलिभः परैरित्येवमादिकः प्रत्ययो यः से। ऽइंकारः ।

No. 17.—To the question—what is 'self-consciousness'?—it is replied that 'self-consciousness' is a 'conceit' (abhimána)—the conceit or fancy that 'I am the embracer in the case of sound' [i. e., 'I hear'], 'I feel,' 'I see,' 'I taste,' 'I am lord,' 'I am rich,' 'I am deity,' 'I enjoy,' 'I am connected with virtue,' by me was he slain,' 'I shall be slain by powerful enemies:'—such and the like belief is 'self-consciousness.'

[The term ahankára (the 'making of an Ego or an P), the technical import of which, as remarked by Professor Wilson, is 'the pride or conceit of individuality,'* is rendered, in Mr. Colebrooke's version of the Sánkhya Káriká, by the term 'Egotism.' It must be carefully borne in mind that the word 'egotism,' thus employed, is not to carry with it the familiar import of bustling vanity—the feeling which prompts a vain man to be constantly talking about himself:—for, a man who is no 'egotist,' in that familiar sense of the term, is not the less chargeable with ahan-kára, if he fancies that his employing the pronoun 'I' at all is not an absurdity. The word, as described by Váchaspati, in his commentary on the 24th of the Kárikás of I's'wara Krishna, might signify 'egotism' in the ordinary sense—verging even on 'ego-ism,'—i.e., the belief that 'besides me there is nought else:'—but the significance of Kapila's system will perhaps be more clearly dis-

cerned, if the technical acceptation of the term, as given by Professor Wilson, be strictly adhered to.]

अन्नं कारस्यामी पर्यायश्रब्दाः। अन्नं कारो वैकारिकस्तेजमे। भूता-दिः चानुमाने। निरनुमानस्रेति ।

No. 18.—The various epithets given to 'self-consciousness' are 'the conceit of individuality' (ahankára); the 'modifying' (vai-kárika); the 'ardent' (taijasa); the 'origin of the elements' (bhútádi); 'dependent on inference' (sánumána); and 'independent of inference' (niranumána).

[Of the eight 'producers' (No. 5) we have now to consider the last five—viz., the five 'subtile elements'—the rudiments of what are familiarly called the 'elements.']

अवाह कानि पञ्च तनावाणीत्युच्यते । अहंकारान्वितानि प-च्च तनावाणि । अञ्चरतनावं सार्थतनावं रूपतनावं रसत-नावं गन्धतनावच्चेति पञ्च तनावाणि ।

No. 19.—To the question—what are the five 'subtile elements'?—it is replied:—the five 'subtile elements' are consequents of 'self-consciousness.' The 'subtile element of sound' (s'abda-tanmátra); the 'subtile element of tangibility' (spars'a-tanmátra); the 'subtile element of colour' (rúpa-tanmátra); the 'subtile element of savour' (rasa-tanmátra); and the 'subtile element of odour' (gandha-tanmátra);—these are the five 'subtile elements.'

[" Tan-mátra is a compound of tad, 'that,' and mátra, 'alone;' implying, that in which its own peculiar property resides, without any change or variety." In this respect the 'subtile elements' are held to differ from the gross or derivative elements, the pro-

perties of which are various at different times and in respect to different mortals.]

तच तावच्छव्दतमाचाणि शब्देघ्वे वोपलस्यन्ते। उदानानुदा-त्तस्वितिकस्पितषद्भविभगान्धारमध्यमपच्चमधैवतनिषादादयः श-ब्द्विशेषा उपलस्थन्ते। तसाच्छब्दतमाचे ऽविशेषः।

No. 20.—The 'subtile elements of sound' [like the 'atoms' of the Nyáya, which are separately inappreciable by the senses of men,] are apprehended only in [derivative and gross] 'sounds.' Varieties of 'sound' are apprehended, such as 'acutely accented,' gravely accented,' 'circumflexly accented,' and [the notes of the gamut—viz.:] 'C' (shadja), 'D' (rishabha), 'E' (gándhára), 'F' (madhyama—i. e., the 'middle' note of the scale—corresponding to the 'sub-dominant'*), 'G' (panchama—i.e. the 'fifth' note of the scale—corresponding to the 'dominant'), 'A' (dhaivata), 'B' (nisháda), &c. But there is not hence [i. e., in accordance with the variety in sounds appreciable by mortals] any diversity in the 'subtile element of sound' itself.

^{*} It is noticeable that the keynote and those two important notes, the dominant and sub-dominant, have names marking their place in the scale, whilst the other names are unscientific and fantastical. The word rishabha means 'a bull,' gándhára means 'red lead,' dhaivata seems to have no sense elsewhere, and nisháda means 'an outcaste.' The keynote—viz., shad-ja 'born of six' is said to be so named because it is "supposed to require for its articulation the employment of the tongue, teeth, palate, nose, throat and teeth,'—but this is evidently the conjecture of a grammarian, not of a musician. The writers on music may have given it the name as indicative of the acoustic fact that the ear, though content if the keynote be sounded, demands that, if the other six are sounded in their order, the keynote shall follow (before closing) to complete the octave and to form the cadence. It is "the offspring of (all or any of these) six."

अय स्पर्धतन्माचाणि स्पर्धे घ्वेवापलभ्यन्ते। तच च्हुकठिनक-र्कमपिच्छिलभीताषणादयः स्पर्भविभेषा उपलभ्यन्ते। तस्मात् स्पर्भतन्माचे ऽ विभेषः।

A LECTURE ON THE

No. 21.—The 'subtile elements of tangibility' are apprehended only in [derivative cases—see No. 20—] of 'tangibility'. In these, varieties of 'tangibility' are apprehended—such as 'soft,' 'hard,' 'rough,' 'slippery,' 'cold,' 'hot,' &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtile element of tangibility' itself.

रूपतन्माचाणि रूपेष्ये वापलभ्यन्ते। तच ग्रुक्षरत्तकणाचरित-पीतचारिद्रमांजिष्ठादया रूपविशेषा उपलभ्यन्ते। तसाद्रूपतन्मा-चेऽ विशेष:।

No. 22.—The 'subtile elements of colour' are apprehended only in 'colours.' In these, varieties of 'colour' are apprehended—such as 'white,' 'red,' 'black,' 'green,' 'yellow,' 'turmeric-colour,' 'madder-colour,' &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtile element of colour' itself.

रमतन्माचाणि रहे घ्वे वोपलभ्यन्ते । तच कटुतिककषायचा-रमधुराम्बलवणादया रमविशेषा उपलभ्यन्ते । तसाङ्गमतन्माचे ऽविशेषः ।

No. 23.—The 'subtile elements of savour' are apprehended only in 'savours.' In this, varieties of 'savour' are apprehended—such as 'pungent,' 'bitter,' 'astringent,' 'alkaline,' 'sweet,' acid,' 'salt,' &c. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtile element of savour' itself.

गन्धतन्माचाणि गन्धे एवोपलभ्यन्ते । तच सुरिभरसुरिभञ्च गन्धिविश्रेषौ उपलभ्येते । तस्माञ्जन्धतन्माचे ऽविश्रेषः । एव-मेतत्पञ्चतन्माचाणि स्चितानि ।

No. 24.—The 'subtile elements of odour' are apprehended only in 'odour.' In this, two varieties of 'odour'—viz., 'fragrance' and 'stench,' are apprehended. But there is not hence any diversity in the 'subtile element of odour' itself.

Thus have the five 'subtile elements' been made known.

अथैषां पर्यायशब्दाः । तन्माचाणि अविशेषाणि महाभतानि प्रक्तयो ऽभोग्यानि अणवे।ऽशान्ताघोरामूढानीति । एवमेता अ- ध्यत्तबुद्धा हंकारतन्माच गंज्ञिता अष्टी प्रक्रतये। व्याख्याताः । अ- य कस्मात्प्रक्षतयः । प्रकुवन्तीति प्रक्षतयः ।

No. 25.—Now the synonymes of these are 'elemental rudiments' (tan-mátra); 'unvaried' (avis'esha); the 'pervading elements' or 'whence the gross elements proceed' (mahá-bhúta); 'producers' (prakriti); 'not adapted for [mortal] fruition' (a-bhogya); 'atoms' (anu); 'not soothing' (as'ánta); 'not terrific' (aghora); 'not stupifying' (amúdha). [These last three names refer to the triad of Qualities—see No. 49]. Thus have the eight producers—viz., the 'undiscrete,' 'intellect,' 'self-consiousness,' and the five 'subtile elements,' been explained.

Now why are these (No. 5) called 'producers'? It is because they produce [the sixteen 'productions'—see No. 4—which are next to be described.]

अयं ते के घोडम विकारा द्रत्यचोच्यते। एकादमेन्द्रियाणि पच मृतान्येते घोडम विकाराः। No. 26.—Now what are those sixteen 'productions?' To this it is replied:—the eleven 'organs' (indriya), and the five [derivative or gross] 'elements:'—these are the sixteen 'productions, or 'modifications' [vikára].

तचे न्द्रियाणि तावदुच्यन्ते। श्रोचं त्वक्चचुषी जिष्टा प्राणिन-ति पच्च बुद्दीन्द्रियाणि।

No. 27.—Now the 'organs' are set forth. The 'organ of hearing' (s'rotra); the 'organ of touch' (twach) and the 'organ of sight' (chakshush); the 'organ of taste' (jihwá); the 'organ of smell' (ghráṇa); are the five 'organs of the intellect' (bud-dhíndriya).

(These are called 'organs of the intellect' because their function is that of observation, not, as that of the other organs is, of action.)

श्रीचं शब्दिविषयं वुध्यते। त्वकं स्पर्शिवषयं बुध्यते। चचूरूप-विषयं बुध्यते । रसना रसविषयं बुध्यते। घ्राणो गन्धविषयं बुध्यते। इति

No. 28.—The 'hearing' apprehends its object 'sound' (s'abda). The 'touch' apprehends its object 'tangibility' (spars'a). The 'sight' apprehends its object 'colour' (rúpa). The 'taste' apprehends its object 'savour' (rasa). The 'smell' apprehends its object 'odour' (gandha).

वाक् पाणिपादम् पायूपस्थाखानि पञ्च कर्मे न्द्रियाणि स्वं स्वंकनर्म कुर्वन्ति । वाक् वचनमुचरित । इस्तो कर्म कुरुतः । पादौ
विचरणम् । पायुर्विसर्गम् । उपस्थम् त्रानन्दम् । उभयात्मकं मनः
स्वसंकल्पविकल्परत्ती कुरुते। एवमेकादग्रेन्द्रियाणि व्याख्यातानि ।

No. 29.—The five 'organs of action' (karmendriya), viz., the 'voice' or the 'larynx &c.' (vák), the 'hands,' the 'feet,' the 'organ of excretion,' and the 'organ of generation,' perform severally their own function. The 'voice' pronounces words. The 'hands' perform actions. The 'feet' perform locomotion; the 'organ of excretion,' evacuation; and the 'organ of generation,' enjoyment. 'Mind' (manas), an organ both of observation and action, performs its appropriate functions of 'resolving' (sankalpa) and 'doubting' (vikalpa).

Thus have the eleven organs been described.

श्रथेषा पर्यायाः । दुन्द्रियाणि करणानि वैकारिकाणि नियतानि पदानि अवधतानि श्रणुनि अचाणीति ।

No. 30.—Now the synonymes of these are—'organs of sense' (indriya); 'instruments' (karaṇa); 'changers' (vaikárika); 'allotted' (to each mortal) (niyata); 'appliances' (pada); 'placed under' (the soul) (avadhrita); 'subtile' (aṇu); 'organs' (aksha).

श्रय कानि पष्च महाभूतानीत्यचोष्यते । एथियप्रेजोवाव्याका-शानीति महाभूतानि ।

No. 31.—Now what are the five 'gross elements' (mahá-bhú-ta)? To this it is replied—'earth,' water,' 'light,' 'air,' and ether,' are the 'gross elements.'

तच प्रथिवी धारणभावेन प्रवर्त्तमाना चतुर्णामुपकारं करेाति । श्रापः जलानि स्नेदनभावेन प्रवर्त्तमानानि चतुर्णामुपकारं कुर्वन्ति । तेजः पाचकभावेन प्रवत्तमानं चतुर्णामुपकारं करेाति । वायुः श्रोषणभावेन प्रवर्त्तमानश्चतुर्णा मुपकारं करेाति । श्राकाशं श्व- वकाणदानेन प्रवक्तमानं चतुर्णामुपकारं करोति । शब्दस्पर्शे रूप-रसगन्धवती पञ्चगुणा प्रथिवी । शब्दस्पर्शक्परसवत्यञ्चतुर्गुणा ञा-पः । शब्दस्पर्शे रूपवित्तगुर्णं तेजः । शब्दस्पर्शवानिति द्विगुणो वा-युः । शब्दवदेकगुणमाकाश्रम् । एवमास्थातानि पञ्च महाभूतानि ।

No. 32.—'Earth,' acting in the character of supporter, co-operates with the [other] four [elements, in the production of effects.' 'Water' acting in its character of the 'humid,' co-operates with the other four. 'Light,' acting in the way of 'maturation,' co-operates with the other four. 'Air,' acting in the way of 'siccation,' co-operates with the other four. 'Ether,' acting in the way of giving space, co-operates with the other four.

'Earth' is possessed of five qualities—having 'sound,' 'tangibility,' 'colour,' 'savour,' and 'odour.' 'Water,' possesses 'sound,' 'tangibility,' 'colour,' and 'savour.' 'Light' possesses 'sound,' 'tangibility,' and 'colour.' 'Air' possesses 'sound' and 'tangibility.' 'Ether' has the single quality of 'sound.'

Thus have the 'gross' 'elements' been set forth.

श्रधेषां पर्यायाः । भूतानि । भूतिवश्रेषाः । विकाराः । श्राक्ष-तयः । तनवः । विग्रहाः । श्रान्ताः । घोराः । मूढ्यः । इत्येते षोडश विकारा व्याखाताः ।

No. 33.—Now their synonymes—'elements' (bhúta), 'varieties of element' (bhúta-vis'esha), 'productions' or 'modifications' (vikára), 'forms' (ákriti), 'minute,' (tanu), bodies, (vigraha), 'soothing,' 'terrific,' 'stupifying.'

Thus have the sixteen 'productions' or 'modifications' been described.

[The eight 'producers,' and the sixteen 'productions,' or results of the modification of the 'producers,' having been thus described, the third of *Kapila's* aphorisms, in which he announces 'soul,' is next adverted to.]

अथाह कः पुरुषः। इत्युच्यते। पुरुषो ऽनादिः सूद्धमः सर्वगतस्वे-तना ऽगुणो नित्यो द्रष्टा भोता ऽकत्ता चेचिवदमलो ऽप्रसवध-मीति।

No. 34.—Now it is asked—what is 'soul'? To this it is replied —'soul' is without beginning, subtile, omnipresent, intelligent, without [the three] qualities [see No. 49], eternal, spectator, enjoyer, not an agent, the knower of body, pure, not producing aught.

अथाह कसात्पुरुषः । पुराणात् पुरि श्ययनात् पुरोहितव्सि-त्वाच प्रषः ।

No. 35.—Now it is asked—why [is it called] 'soul' (purusha)? Because it is 'ancient' (purana) [having been from eternity—see No. 34—]; and because 'it reposes in body' (puri s'ayate); and because it is that towards which the 'highest affection' (puro hita) is entertained [—seeing that each one loves self, if loving nought else—] therefore it is called purusha.

श्रथ कसादनादिः । नास्यादिरन्तो मध्यो वा विद्यते द्रत्यना-दिः । कसात्मूच्याः । निरवयवत्वादतीन्द्रियत्वास्मूच्याः । कसा-स्मवगतः । सर्वमाप्तवाननन्तास्मदे । गगनवद्त्तीति सर्वगतः । क-साच्चेतनः । सुखदुःखमोद्दे । गगनवद्त्तीति सर्वगतः । क-जन्मास्यसिद्ध सन्त्यते । ऽगुणः । कसाद्वित्यः । श्रक्षतकत्वादन- त्याद्यत्वाच । कस्मादृष्टा । प्रकृतिविकारानुपन्नभते द्वति । कस्माद्वेता । चेतनभावात्मखदुःखपरिज्ञानात् । कस्मादकर्ता । उदाचीन्त्वादगुणत्वाच । कस्मात्वेचिवद् । घेचेभ्यो गुणाचेत्ति द्वति घेचिवद् । अथ कस्मादमन् । गुभाग्नुभकर्माण्यस्मिन् पृक्षे न सन्तीति अमनः । कस्मादग्रमवधर्मी। निर्वीजत्वात् । न किच्चिद् न त्यादयतीत्यर्थः । एवमेष सांख्यप्रधो ध्याख्यातः ।

No. 36.-Now why is it ['soul'] said to be 'without beginning' [No. 34]? Because it has neither beginning, middle, nor end. Why 'subtile'? From its being without parts, and its transcending the senses. Why 'omnipresent'? Because it comes into relation with all, and its sphere is boundless as the sky. Why ' intelligent'? From its discerning pleasure, pain, and delusion. Why 'without qualities'? Because neither the quality of 'goodness' [No. 49], of 'passion,' nor of 'darkness,' is in it. Why 'eternal'? From its not being made or produced. Why 'spectator'? Because it apprehends the modifications which productive nature undergoes. Why 'enjoyer'? Because it discerns pleasure and pain through its possession of intelligence. Why 'not an agent'? From its being indifferent (udásína) and devoid of the 'qualities' [see No. 42.] Why the 'knower of body'? Because through bodies it apprehends the 'qualities.' Why 'pure'? Because in this 'soul' there are neither good actions nor bad. Why ' not wont to produce'? Because it is seedless :- that is to say, it does not give rise to any thing.

Thus has the 'soul' of the Sánkhya been described?

श्रथास्य पुरुषस्य पर्यायाः । पुरुषः । श्रात्मा । पुनान । पंगुण-जन्तुजीवः । चेत्रज्ञः । नरः । कविः । ब्रह्मः । श्रवरः । प्राणः । य: । कः । सः । एषः । एवमेतानि पञ्चविंग्रति तत्वानि व्या-खातानि । अष्टौ प्रकृतयः षोडग्र विकाराः पृरुषक्रेति । पञ्चविंग्रतितत्वृत्ती यचकुचात्रमे रतः । जटी शिखी सुद्धी वापि सुच्यते नाच संग्रमः॥

No. 37.—Now the synonymes of this 'soul'—the 'reposer in body' (purusha); 'self' (átmá); 'the male' (puns); 'that which superadds the quality of reason to mere animal life' (pun-guna-jantu-jíva); the 'knower of body' (kshetra-jna); the 'man' (na-ra); the 'poet' (kavi); 'deity' (brahma); the 'indestructible' akshara); 'life' or 'vital air' (prána); 'who,' 'who'? 'he,' 'this.'

Thus have the twenty-five 'principles' (tatwa) been explained—viz:, the eight 'producers' [No. 5], the sixteen 'productions' [No. 26], and 'soul' [No. 34].

"He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he may have entered, and whether he wear matted hair, a top-knot only, or be shaven, he is liberated:—of this there is no doubt."

श्रचाच । पृष्ष: किं कर्ना श्रक्तचिति । यदि कर्ना पुष्षः स्थात् श्रुभान् कुर्यात् नतु द्यत्तिचयं।

No. 38.—Here it is asked—is 'soul' an agent, or not an agent? If 'soul' were an agent, it would do only good actions—it would not adopt the 'triad of habits.'

[What the three 'habits' are, is next stated.]

धर्माखं चै। चित्वं यमनियमनिवैं रिणं प्रचंखानं ज्ञानै खयंप्रका-ज्ञानमित चात्विकी ष्टन्तिः।

No. 39.—The 'amiable' (sátwika) habit consists of virtue,

kindliness, restraint [of the senses], regulation [of the organs], freedom from enmity, correct judgment, the attainment of knowledge and supernatural power [see No. 13.]

रागः क्रोधी लोभः परपरिवादो ऽतिरीष्ट्रता ऽतृष्टिर्विकताक-तिपार्ष्यं प्रखातिषातु राजसी वित्तः।

No. 40.—But passion, anger, covetousness, the reproaching of others, extreme sternness, discontent, fierceness shown in change of aspect—this is called the 'passionate' (rájasa) habit.

उन्मादमद्विषादा नास्तिकास्त्रीप्रसंगिता निद्रा आलस्तं नैगु-ण्यमशौचिमिति तामसी एतिः।

No. 41.—Madness, intoxication, lassitude, atheism, addiction to women, drowsiness, sloth, worthlessness, impurity—this is called the 'dark' (támasa) habit.

एतद् द्विचयं दृष्ट्वा लेकि गुणानां कटलं सिद्धमितिचाकत्ता पुरुषः सिद्धी भवति ।

No. 42.—Since we see this triad of habits in the world, the agency of the 'qualities' [in which these habits originate—see No. 49] is established; and hence 'soul' [the agency being thus accounted for independently of it] is proved to be 'not an agent.'

दमानगुणानप्रकृतेवत्तमानान् रजस्तमोध्याः विपरोतद्रश्चनात्। श्च करोमीत्यबुधो ऽभिमन्यते । त्यणस्य कुब्जीकरणे ऽप्यनीश्वरः सर्वमिदं मया कृतं ममेदं द्रितवदन्नभिमानादबुध उन्मत्तः कर्त्व-वज्ञविति ।

No. 43.—Through 'passion' (No. 51) and 'darkness' (No.

52), through an erroneous view, it (viz., 'soul') foolishly imagines—'I am the agent' in regard to these 'qualities' (No. 49) which belong to nature. Though incompetent even to the crooking of a straw, ('soul' imagines) 'All this was made by me—this is mine:'—thus saying, it, through a vain imagination, foolish, insane, becomes as if it were an agent.

श्रवाह ॥ प्रक्ततेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि भागशः । श्रहंकारिवमृद्धात्मा कर्त्ताहमिति मन्यते ॥ श्रनादित्वाद्मिगुणत्वात्परमात्मायमञ्जयः । श्ररीरस्थोऽपि कौन्तेय न करोति न लिप्यते ॥ एवं ॥ प्रकृत्येवच कमाणि क्रियमाणानि सर्वशः ।

यः प्रथित तथात्मानमकत्तरिं स प्रथित ॥

No. 44.—On this subject it is said (in the Bhagavad Gitá—Lect. III v. 27.) "Actions are effected by the qualities of nature, according to their shares:—the soul, deluded by the conceit of individuality, imagines 'I am the agent.'"

(And again, Lect. XIII. v. 31.)

"From its being without beginning, and its being devoid of the qualities,' this incorruptible supreme Soul, even while remaining in body, neither acts nor is affected."

Also-(Lect. XIII. v. 29).

"Whoso beholds actions as in all respects performed by nature alone, and so too beholds Soul as a non-agent—he indeed sees (aright)."

त्रवाच । किमयमेकः पुरुषो बच्चो वेत्युच्यते । सुखदुःखमोच-संकरविग्रद्वकरणपाटवजन्ममरणकरणानां नानात्वात्पुरुषबज्जत्व सिद्धं लेकाश्रमवणभेदाच । यद्येकः पुरुषः स्यादेकस्मिन् सुखिनि सर्व एव सुखिनः स्युः । एकस्मिन् दुःखिनि सर्व एव दुःखिनः स्यः । एकस्मिन् मृढे सर्वे मूढाः स्युः । एकस्मिन् संकीण सर्वे सं-कीणाः स्युः । एकस्मिन् विश्वद्वे सर्वे विश्वद्वाः स्युः । एकस्मिन् करणपाटवे सर्वे धां करणपाटवं स्थात् । एकस्मिन् जाते सर्वे जा-येरन् । एकस्मिन् मृते सर्वे विश्वरेन् । इति नचैक इतस्य बद्दवः पुरुषाः सिद्धाः । श्राकृतिगर्भाश्रयभागसंगतिविभागलिंगबद्धत्वात् ।

No. 45.—Here the question occurs—is 'soul' one, or many? To this it is replied:—the multiplicity of 'soul' is proved by the diversity of the conditions of pleasure, pain, delusion, mixture of race, purity of race, soundness of organs, birth, and death, and by the difference of the world (heaven, earth, and hell,) and of office, and of caste. If there were only one 'soul,' then, when one is happy, all would be happy; when one is grieved, all would be grieved; when one is deluded, all would be deluded; when one is of mixed race, all would be of mixed race; when one is of pure race, all would be of pure race; when one possesses soundness of organs, all would possess soundness of organs; when one is born, all would be born; when one dies, all would die. Hence 'soul' is not one; and hence multifarious 'souls' are proved to existfor these possess a multiplicity of distinctive characters in the diversified allotment of form, birth, habitation, fortune, society, and body.

एवं तावत्वांख्याचार्याः कपिलामुरिपच्चित्रखपतच्चलिप्रश्वतया बक्रन्पुरुषान्वर्षयन्ति । वेदान्तवादिन आचार्या इरिइरिइर्ण्यगर्भ-ध्यासादय एकमेवात्मानं वर्णयन्ति ।

No. 46.—Thus [as set forth in No. 45] do the teachers of the

Sánkhya, Kapila, Asuri, Panchas'ikha, Patanjali, &c., describe souls as many. The teachers who speak according to the *Vedánta* [the doctrine derived from the *Vedas*,] viz., Harihara, Hiranyagarbha, Vyása, &c., describe Soul as one only.

कसादेवं। तदाइ। पुरुष एवेदं। सर्वं यहूत यच भाव्यं उता-मृतत्वस्योगाना यदन्येनातिरोइति। तदेवाग्निसादादित्यसाद्वा-यसच चन्द्रमाः। तदेव गुक्तं तद्भुद्धा तदापः स प्रजापतिः। तदेव सत्यममृतं स मोच्यः सा परागितः। तद्चरं तत्सवितुर्वरेषयं यसा-त्यरं नापरमस्ति किष्चित् यसाद्वाणीया न ज्याया ऽस्ति किष्चित्।

No. 47,—Why thus (but one)? He replies. This [universe] is Soul only. [Soul is] all that has been, and that is to be, and the lord of immortality—that which by nought else is overlaid. It alone is fire, it is the sun, it is air, and it is the moon. It alone is pure, it is the vast one, it is the waters, it is the lord of creatures, it alone is the true nectar of immortality, it is liberation, it is the ultimate goal, it is the indestructible, it is the glory of the sun, it is that beyond which there is nothing else, than which there is nothing either more recent or more ancient.

वच द्रव स्तव्धो दिवि तिष्ठत्येकस्तेनेदं पूर्ण पुरुषेण सर्व सर्वतः पाणिपादं तस्त्रवतोचिशिरोमुखं सर्वतः स्तृतिमक्षोके सवमाद्यय तिष्ठति । सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभागं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्णितं । सर्वेषां प्रभु-मीशानं सर्वस्य श्ररणं महत् । सर्वतः सर्वतन्त्वानि सर्वातमा सर्व-सम्भवः । सर्वे निस्तियते यस्मिन् तद्वस्य मुनयो विदुः । एक एव हि भूतात्मा देने देने व्यवस्थितः । एकधा बद्धधा चैव दश्य- ते जलचन्द्रवत्। स हि सर्वेषु भृतेषु स्थावरेषु चरेषुच। वसत्ये-की महानात्मा येन सर्वमिदं ततं । एकी ऽयमात्मा जगतां सं कीन बज्जधा छतः । एथक वदन्ति चात्मानं ज्ञानादिकप्रवत्ते । ब्राह्मणे छिनिकीटेषु श्वपाके ग्रुनि हस्तिनि । पश्चेगदंशम-भक्ते सनं पश्चित्ति पण्डिताः । एकमेव यथा सृचं सुवर्णे वर्त्तते पुनः । सुक्तामिष्प्रवालेषु मृण्मये रजते तथा । तदद्वीषु मनुष्येषु तद्वद्विसमृगादिव, । एको ऽयमात्मा विद्वेषः सर्वचैव व्यवस्थितः ।

No. 48.—Firm as a tree it remains in the heavens. With that Soul all this is filled everywhere. On all sides are the hands, feet, eyes, heads, and faces of that [Soul-tree] - and, with ears in all directions, it stands embracing all-assuming the aspect of all the organs and qualities, though devoid of all the qualitiesthe lord and ruler of all—the great refuge of all—that which altogether is all the principles, is every soul, is the source of allinto which all is resolved—the sages regard it as Brahma. For only one soul is located in various bodies; as the Moon, though but one, appears many in [many vessels of] water. In all existences, immoveable or locomotive, it dwells-one only-by which all this [universe] was spread out. This soul, of all worlds, is but one: by whom is it made more? Some speak of soul as several-seeing that Knowledge and other mental states are observable [simultaneously—some being happy while others are sad]; but in the Bráhman, the worm, and the insect; in the outcaste, the dog, and the elephant; in goats, cows, gadflies, and gnats, the wise behold the same [single Soul]. Just as a thread may pass through golden beads, and again in like manner through pearls, gems, coral, earthen beads, or silver, -so this Soul is to be

regarded as remaining everywhere one-in cows, men, elephants, deer, &c.

श्रवाह किं चे गुण्यं नाम । उच्यते । सन्वरजसामां सीति चे गुण्यं । चिगुणा एव चे गुण्यं ।

No. 49.—Now it is asked—what is the 'triad of qualities'? It is replied—the triad of qualities consists of 'Goodness' (sattwa), 'Foulness' (rajas), and 'Darkness' (tamas). By the 'triad of qualities' is meant the 'three qualities.'

चन्चं नाम प्रचादलाघवप्रचन्नाभीष्टगतितृष्टितितिचाचन्तोषादि लचणमनन्तभेदं चमाचतस्मुखात्मकं ।

No. 50.—'Goodness' (sattwa) is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in calmness, lightness, complacency, attainment of wishes, kindliness, contentment, patience, joy, and the like. Summarily, it consists of happiness.

रजो नाम श्रोकतापभे दे। देगदे। षगमनादिलचणमनन्तभेदं स-मासता दःखात्मनं।

No. 51.—'Foulness' (rajas) is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in grief, distress, separation, excitement, anxiety, fault-finding, and the like. Summarily, it consists of pain.

तमे। नाम श्राच्छादनाज्ञानबीभत्सदैन्यगौरवालस्यनिद्राप्रमा-दादिलचणमनन्तभेदं समासता माद्यात्मकं।

No. 52.— Darkness' (tamas) is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it it is exemplified in envelopement, ignorance, disgust, abjectness, heaviness, sloth, drowsiness, intoxication, and the like.

Summarily, it consists of delusion.

एतावन्नेगुण्यं व्याख्यातं । सत्त्वं प्रकाशकं विद्याद्रजो विद्यात्प्रवत्तकम् । तमा ऽप्रकाशकं विद्यात् चैगुण्यं नाम संज्ञितं ॥

No. 53.—So far (i. e. in Nos. 50, 51, and 52,) has the 'triad of qualities' been expounded.

One should regard 'goodness' as 'illuminating;' one should regard 'foulness' as 'exciting'; one should regard 'darkness' as 'non-illuminating';—such is what is named the 'triad of qualities.'

अचाह कः संचरः प्रतिसंचरस्य । अचोच्यते । उत्पत्तिः संचरः । प्रलयः प्रतिसंचरः । तचोत्पत्तिनाम ।

श्रव्यक्तात्प्रागुपदिष्टात्सवगतपुरुषेण परेणाधिष्ठिता बृद्धि रत्य-द्यते। श्रष्टगुणा वृद्धिः। बृद्धेस्तत्वाद इंकार उत्पद्यते। से । ऽइंकार-स्त्रिविधो वैकारिकस्त जसे। मूतादिरिति। तत्र वैकारिकाद इंकाराद् देवता इन्ट्रियाणिचे त्यद्यन्ते। भूतादेस्तन्मा चाणि । तैजसादुभ-यं। तन्माचे भ्यो भूतानीति संचरः।

No. 54.—The next question is—what is (meant by) 'developement' and 'resolution' (sanchara and pratisanchara—the 5th and 6th in Kapila's enumeration of topics—No. 6)? To this it is replied—'development' is production:—'reabsorption' (pratisanchara) is dissolution. [The order of] 'production' is as follows:—from the 'undiscrete' beforementioned [No. 7], superintended by Soul, which is another [than Nature, and for whose use is the assemblage of sensible objects,] and omnipresent, 'intellect' is

produced. 'Intellect' is of eight kinds—[No. 9]. From the principle of 'intellect' 'self-consciousness' [No. 17] is produced. 'Self-consciousness' is of three kinds [No. 18]—the 'modifying,' the 'active,' 'ardent,' or 'urgent,' and the 'origin of the elements.' From the 'modifying self-consciousness' the gods and the senses are produced; from [self-consciousness as] 'the origin of the elements' the 'subtile elements' (No. 19) are produced. From the 'active' both proceed, [for, without the 'active,' both the others are held to be inert]. From the 'subtile elements [are produced] the [gross] 'elements:'—such is [the order of] 'development.'

प्रतिसंचरे। नाम भूतानि तन्माचेषु लीयनो तन्माचाणीन्द्रिया-णिचाचंकारे ऽचंकारे। बुद्धौ बुद्धिरयक्ते । तद्यकं कचिन्न प्रजी-यते । कस्मादनुत्पद्यमानत्वात् । प्रकृतिं पृक्षंचैव विद्यानादीत्ये-वं प्रतिसंचरे। व्याखातः ।

No. 55.—'Reabsorption' [No. 6] is as follows:—the 'elements' are resolved into the 'subtile elements;' the 'subtile elements' and the 'senses' into 'self-consciousness; 'self-consciousness' into 'intellect;' 'intellect' into the 'undiscrete.' The 'undiscrete' is nowhere dissolved. Why? Because it was not produced out of anything (into which it might be resolvable). Regard Nature and Soul as being both eternal. Thus has 'reabsorption' been explained.

तचा ह कि तद्ध्यात्ममिभूतमिधदैवंचेति । तची च्यते । बु-द्विरध्यात्मं बोधयितव्यमिधभूतं ब्रह्मा तचाधिदैवतं । श्रष्टंकारो ऽध्यात्मं मन्तव्यमिभूतं रुद्रस्तचाधिदैवतं । मने।ऽध्यात्मं सक्ति- तथमधिमूनं चन्द्रसाचाधिदैवतं। श्रोचमधातमं श्रोतथमधिमूनं चायुस्तचाधिदेवतं। चनुरधातमं द्रष्टव्यमधिमूनं श्रादित्यसाचाधिदैवतं।
जिष्ट्राध्यातमं रपियतव्यमधिभूनं वर्षणसाचाधिदैवतं। श्राणमध्यातमं श्रातव्यमधिभूनं प्रध्यो तचाधिदैवतं। वागध्यातमं वक्तव्यमधिमूनं विच्चित्तचाधिदैवनं पाणी श्रध्यातमं ग्रहीतव्यमधिभूनं द्रन्द्रसाचाधिदैवनं। पादावध्यातमं गन्तव्यमधिभूनं विष्णुसाचाधिदैवतं।पायुरध्यातमं उत्सष्टव्यमधिभूनं मिचसाचाधिदैवनं। उपस्यमध्यातमं श्रानन्दियतव्यमधिभूनं प्रजापितस्तचाधिदैवनं। एवमेतस्नयोदश्विधस्य करणस्याध्यात्ममधिभूनमधिदैवनं।

No. 56.—Now it is asked—what is meant by the 'ministers of soul' [No 6], the 'province of an organ,' and the 'presiding deity?' To this it is replied:—'intellect' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is to be understood' constitutes its 'province;' and its 'presiding deity' is Brahmá. 'Self-consciousness' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be believed' constitutes its 'province;' and Rudra is its 'presiding deity.' 'Mind' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be resolved on' constitutes its 'province;' the Moon is its 'presiding deity.' The 'hearing' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be heard' constitutes its 'province;' the Ether is its 'supernatural presiding power.' The 'touch' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be touched' constitutes its 'province;' the air is its 'supernatural presiding power.' The 'sight' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be seen' constitutes its 'province;' the sun is its 'presiding deity.' The

'taste' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be tasted' constitutes its 'province;' Varuna [the god of the waters] is its 'presiding deity.' The 'smell' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be smelled' constitutes its 'province;' the Earth is its 'supernatural presiding power.' The 'voice' is a 'minister of soul; whatever is 'to be uttered' constitutes its 'province;' its 'presiding deity' is either Saraswatí or Fire. The 'hands' are 'ministers of soul;' whatever is 'to be grasped' constitutes their 'province;' Indra is their 'presiding deity'. The feet are 'ministers of soul; whatever is 'to be gone over' constitutes their 'province;' Vishnu is their 'presiding deity.' The 'organ of excretion' is a 'minister of soul;' whatever is 'to be excreted' constitutes its 'province;' Mitra is its 'presiding deity'. The 'organ of generation' is a 'minister of soul;' what is 'to be enjoyed' constitutes its 'province;' Prajápati is its 'presiding deity.'

Such, in the case of each of the thirteen kinds of instruments [of the soul], is the respective 'minister,' 'province,' and 'presiding deity'.

तत्त्वानि ये। वेदयते यथावद्। गुणखरूपाण्यधिदैवतंत्र। विमुक्त-पाष्मा गतदोवसङ्घो । गुणांख भुङ्को न गुणेः स युज्यते ।

॥ इति तत्त्ववादः ॥

No. 57.—Whosoever is correctly acquainted with the 'principles' [viz. the 8' producers', 16' productions,' and 'soul'], the nature of the 'qualities,' and the 'presiding deities' [No. 56], being liberated from his sins and released from the whole of his defects, enjoys [the various pleasing effects of] the 'qualities,' (while he remains in the world) and is liberated from the 'qualities' (when he attains to final emancipation).

So much for the discussion of the [25] 'principles' (tattwa).

स्य काकाः पष्चाभिनुद्वयः । उत्यते । व्यवसाया ऽभिमान इच्छा कर्त्तव्यता क्रियेति । स्रभिमुखनुद्विरिदं करणीयं मयेति व्यवसाया बुद्धिक्रिया । स्रात्मपरात्मखरूपप्रत्ययाभिमुखो ऽभिमा-ने। स्रष्टंकारा बुद्धेः क्रिया । इच्छा वाञ्छा संकल्पो मनसे। बुद्धि-क्रिया । सञ्दादिविषयेन्द्रियस्रवणादिलचणकर्त्तव्यता बुद्धीन्द्रिया-णां बुद्धिक्रिया । वचनादिलचणबुद्धिक्रिया कर्मेन्द्रियाणां सा क्रि-येति । एवमेताः पष्ट्याभिनुद्वया व्याखाताः ।

No. 58.—Now what are those five 'intelligent functions' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—'ascertainment' (adhyavasáya), 'conceit' (abhimána), 'willing' (ichchhá), 'adaptability' (karttavyatá), and 'action' (kriyá). The function of intellect when it decides 'This is to be done by me,' is 'ascertainment' (adhyavasáya). That function of the intellect, self-consciousness,—the notion that 'I act'—which fixes on the conceptions of 'self' and 'not-self'—is 'conceit'. The intelligent function of 'mind' is 'willing'—desiring and purposing. The intelligent function of the organs of sense (No. 27) is the 'adaptability' of each sense, such as the hearing, or the like, to its object, such as sound, or the like. The intelligent function of those (organs of action—No. 29—) which are recognised by 'utterance,' and the like, is called 'action'.

Thus have the five 'intelligent functions' been explained.

अथ कास्ताः पञ्च कर्मयोनय दृत्युच्यते । धतिः अद्भा सृका । धितः अद्भा सृका

वाद्यंकम्माणि संकल्प प्रतीतं याऽभिरचित ।

तिद्वाष्टस्तातिष्ठस्य धतेरेति इ लचणं ॥
स्वाध्याया ब्रह्मचयेष्ट्व यजनं याजनं तपः ।
दानं प्रतिग्रहा होनः श्रद्धाया लचणं स्टतं ॥
सुखार्यं वस्तु सेवेत विद्याकर्मतपांसिच ।
प्रायश्चित्तपरे। नित्यं सुखेयं परिकोर्त्तिता ॥

विषयभधुनिश्चितान्तः करणत्वमविविदिषा । विविदिषाच ध्या-निनां प्रजानयोनिः ।

एकत्वंच प्रयक्षेच नित्यंचैवमचेतनं।

मूक्त्रमस्कार्यमचोभ्यं ज्ञेया विविद्घाच सा ॥

कार्यकारणचयकरी विविद्घा प्राक्तिकी चित्तः।

एवमेताः पंच कश्मेयोनयो व्याख्याताः।

No. 59.—Now, what are those five 'sources of action' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—'firmness,' or 'decision of character' (dhriti), 'faith' (s'raddhá), 'piety' (sukhá), 'indifference about knowledge' (avividishá), and 'desire of knowledge' (vividishá):—these are the five 'sources of action.'

Having resolved on any outward act, he who keeps his purpose, being intent on it, and carrying it into effect,—this [conduct of such a man] furnishes the definition of 'firmness.'

The characters by which 'faith' may be recognised are stated to be the perusal of the Scriptures, the condition of the religious student, sacrificing or causing sacrifices, penance, giving and receiving proper donations, and making oblations.

But he who may addict himself to study, to religious actions, and austerities, being always intent on penances with a view to the

obtaining of future enjoyments,—this [conduct of such a one] is called 'piety.'

'Indifference about knowledge' implies that the heart is engrossed with the sweets of sensual objects.

Desire of knowledge' is the source of the wisdom of the wise. The unity (of Nature), the severalty (of Nature and Soul), the eternity [of Soul] and its unconsciousness, the subtilty [of Nature], the existence of effect [in its cause—even antecedently to manifestation—as the statue exists in the block of marble—] and the duration (of body even after the attainment of knowledge—see No. 69)—this is to be considered (as constituting the assemblage of matters which form the object of) 'the desire of (true) knowledge'.

श्रवाह के पश्च वायवः । उच्यते । प्राणो ऽपानः समानश्च उदानो व्यान एवच इत्येते वायवः पश्च श्ररीरेषु श्ररीरिणां । तच प्राणो नाम वायुर्मुखनासिकाधिष्ठाता प्रणयनात्प्रक्रमणाच प्राण इत्यिभिधोयते । श्रपानो नाम वायुर्म्मास्यिष्ठाता श्रपनयनादा धोगमनाचापान इत्यिभिधीयते । समानो नाम वायुर्हुद्धिष्ठाता समन्यनात्समगमनाच समान इत्यभिधीयते । उदानो नाम वायुः कण्डाधिष्टाता जर्ड्वगमनादुत्क्रमणाचीदान इत्यभिधीयते । व्यानः सर्वेव्यापकः । इति पश्च वायवे। व्याख्याताः ।

No. 60.—It is now asked—what are the five 'airs' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the five airs, in the bodies of those who have bodies, are those named prána, apána, samána, udána, and vyána. The 'air' called prána is that which is superintended by the mouth and nose. It is so named because it comprises 'inspiration' (pranayana) and 'expiration' (prakramana). [This refers to

the process of respiration]. The 'air' called apána is that which is superintended by the navel. 'It is so called from its 'taking away' (apanayana), and 'going downwards'. [This refers to flatulence]. The 'air' called samána is superintended by the heart. It is so called from its 'leading and going equably' [neither up nor down—as far as regards the food, to aid in the digestion of which is its province]. The 'air' called udána is that which is superintended by the throat. It is so named from its ascending and 'going upwards' (utkramana). [This refers to the arterial pulsation &c. of the upper members of the body—the throat and head]. The 'air' called vyána is the 'pervader' (vyápaka) of the whole body. [This refers to pulsation in general and all the other involuntary actions of the system.]

Thus have the five 'airs' been described.

श्वाह के ते पश्च कर्मात्मान द्रत्युश्चते। वैकारिकस्त जिसे मृतादिः सानुमाना निरनुमानश्च । तच वैकारिकः शुभकरमकिना । तै जिसे ऽश्भकर्मकर्ना । भूतादिनिंगूडकर्मकर्ना । सानुमानः शुभ-मूडकर्ना । निरनुमाना ऽश्भमूडकर्ना पैव पश्च कर्मात्माना व्या-ख्याताः ।

No. 61.—It is now asked—what are those five 'whose nature is action' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the 'modifying' (vaikári-ka), the 'ardent' (taijasa), the 'origin of the elements' (bhútádi), that which is 'associated with inference' (sánumána), and that which is 'not associated with inference' (niranumána). Among these the 'modifying' [form of 'self-consciousness'—see No. 18—] is the agent in good actions:—the 'ardent' is the agent in actions not good:—the 'origin of the elements' is the producer of things good but obscure:—[self-consciousness] 'associated with inference' is the worker of what is good but foolish:—and that which is 'not

associated with inference' is the worker of what is not good and (also) foolish.

Thus have the five been explained, 'whose nature is action.'

यवाह का सा पञ्चपर्वा ऽविद्येति । तमा माहा महामाहसानिस्तोऽन्थतानिस्रञ्चेति । तच तमामाहावुभावष्टात्मकौ । महामोहा दशात्मकः । तानिस्तो उन्धतानिस्रञ्चाष्टादशात्मकौ । तमा
नामाष्टसु प्रक्रतिष्वव्यक्तबुद्धाहंकारपंचतन्माचमंद्वितासु चनात्मसु
चात्माभिमानस्तम द्रत्यभिधीयते । मोहो नाम चिणमाद्यष्टेश्वर्य
प्राप्तये यो ऽभिमान उत्पद्यते स मोह द्रत्यभिधीयते । महामाहो
नाम दृष्टास्विकेषु श्रब्दादिविषयेषु दश्रमु वृत्तिषु मुक्तो ऽइमिति मन्यते स महामाह द्रत्यभिधीयते । तानिस्तो नामाष्टगुणैययो ऽणिमाद्ये दश्विधेच विषये यो देषो ऽप्रतिहतस्त्रयं दुःखमुत्यद्यते ऽसौ तानिस्त द्रत्यभिधीयते । चन्धतामिस्तो नामाष्टगुणैव्यद्यते ऽसौ तानिस्त द्रत्यभिधीयते । चन्धतामिस्तो नामाष्टगुणैव्यद्यते ऽसौ तानिस्त द्रत्यभिधीयते । चन्धतामिस्तो नामाष्टगुणैवे। उन्धतामिस्त द्रत्यभिधीयते । एवमेषा पञ्चपर्वा ऽविद्या दिषष्टिभेदाऽऽख्याता ।

No. 62.—Here it is asked—what is that 'ignorance'—under five divisions [No. 6]? To this it is replied:—'obscurity' (tamas), 'illusion' (moha), 'extreme illusion' (mahámoha), 'gloom' (támisra), and 'utter darkness' (andha-támisra). Among these, 'obscurity' and 'illusion' are each eightfold. 'Extreme illusion' is tenfold. 'Gloom' and 'utter darkness' are eighteenfold.

'Obscurity' is the conceit that [he will be liberated from trans-

migration because] soul [merges] into [some one or other of] the eight 'producers,' which are not Soul-viz., those called the 'undiscrete,' 'intellect,' 'self-consciousness,' and the five 'subtile 'elements,'-[the errors in regard to these eight severally making up the eight varieties of 'obscurity']. 'Illusion' is the conceit (of liberation) which arises from the possession of the eight kinds of superhuman power, such as 'minuteness' and the rest (No. 13). 'Extreme illusion' is when one supposes 'I am liberated' through (any one of) the ten modes (supplied by) the objects of sense, viz., sounds, &c., belonging to the seen and to the unseen (or scripturerevealed) world—(i. e. the five as perceived by men and the five as perceived by the gods). 'Gloom' is that unchecked hate (or fierce impatience) in regard to the (possession of the) eight kinds of superhuman power, 'minuteness,' &c., and the ten kinds of objects of sense, which (by preventing liberation) results in the three kinds of pain (incident to corporeal existence.) . Utter darkness' is the name given to that grief which arises at the time of death, when one is in possession of (any one of) the eight kinds of superhuman power, or of the ten kinds of objects of sense.

Thus has fivefold 'ignorance' (the obstruction to the soul's object of final liberation) in its sixty-two varieties, been declared.

यवाह का मा अष्टविंग्रतिधा ऽग्रिकिच्छते। एकाद्रमेन्द्रिय-वधाः मप्तद्रम बृहिवधाः। एषाष्ट्विंग्रतिधा ऽग्रिकिरिति। तचे-निद्रयवधानावदुच्छते। श्रोचे बाधिर्य जिह्नायांजडत्वं त्वचि कु-ष्ठित्वं चचुष्टक्पत्वं नामिकायामन्नाणत्वं वाचि मूकत्वं हस्तयोः कु-णित्वं पाद्योः पंगुत्वं पाव्विन्द्रिये उदावत्तं उपस्थिन्द्रिये क्रीयं मनमि उन्माद द्रत्येकाद्रमेन्द्रियवधाः। मप्तद्रमबुद्धिवधा नाम वि-पर्यथास्तृष्टिसिद्धीनां। गुष्टिविपर्ययासावदुच्यत्ते। No. 63.—It is now asked—what is twenty-eightfold 'disability' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the depravity of the eleven organs, and the seventeen injuries of the intellect—these constitute twenty-eightfold 'disability.' Now the defects of the organs are stated:—in the organ of hearing, deafness; in the organ of taste, insensibility; in the organ of touch, leprosy; in the organ of sight, blindness; in the organ of smell, loss of smell; in the organ of utterance, dumbness; in the hands, crippledness; in the feet, lameness; in the organ of excretion, constipation; in the organ of generation, impotence; in the mind, insanity:—such are the defects of the eleven organs. The seventeen 'injuries of the intellect' are the reverse of (the nine kinds of) 'acquiescence' and of (the eight kinds of) 'perfectness.' What is meant by the 'reverse of acquiescence' is next stated.

तच नास्ति प्रधानमिति या प्रतिपित्तरनता । एवं महत्यातमज्ञाने तामस्कीना । तथाइंकारस्याद्श्नमवेद्या । नैव सित्ति
तन्माचाणि भूतकारणानीत्यदृष्टिः । विषयाणामजने पृष्ठित्तरमुतारा । रचणे तु प्रष्टित्तरमुपाराच । चयदोषमदृष्ट्रार्थेषु प्रदृत्तिरमुनेचा । भोगासितरमुमरीचिका । हिंसादे।षमप्रथतो भोगारमो ऽनुत्तमाम्भसिका । इति तुष्टिविपर्यया नवधा ऽतुष्ट्ये।
ध्याख्याताः ।

No. 64.—Among these [that are the 'reverse of acquiescence'—No. 66—] that called anantá is the belief that there is no such thing as Nature. In like manner, (non-acquiescence) in the notion that Soul consists of Intellect, is that called támasa-líná. So, again—the non-recognition of 'self-consciousness' is that called avedyá. (The notion that) there are no 'subtile elements,'

the causes of the gross elements, is that called avrishti. The concerning one's self about the acquisition of the objects of sense is that (form of non-acquiescence) called asutára; and (the concerning one's self) about their preservation is that called asupára. The concerning one's self about property, without regarding the evils of waste, is that called asunetra. The addiction to enjoyment is that called asunaríchiká. The engaging in enjoyment, on the part of one who does not look to the evils arising from injury (to created beings), is that called anuttamámbhasiká.

Thus have the ninefold opposites of acquiescence been explained.

[The technical names here are the opposites of those adverted to in section No. 66.]

श्रथ सिद्धिविपर्ययाः । श्रिक्षयो ऽष्टो चाभिधीयन्ते । नानात्वं भृतमा चस्ते कत्वमाविभूतमतारमु चते । श्रव्यमा श्रवणा विपरीतं प्र-तियद्वो नानात्व श्रो स्राम्त दित श्रता विपरीतं प्र-तिपद्वो नानात्व श्रो स्राम्त दित । श्रथ्ययम् श्रवणा भिनिविष्ट्या-पि जडत्वा द स्क्षा स्त्रोप हत्व द्वि । श्रथ्ययम श्रवणा भिनिविष्ट्या-पि जडत्वा द सक्का स्त्रोप हत्व द्वि पञ्चित्र तितत्व श्रानि सिद्धिने भवित तदा ऽतारतारं तद श्रानं । कस्य चिदा ध्यात्मिके न दः स्वाभिभूतस्यापि समारे उनु देगा द जिल्लासे । श्रक्ष प्रमादं । स्वमप्रमुदिता प्रमोदं । एवमप्रमुदिता प्रमोदमानये। श्रान्यये। श्रवस्य व प्रान्य प्रमुद्धे उप्यनिश्यय द्वि श्राना सिद्धि स्तर श्रानमस्त्र मुदिति । एवने प्राने दिद्धि विपर्यया श्री सिद्धि विषये श्री स्त्रान्य स्त्रान्य । एवने प्रान्य सिद्धि विषये श्री सिद्धि विषये श्री स्रान्य सिद्धि विषये । एवने प्रान्य सिद्धि विषये । स्वने प्रान्य सिद्धि विषये । सिद्य विषये । सिद्धि विषये । सिद्

No. 65.—Now (as regards) the 'opposites' of perfectness. These are called also the eight 'imperfections' (asiddhi). When the diversity (of the various principles from which the creation proceeds) appears as the unity of the mere (phenomenal) creation -this (imperfect view of the truth) is called atára. After hearing the words merely (of a competent instructor), the adoption of the contrary is that called asutára:—as when, having heard that 'he who acknowledges the various principles is liberated,' one determines that it is the reverse-viz., that 'he who acknowledges the various principles is not liberated.' When a person, even though intent on studying and hearing, through obtuseness or from his intellect's being impaired by unsound doctrine, does not attain to a perfect knowledge of the twenty-five principles, then his ignorance is called atáratára. To another, who, though oppressed by the pain inseparable from body and mind, yet, from feeling no anxiety about transmigration, entertains no curiosity, knowledge is no 'delight' (pramoda). Analogously are the next two to be regarded -viz., (the forms of 'imperfection' termed-as the opposites of the corresponding two forms of 'perfectness' in No. 67-) apramudita and apramodamána. Ignorance that arises from the not arriving at certain knowledge even on being instructed by a friend, is that called arasya. When, from his preceptor's disregarding him, or not instructing him correctly, an unfortunate man does not attain to knowledge, his ignorance is called asatpramudita.

Thus have those 'opposites of perfectness,' the eight imperfections, been explained. [The technical names are the opposites of those adverted to in section No. 67.]

Thus have the twenty-eight kinds of 'disability' [No. 63] been explained.

अवाह का सा नवधा तुष्टिरचोच्यते । प्रकृतिं परमात्मत्वेन

परिकल्प परितुष्ये माध्यस्थ्यं लभते तस्य तुष्टेया सा तांन्त्र-की मंज्ञा अम्म इति। अपरे। बुद्धिं परमात्मत्वेन प्रतिपद्य परितृष्टस्य तुष्टेः मिलला इति मंज्ञा। श्रन्यो ऽइंकारं परमात्मत्वेनाभ्यपगम्य प-रितुष्टस्य तुष्टेरोघ इति संज्ञा । इतरस्तन्माचाणि अभाग्याखानि परमात्मत्वेन विनिश्चित्य परितृष्टसास्य तुष्टेः दृष्टिरिति संज्ञा। एवं चध्यात्मिकास्वतस्रस्तष्टया भवन्ति। चतमुख्यपि तुष्टिषु ना-क्ति मेाचक्तत्वज्ञानस्यासम्भवात्। वाद्या चर्यार्जनरवणव्यसंग चिंसादिदे । षदर्शनादिषयापरमे पच्च तुष्टया भवन्ति । अर्थाना-मर्जने देाषदर्शनान्तृष्टः प्रवितिस्थापि नास्ति मेाचसत्वज्ञानाभा-वात् सा पच्चमी तुष्टिः स्तारेत्यभिधीयते। अन्यो ऽथानां रचणे दे।षदर्भनानुष्टः प्रविजतस्थापि नास्ति मे।चस्तन्वज्ञानाभावात् सा षष्ठी तुष्टिः सुपारेत्य्चते। अन्यो ऽर्थानां चये दे । षदर्शनात्तष्टः प्रव-जित स्वापि नास्ति मोचस्तत्वज्ञानाभावात् सा सप्तमी तृष्टिः सुने-चेत्यभिधीयते। अन्यो ऽर्थानां संगदे। षदश्रनान्निष्टत्तसुष्टः प्रविजत-स्यापि नास्ति मेाचस्तत्वज्ञानाभावात् सा ऽष्टमी तृष्टिः सुमरीचि-केत्यभिधीयते । अन्यो भूतानामर्धं निमित्ति डिंगादिदे । षदर्भनाद्मिष्ट-त्रसाष्टः प्रविजितस्यापि नास्ति मोचस्तत्वज्ञानाभावात् सा नवमी तृष्टि रत्तमा सालिकीत्यभिधीयते । इत्येता नव तृष्ट्या व्याखाताः।

No. 66.—Now it is asked—what is ninefold 'acquiescence' [No. 6]? To this it is replied:—having supposed that Nature is Soul, a man contentedly betakes himself to indifference:—the

technical [or slang] name of his indifference is ambhas, [the ordinary sense of which word is 'water']. Another, having satisfied himself that 'intellect' is Soul, is contented. The technical name of his 'acquiescence' is salila 'water.' Another, having come to the conclusion that 'self-consciousness' is Soul, is contented. The technical name of his 'acquiescence' is ogha 'quantity.' Another, having decided that the 'subtile elements,' those called the 'unfitted for [mortal] fruition' [No. 25] are Soul, is contented. The technical name of his 'acquiescence' is vrishti' rain.' Such are the four 'internal' or 'spiritual' (ádhyátmika) kinds of 'acquiescence.' Where [together or separately] those four kinds of acquiescence exist, liberation does not take place—from the inconsistency [of such sentiments] with a knowledge of the principles.

The five 'external' (váhya) kinds of 'acquiescence' consist in abstaining from [the enjoyment of the five] objects of sense, [such abstinence proceeding] from observation of the evils of acquiring, preserving, waste, attachment [to sensual pleasures], and injuriousness. A man is acquiescent (and abstinent) from observation of the evils attendant on the acquiring of property; but his liberation-even though he be an ascetic-does not take place, because of the (quite possibly concurrent, and here assumed,) absence of a knowledge of the principles. This fifth kind of 'acquiescence' is (technically) named sutura. Another is acquiescent from observation of the evils attendant on the preserving of property; but his liberation-even though he be an ascetic-in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This sixth kind of 'acquiescence' is (technically) named supárá. Another is acquiescent from observation of the evils of the waste of property; but his liberation-even though he be an ascetic-in the absence of a knowledge of the principles,

does not take place. This seventh kind of 'acquiescence' is (technically) named sunetra ('a beautiful eye'). Another is acquiescent from observation of the evils attendant on attachment (to sensual pleasures)—but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This eighth kind of 'acquiescence' is (technically) named sumaríchiká. Another is acquiescent, and abstains from worldly acts, from observation of the evils in the shape of injury, &c., to created beings on account of property—but his liberation—even though he be an ascetic—in the absence of a knowledge of the principles, does not take place. This ninth kind of 'acquiescence' is (technically) named anuttamá ('best'), or sátwikí ('amiable').

Thus have these nine kinds of acquiescence been explained.

यचा का ऽष्टी सिद्धय द्रत्य चोच्यते । यदू हेन ज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्त्वभावभूतेषु सा प्रथमा सिद्धिक्तारेत्यभिधीयते । यच्छ ब्द्मा-चेण ज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्त्वभावभृतेषु सा द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतारे-त्यभिधीयते । यद्ध्ययनेन ज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्वभावभूतेषु सा द्व-तीया सिद्धिक्तारयन्तीत्यभिधीयते । यद्घ्यात्मिकस्य दुःखम्याप-नोदनं कत्वा ज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्वभावभुतेषु सा चतुर्थी सिद्धः प्र-मोदेत्यभिधीयते । यदाधिभौतिकस्य दुःखस्यापनोदं कत्वा ज्ञान-मृत्यद्यते तत्वभावभूतेषु सा पच्चनी सिद्धः प्रमोदितत्यभिधीयते । यदाधिदैवतस्य दुःखस्यापनोदं कत्वा ज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्वभावभूतेषु सा पछी सिद्धः प्रमोदनानेत्यभिधीयते । यत्विग्धसंसर्गा व्यपा-याज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्वभावभूतेषु सा सप्तमी सिद्धः रस्यकेत्यभिधीय-याज्ञानमुत्यद्यते तत्वभावभूतेषु सा सप्तमी सिद्धः रस्यकेत्यभिधीय-

ते। यत्परिचर्यादानेन ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत्वभावभूतेषु परितेषिते गुरी षाष्टमी विद्धिः चन्त्रमुदितेत्यभिधीयते । इत्येता अष्टविद्धाया व्याखाताः ।

No. 67.—Now it is asked—what are the eight kinds of 'perfectness' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the knowledge which arises from reasoning, in regard to the principles (No. 57), the conditions of intellect (No. 9), and the elemental creation (No. 72)—this, the first kind of 'perfectness,' is (technically) named tára. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, which arises from hearing alone—this second kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named sutára. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and elemental creation, which arises from study,-this third kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named tárayantí. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, which arises on effecting the removal of internal pain,—this fourth kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named pramoda ('delight'). The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, which arises on effecting the removal of external pain—this fifth kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named pramodita ('delighted'). The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, which arises on effecting the removal of pain occasioned by something superhuman-this sixth kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named pramodamána. The knowledge, in regard to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, which arises from continuance of association with amiable persons,—this seventh kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named ramyaká. The knowledge, in regard

to the principles, the conditions of intellect, and the elemental creation, when a teacher is propitiated by giving him veneration,—this eighth kind of 'perfectness' is (technically) named satpramudita.

Thus have these eight kinds of 'perfectness' been explained.

श्रमा के दग मूलिकाया दत्य चोच्यते। श्रक्तित्वमेकत्वमथार्थवत्वं परार्थमन्यत्वमकद्धताच योगो वियोगो बच्चः पुमांसः स्थितिः

गरीरस्य विशेषद्यत्तिः। द्रत्यते दग मृलिकार्थाः।

No. 68.—Now it is asked—what are the ten 'radical facts' (No. 6)? To this it is replied—the existence (of 'Soul' and of 'Nature'); the singleness (of Nature); its objectiveness; its subservience; the distinctness (of Soul from Nature); and the inertness (of Soul); the union (of Soul and Nature); the separation (of Soul from its corporeal frame); the peculiar habit of body—its durability (after it ought to have disappeared).

Such are the ten 'radical facts.'

संघातपरार्धत्वादिति पृष्वास्तित्वं सिद्धं। भेदानां परिमाणात्का-रणमरत्यथ्यक्तमिति पर्यायद्वयेन प्रधानस्यास्तित्वं सिद्धं। हेतुमद-नित्यमित्येकत्वं सिद्धं। प्रीत्यप्रोतिविषादात्मकादय द्रत्यथ्वत्वं सिद्धं। नानाविषेवपायरिति परार्थकत्वं सिद्धं। चिगुणमिववेकि-विषय द्रत्यन्यत्वं सिद्धं। तस्माच विपययादित्यकर्द्धं सिद्धं। पृष्वस्य द्र्यनार्थं केवच्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्यापीति योगः सिद्धः। प्राप्ते यरीरभेदे चरितार्थादिति वियोगसिद्धिः। जन्ममरणकरणा-नामिति पृष्वस्त्रत्वं सिद्धं। चक्रभमवदिति विश्वेषद्तिः सिद्धाः।

एते दश मृलिकार्या व्याखाताः।

No. 69.— Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use,' the existence of Soul is established. The existence of Nature is established by the pair in order-(of antecedent and consequent)-viz., that 'since specific objects are finite,' therefore 'there is a general cause which is undiscrete'. Since 'what is causable is inconstant (and multitudinous), &c.,' the singleness (of Nature which is not caused by aught) is established. Since 'these (meaning the Qualities) consist in pleasure, pain, and dulness, &c.,' (see the XIIth of the Memorial Verses of the Sánkhya-) the objectiveness (of Nature) is established. Since 'by manifold means (Nature, without benefit to herself, accomplishes the wish of Soul,)' the subserviency (of Nature) is established. Since 'it (the 'undiscrete,' as well as its modifications) has the three qualities, is indiscriminative, objective, &c.,' the distinctness (of Soul, which is, in all these respects, the reverse,) is established. 'From the contrast' (shown to exist between active Nature and Soul) the inertness (of Soul) is established. 'For the Soul's contemplation of nature, and for its abstraction, &c.'-thus is the union (of the two) established. Since 'separation (of the Soul) from the body takes place, when the object is accomplished, the separation of the two is established. Since 'of birth, death, and the instruments of life, (the allotment is severally diverse),' the multiplicity of Soulis established. Since it is 'like the whirling of the potter's wheel, (after the impulse that set it in motion has been discontinued),' the peculiar habit (of body, which continues, till death, to invest the soul even of him who has attained to perfect knowledge,) is established.

Thus have the ten 'radical facts' been explained.

सप्तदशानां प्रागुपदिष्टानाच्च पच्चाश्रत प्रत्यया एतेच षष्टि

पदार्थाः षष्टितन्त्रमित्युचते।

No. 70.—The fifty intellectual modifications consisting of the seventeen (enumerated in Nos. 64 and 65) and of those (thirty three) previously exhibited (in Nos. 62 and 63), together with these (ten 'radical facts'—No. 69—) make up the sixty topics called the 'System of Sixty.'

यवाह को ऽनुयहसर्गः । यवोद्यते । वाद्यानां पष्ट्यतन्मावेश्यथो-त्पच्यानुयहसर्गः । मानेत्पत्तेराधारवर्ज्ञितानुत्पन्नान्द्रष्ट्या तेश्य-सन्मावेश्यो ऽनुयहसर्गमस्बद्धाः ।

No. 71.—Now it is asked—what is 'benevolent creation' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—'benevolent creation' consists in the production of external objects from the five 'subtile elements.' (As it is said) 'Brahmá, perceiving these (senses, &c.) produced from thought (—see No. 19) to be destitute of a sphere of action, created, from these 'subtile elements,' this 'benevolent creation.'

यचा कस्रतुर्व प्रविधो भूतमर्ग द्रत्यचे स्थित । यष्टिविक स्था देवः पैयाची राचमा याची गान्धव ऐन्द्रः प्राजापत्यो ब्राह्म द्रत्यष्टौ देवयोनयः । पत्त्रधा तिर्यग्योनिस्य पशुपचिष्टगम्परावरान्तेति । मानुष्यक स्वैकविधं ब्राह्मणादि चाण्डाम् लान्तं । गवादि मूषकान्तं प्रयवः । सिंहादि युगालान्तं मृगाः । गरुडादि मयकान्ताः पचिणः । येषादि कीटान्ताः सरीम्पाः । पारिजातादि द्यणान्ताः स्थावराः । दति तिर्यग्योनिस्य पद्याधा भवति । समासता द्रयं विधा सर्गः । एतस्रं सान्ताः

रमण्डलमुक्तं ।

No. 72.—Now it is asked—what is the fourteenfold 'elemental creation' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the divine kind is of eight sorts-that of hobgoblins, of titans, of attendants on the god of riches, of celestial quiristers, of demigods, of divine sages, of the planetary regents, and of the supreme deities. Such are the eight families of divinities. The grovelling kind is fivefold-that of domestic animals, winged animals, wild animals, reptiles, and, lastly, of fixed things. Mankind is single in its class-beginning with the Bráhman, and ending with the Chándála. Domestic animals, beginning with the cow, end with the mouse. Wild animals, beginning with the lion, end with the jackal. Winged animals, beginning with the bird of Vishnu (or the adjutant), end with the gnat. Reptiles, beginning with the Worldsnake, end with the worm. Fixed things, beginning with the tree of Paradise, end with grass. Thus is the grovelling kind fivefold. Compendiously, this (elemental) creation is threefold-(viz.,-divine, human, and grovelling-and, thus viewed, it supplies the 21st topic in Kapila's enumeration—see No. 6.) All this constitutes what is called the mundane orb.

A LECTURE ON THE

अचा च कि स्विधो बन्धः । द्रत्यचो च ते । प्रकृतिबन्धो वैकारिकबन्धो दिवाणावन्धस्थिति । तच प्रकृतिबन्धो नामाष्टौ प्रकृतयस्ताः परत्वनाभिमन्यमानस्य प्रकृतिबन्धः प्रकृतिबन्धं द्रत्यु- च ते । तच वैकारिकबन्धो नाम प्रवृज्ञितानां चौकिकानां वैकारिकबन्धो नाम प्रवृज्ञितानां चौकिकानां वैकारिकबन्धे प्रसृत्तानामि जितेन्द्र्याणाम- च्चानिनां काममे। चितानां वैकारिकबन्धं द्रत्यु ध्यते । द्विणावन्धो नाम ग्रुच्छित्रस्वारिभिचुवैद्यानसानां काममे। चे प्रचृत्वेतसामिभ-

मानपूर्विकां दिचणां प्रयच्छतां दिचणां बन्ध इत्यच्छते । इति चि-विधी बन्धा व्याख्यातः । उक्तच्च प्राक्ततेनतु बन्धेन तथा वैकारि-केणच । दिचणाभिस्तृतीयेन बन्धा ऽयच्च निमद्यते ॥

No. 73. —Now it is asked—what is threefold 'bondage' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—the bondage of the 'producers,' that of the 'modifications,' and that of 'ritual observance.' And first of the 'bondage of the producers:'-this is the name given to the 'absorption into nature' (No. 15.) of him who imagines that (any of) the eight 'producers' constitute Soul. The 'bondage of the modifications' is the name given to that (which opposes the liberation) of those wordly devotees who are in the power of the 'modifications' of nature (No. 26), such as the senses-who are devoted to objects of sense, such as sounds, &c.,-who have not their organs in subjection-who are ignorant, and deluded by passion. The 'bondage of ritual' is the name given to that (which opposes the liberation) of those who, whether householders, students, mendicants, or anchorets, with minds vitiated by passion and delusion, bestow (on Bráhmans, upon solemn or sacrificial occasions,) gifts prompted by conceit.

Thus has threefold 'bondage' been explained. And it is said—"Bondage is spoken of by the title of 'bondage through nature'—'bondage through nature's modifications'—and, thirdly, as that 'through gifts.'"

तचा च किस्तिविधे। मोचः। ज्ञाने द्रिकादिन्द्रियरागोप श्रमात्कत्वः चयाचेति। ज्ञाने द्रिकादिन्द्रियरागोपश्रमात्स्वध्मीधम्मे चये। भवति ध्रमीधम्मे चयाच कैवस्थमिति। उक्तष्व। श्राहो चि मोचो ज्ञानेन

दितीया रागधंचयात्। कृत्सचयानृतीयसु व्याख्यातं मेाच

No. 74.—Here it is asked—what is threefold 'liberation' (No. 6)?—It is (1) from the increase of knowledge, (2) from the subduing of the senses and passions, and (3) from the destruction of the whole. From the increase of knowledge and the subduing of the senses and passions, there results the destruction both of merit and demerit, and, from the destruction of merit and demerit, (liberation in the shape of) 'singleness' (kaivalya). And it is said—"The first liberation is (gained) by knowledge; the second, from the destruction of passion; and the third, from the destruction of all:—such are the characters of liberation."

किं चिविधं प्रमाणमित्युच्यते। दृष्टममुमानमाप्तवचनच्चेति। एत-चिविधं प्रमाणं।

No. 75.—What is threefold 'Proof' (No. 6)? To this it is replied:—'perception,' inference,' and 'right affirmation'—this is threefold 'proof.'

हर्छ ताबद्वाखायते। यावदिन्द्रियाणां पच्चेन्द्रियायाः प्रत्यचा एव हर्छ।

No. 76.—'Perception' (drishta) is now described. Whenever the five objects of the senses are present to the senses, there is 'perception.'

अनुमानं प्रमाणं लिङ्गद्यमे जायमानं ज्ञानं । यथा मेघोदये वृष्टिः साध्यते । वलाकादिभिः सलिलं । धूमेनाग्निः । पर्शमद-

No. 77.—The proof called 'inference' is knowledge arising on

the recognition of a 'sign' (linga). For example—by the rising of clouds (regarded as a sign of approaching rain) rain is proved (to be approaching):—by cranes and the like (regarded as a sign attendant on the sheets of water which they frequent) water (is proved to be in the neighbourhood of the place where the cranes are seen). By smoke (regarded as a sign of fire) fire (is proved to exist where the smoke originates):—this is the third kind of inference.

प्रत्यचेणानुमानेन वा ये। ऽथीं न साध्यते स श्राप्तवचनात्साध्यते। यथेन्द्रो देवानां राजा। उत्तराः कुरवः। सौवणीं मेरः। खगें ऽ सरस द्रति। ते द्रन्द्रादयः प्रत्यचानुमानासाध्यास्य विश्वष्टादये। मुनये। वदन्ति। सन्तीन्द्रादयः। श्रागमे। ऽथि ति। स्वकर्मण्य-भियुक्तो ये। रागदे पविवर्जितः। ज्ञानवान् श्रोलसम्पद्म श्राप्ते ज्ञेन्यस्य ताहशः। एवमेतस्त्रिविधं प्रमाणमभिष्टितं।

No. 78.—A fact which is not established by 'perception' or by 'inference,' is established (when it is established) by 'right affirmation'. Such matters (not proveable either by perception or by inference) are (the existence of) Indra the king of the gods, the northern Kurus, the golden mountain Meru, the nymphs in Paradise. These—Indra, &c.,—not proveable either by perception or by inference, the sages, such as Vas'ishta declare—saying "Indra &c. do exist." There is also the Scripture (—which is an authority sufficient to establish such points).

"He who is assiduous in his own duties, devoid of passion and malice, intelligent, and virtuous—such a one is to be held 'worthy' (to be received as an authority in regard to matters not demonstrable by perception or by inference)."

Thus has 'threefold proof' been declared.

श्रवाह तेन चिविधेन प्रमाणेन किं साध्यते। श्रवीच्यते। यथा लोके मानेन प्रस्थादिभिधीन्यानि मीयन्ते तुलयाचन्दनादीनि द्रव्या-णि एवमनेन तत्ववभावमृतानि प्रमीयन्ते।

No. 79.—Now it is asked—what is established by this 'three-fold proof'? To this it is replied:—As, in common life, things are estimated by means of a measure—grain and the like by means of such (measures of capacity) as a prastha, and sandal &c. by means of weights—so by means of this (apparatus of 'perception,' 'inference,' and 'right affirmation'), the 'principles,' the 'modifications of intellect,' and the 'elemental creation,' [—see No. 67—] are accurately determined [pramíyante—whence their name of pramána 'proof.']

चिविधेन दुःखेनाभिभूतो ब्राह्मणः विष्णमन्दि प्ररणमुपागतः। याचान्त किं चिविधं दुःखिनत्यचोच्यते। याध्यात्मिकमाधिभौतिक-माधिदैविकमिति।

No. 80.—"Oppressed by 'threefold pain,' the Bráhman had recourse to the great sage Kapila"—[see No. 5]—so the question arises—what is 'threefold pain'? To this it is replied—'natural and inseparable' (ádhyátmika); 'natural and extrinsic' (ádhibhautika); and 'non-natural or superhuman' (ádhidaivika).

तचाध्यात्मिकं दिविधं शारोरं मानसन्दिति । शरीरे भवं शा-रीरं । मनिस भवं मानसमिति । तच शारीरं नाम वातिपत्तस्वे क्ष्मणां वैषम्याद् दुःखमुत्पद्यते । ज्वरातीसारिवसूचिकामूच्छी-दिकं तच्छारीरमुच्चते । कामक्रोधनेशिक्मदेर्षादिकं प्रियविया-गाप्रियसंयोगादिकं तन्मानसमित्युच्यते । No. 81.—Pain 'natural and inseparable' [No. 80] is of two kinds, corporeal and mental. 'Corporeal' means residing in the body; 'mental' means residing in the mind. Pain, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm, and taking the form of fever, flux, cholera, swooning, &c., is called 'corporeal'. Desire, anger, covetousness, folly, madness, envy, &c.,—privation of what is liked and approximation of what is disliked—this is called 'mental' [pain or evil.]

[The pain called ádhyátmika is that which arises from the things called adhyátma—see No. 56].

अधिभूतेभ्यो भवं आधिभौतिकं। मानुषपशुक्तगसरीमृपस्थाव-रेभ्यो दुःखमुत्पद्यते तदाधिभौतिकं।

No. 82.—What arises from an object of sense (adhibúta—see No. 56)—is called ádhibhautika ('natural and extrinsic'). Pain is 'natural and extrinsic' which arises from men, cattle, wild beasts, reptiles, or things that do not move.

अधिदेवेम्यो जातं आधिदैविकं। श्रीताष्णवातवर्षाश्रनिपाता-दिनिमित्तं यद् दुः खमुत्पद्यते तदाधिदैविकं।

No. 83.—What arises from a supernatural agent (adhidaiva—see No. 56)—is called ádhidaivika ('non-natural' or 'superhuman'). Of this description is pain which arises from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.

अनेन चिविधेन दुःखेनामिभूतस्य ब्राह्मणस्य जिज्ञासेत्यद्गा । ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा यथा तृषितस्य पानीयं पात्मिच्छा पिपासा।

No. 84.—[As stated at the outset—in the mind] of the Bráhman, oppressed by the three kinds of pain, there arose 'a desire to

know'—such is the meaning of the word jijnásá (the desiderative noun from jná 'to know'), just as pipásá (from pá 'to drink') means the desire of a thirsty man to drink water.

एतत्समामनिश्चेयमं। एतज्ज्ञात्वा पुनर्जन्म न स्थादिति। एवं महमेविज्ञानं कपिलस्य महात्मनः । अनष्टुप्कन्दमाचाच ज्ञेयं स्रोकशतचर्यं। द्रति श्री तन्वसमासास्यमूच्छित्तः समाप्ता। श्रुभ-मसु ॥

No. 85.—This is saving knowledge (derived) from the compendium (of principles laid down by KAPILA.) Having known this, there will be no further transmigration. Such is the doctrine of the magnanimous great sage Kapila.

It is to be observed that there are in this treatise (as much as, three hundred couplets of the Anushthubh metre.

Thus concludes the comment on the aphorisms called 'The Compendium of Principles.'

86.—Of the name Sánkhya, which the philosophical system of Kapila bears, two explanations are given. According to the one explanation, the system is so named, from the word sankhyá 'number,'—"because it observes precision of reckoning in the enumeration of its principles." As the word sankhyá also signifies "deliberation or judgment," the name was more probably intended to designate the result of the "deliberate judgment" of Kapila on the great problem of the universe—with a special regard to emancipation from the evil that prevails in the world.

87.—The 'wenty-five 'principles' (tattwa) of the system, it will be observed, are comprised in the first three aphorisms (No. 6.)—viz., the 'eight producers,' the 'sixteen productions,' and 'Soul.' These twenty-five principles, according to the Sánkhya, constitute "all that is;" and Kapila, we have seen, promises

the enquirer that his final liberation from all distress will be the result of understanding "the real nature of all that is." A noticeable distinction between Kapila's way of speaking of things, and that of the Naiyayikas, presents itself in their respective choice of a fundamental verb. The language of the Nyaya is moulded on the verb "to be," and that of the Sankhya on the verb "to make." The Nyaya asks "what is?"—the Sankhya asks "what makes it so?" The one presents us with a "compte rendu" of the Universe as it stands:—the other presents as with a cosmogony. As the one subdivides its subject-matter into the two exhaustive categories of Existence and Non-existence, the other exhibits everything (except 'Soul'—the spectator of the phantasmagoria) under the two aspects of 'producer' and 'production.'

The 'productions' are held to be not other than the 'producers' modified; and the producers—all except the first of them—are but modifications of the first—the múla-prakriti. By what process of thought the notion of such a first principle is arrived at, the following extract from Morell's History of Philosophy (Vol. 1. p. 208), may serve to illustrate. Mr. Morell is there speaking of one of the latest German systems, that of Herbart.

88.—"The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a per-ception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not portray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example,

"what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact "with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, "bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, "upon reflection, we discover not to be so many real indepen-"dent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, " which we term things. Again, when we examine further into "these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate "essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the " combination of which they are produced. What we term the " reality, therefore, is not the thing as a whole, but the elements " of which it is composed. Thus the further we analyse, the " further does the idea of reality recede backwards; but still it " must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a "nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception " of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all " phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the " essence that assumes the different properties which come be-" fore us in sensation."

89.—This "essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation,"—this, which the European analyst arrives at as "the last result of the analysis"—is what the Sánkhya expositor, proceeding synthetically, lays down as his first position. This primordial essence—among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book (No. 7), are the 'undiscrete,' the 'indestructible,' that 'in which all generated effect is comprehended,' &c., is the 'Absolute' of German speculation. The developement of this principle, according to one of Schelling's views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147 vol. 2d) is "not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in nature, and only coming to self-consciousness in mind." So, according to KAPILA, "from Nature issues Mind, and thence Self-consciousness" [see No. 54]:

—but here a striking difference between the European and the Oriental theory presents itself—for the Self-consciousness, which so many European philosophers assume as the only certain starting-point, and as the very characteristic of Soul, is declared by Kapila to be no property of Soul, and to be regarded as such only through a delusion. In the 64th of the 'memorial verses' of I's'wara Krishna, as translated by Mr. Colebrooke, Kapila says:—

90.—"So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incon"trovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM,
"nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."

91.—This statement M. Cousin not unnaturally regards as amounting to "le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme" -but Professor Wilson, in accordance with the commentaries. declares that "It is merely intended as a negation of the soul's " having any active participation, any individual interest or pro-"perty, in human pains, possessions, or feelings." The Soul. according to the Sánkhya, might be described in the terms in which Fichte speaks of the Mind, "as it were, an intelligent eye, " placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, sur-"'veying all that takes place there"-(Morell-Vol. 2. p. 95). In the words of Kapila (Verse 19th), "Soul is witness, solitary, "bystander, spectator, and passive." Soul being thus inert, all that is done arises from the energy of the 'radical principle'-of which one might correctly speak in the terms employed by Schelling in speaking of the 'Absolute,' where he says-"The " primary form of the Absolute is will, or self-action. It is an "absolute power of becoming in reality what it is in the germ." (Morell-Vol. 2. p. 150).

92.—The 'Absolute,' the germ, in the hands of Kapila, having reached the form of 'Self-consciousness'—ahankara—the

'making of an I,'-the 'positing of an Ego'-the course of subsequent developement runs parallel, for some distance, with that followed by Fichte, who takes the 'Ego' as his starting point. According to a writer in Brande's Dictionary-"To use the "language of Fichte-the ego is absolute, and posits itself: it is " a pure activity. As its activity, however, has certain indefin-"able limits, when it experiences this limitation of its activity, " it also posits a non-ego, and so originates the objective world. "The ego, therefore, cannot posit itself without at the same "time projecting a non-ego; which, consequently, is in so far "the mere creation of the ego." In like manner the ahankara of Kapila creates [No. 54] out of itself the five 'subtile elements,' the bases of the gross elements, -so that the world of sense, formed out of these, is, in this as in Fichte's system, "the mere creation of the ego." A marked difference between the two systems, as observed before, consists in this-that Kapila makes the creative 'Ego' to be something else than 'Soul,' which latter, he holds, by confounding itself with the active principle, gets entangled in the distresses of life.

93.—The motive of the Bráhman's enquiry at Kapila, it will be remembered, is this—that he wishes he may not be "again "obnoxious to the three sorts of pain:"—in other words that he may not be born again—that he may be no more liable to transmigration or the Metempsychosis. Of the Metempsychosis Prof. Wilson (Sánkhya Káriká p. x.) says:—"This belief is not "to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main "principle of all Hindú metaphysics; it is the foundation of all "Hindú philosophy." The doctrine of the Metempsychosis may be regarded as the Hindú theory on the great question of the "origin of evil." The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists—and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one

undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a newborn child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffering evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If it be asked how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer offered is this-it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior-and so on. Applying now the principle of 'limits'—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limitas there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time for its existence at which point this hypothesis does not serve equally well to account, it is argued that, on this hypothesis, and on no other, is the existence of evil fully accounted for. To the European this method of accounting for the origin of evil appears to be vitiated by the 'regressus in infinitum' (anavasthá)—the same consideration which vitiates the theory of the earth's resting on the elephant, the elephant's resting on the tortoise, and so on without end. The origin of evil he regards as not having been revealed; and the requirement that we shall maintain our reliance on the goodness of God in the absence of such revelation, he regards as a trial of our faith.

94.—Several of the terms in the treatise of which a translation has been given, do not occur in the Sánkhya treatises generally studied. On these and some other points a few annotations here follow.

95.—Among the epithets applied to 'Self-consciousness' (in No. 18) are sánumána and niranumána. We can get no account anywhere of this application of these terms. Self-consciousness 'not associated with inference' might possibly refer to the simple consciousness of existence; whilst the consciousness 'associated with inference' might refer to the notion of the Egoist

who has reasoned himself into the belief that he himself constitutes all that is—(see No. 17):—but then the difficulty would remain of tracing the connexion between this sense and the functions assigned to these aspects of self-consciousness under No. 61.—The technical or 'slang' terms in Nos. 64 &c., differ in our text-book from those given in the comment on the Kárikás—see p. 155 of the Sánkhya Káriká, where Prof. Wilson says "No explanation of the words is anywhere given, nor is any reason assigned for their adoption."

96.—On the 'triad of qualities' (No. 49), Prof. Wilson, at p. 52 of the Sánkhya Káriká, remarks:—"In speaking of qualities, "however, the term guṇa is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the Sútra, 'Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and "darkness."

97.—The term abhibuddhi would seen to be obsolete in the sense assigned to it in No. 58. In the copy of the work employed in making the translation, the same term (abhibuddhi) is repeated as representing the first of its own five subdivisions. This, with other obvious clerical errors, has been amended with the concurrence of learned pandits. The term karttavyatá, in the same passage, is akin to our term 'susceptibility.'

98.—'Inference' is briefly noticed in paragraph No. 77. As the writers on the Sánkhya do not appear to be all exactly of the same mind on the subject of inference, it may be worth while to examine the matter:—and, as the terms which they make use of are the same as those which are employed, with less diversity of

sentiment, by the Naiyayikas, it may be as well to begin by determining the sense in which the Naiyayikas understand the terms.

99.—After describing 'perception,' in his fourth aphorism, GAUTAMA, the founder of the Nyáya school, proceeds, in his fifth aphorism, to speak of 'inference' as follows:—

अय तत्पूर्वकं चिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवस्पामान्यते। दृष्ट-

"Now 'inference,' preceded thereby [i. e., preceded by 'perception'] is of three kinds—(1) that which has the 'prior'—(2) that which has the 'posterior'—and (3) that which is [or consists in] the perception of 'community.'"

100.—'Inference,' as stated in paragraph No. 77 of our text-book, is "knowledge arising from the perception of a 'sign;" and as the 'sign' (linga)—the Greek σημεων or rather τεκμηριον—the "mark from which a conclusion may be drawn"—may be of three kinds; so the modes of 'inference,' as stated in the aphorism of Gautama, are likewise three.

101.—The first kind of 'sign' Gautama calls 'prior' (púrvva). The meaning of the term is explained by his commentator (in the Nyúya-sútra-vritti) as follows:—

पूर्व कारणं। _तद्दत्तक्षिज्ञकं। यथा मेघोद्गतिविशेषेण ट-ष्ट्यनुमानं।

"[By the expression in the aphorism] 'prior' [is meant] cause—[a cause being prior to, or the antecedent of, its effect—and, when perceived, serving as a 'sign' of the effect yet unperceived].

[By the expression in the aphorism] 'which has that' [i. e., which has the 'prior,' or cause—is meant] which has that as a 'sign'.

As (for example) the inference of rain from the circumstance of the gathering of clouds."

In this example of inference, the 'prior' (púrvva)—the antecedent or cause—is the 'sign;'—the gathering of clouds, the antecedent or cause of rain, being that 'sign' from which a fall of rain is inferred by anticipation. By European writers, this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to those of the Nyáya, inference 'a priori' [i. e. the inference of the consequent from the antecedent].

102.—The second kind of 'sign' Gautama calls 'posterior' (s'esha). The meaning of the term is explained by his commentator as follows:—

ग्रेषः कार्यः। तिस्तिङ्गकं भ्रेषवत् । यथा नदीरुद्धाः रुष्ट्यनुमानं ।

"[By the expression in the aphorism] 'posterior' [is meant] effect [—an effect being posterior to, or the consequent of, its cause—and, when perceived, serving as a 'sign' of the cause which was unperceived]. [By the expression in the aphorism] 'which has the posterior' [is meant—inference] which has that ['posterior' or consequent] as a 'sign.' As [for example] the inference of rain from the swelling of a river".

In this example of inference, the 'posterior' (s'esha)—the consequent or effect—is the 'sign';—the swelling of a river—the consequent or effect of rain—being the 'sign' from which a fall of rain is inferred to have gone before. By European writers, this kind of inference is named, in terms strictly corresponding to those of the Nyáya, the inference 'a posteriori' [i. e., the inference of the antecedent from the consequent].

103.—The third kind of 'sign' Gautama calles 'the perception of community' (sámányato drishta). The import of the term is explained by his commentator as follows:—

सामान्यते। इष्टं कार्य्यकारणभिन्नि क्विकं। यथा प्रथिवीत्वेन द्रव्यत्वानुमानं।

"[By inference from] 'the perception of community' [is meant inference] where the 'sign' is other than effect or cause. As [for example] the inferring that something is a substance from its having the nature of earth'.

In this example the sámánya or 'generic character' termed prithivítwa 'earthiness' is a 'sign' from which, when perceived, 'substantiality'—neither the cause nor the effect, but, in this instance, the higher genus—is inferred. The definition applies also to 'inference from analogy', as the term sámányato drishṭa has been rendered.

104.—The commentator from whom we have quoted mentions another opinion in regard to the names of the three kinds of inference;—that they refer to those three kinds of 'signs' (specified in page 38 of the 'Lectures on the Nyáya Philosophy'—) viz., the 'sign' which is in every case present; that which is absent in every case but one; and that which is present in some cases and absent in others. This notion—apparently originating in nothing much deeper than the consideration that there are "three to three"—may be dismissed as barely on a level with Captain Fluellen's parallel between Harry of Monmouth and Alexander of Macedon, (in 'King Henry V'—Act iv—sc. 7.), based on the consideration that "There is a river in Macedon; and there is also moreover a river at Monmouth".

105.—Of the three examples given in our text-book (No. 77) the first—viz: the inferring of 'rain from the assembling of clouds,' falls under the first division (—see No. 101.). The second example—the inferring that 'there is water because there are cranes &c.', exemplifies the second division—(see No. 102)—the

presence of the cranes and such-like waterfowl being consequent on the presence of the water which these birds frequent. The third example—the inferring of 'fire from smoke'—(which the author of the Sánkhya Pravachana Bháshya refers to the first class)-falls under the same head as the second-smoke being met with only where there has been fire as an antecedent. The selection of examples here therefore is unsatisfactory-being at once redundant and defective.

106.—In the 5th and 6th of the 'Memorial Verses', inference is spoken of as follows:-

-चिविधमनुमानमाख्यातं तिम्निङ्गिलिङ्गिप्वकं-

चामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियानां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।

Thus rendered by Mr. Colebrooke-

"Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it." * * * * "it is by inference (or reasoning) that acquaintance with things transcending the senses is obtained:"-

[Professor Wilson prefers rendering the latter clause thus:-"It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained."]

107.—The remarks of the scholiast GAUDAPADA (in the Sankhya Bháshya) on the foregoing text are as follows:-

चिविधमनुमानमाख्यातं श्रेषवत् पूर्व्ववत् सामान्यते। दृष्टं चेति । पूर्विमस्यास्तीति पूर्ववद् यथा मेघोन्नत्या दृष्टिं साधयित पूर्व-व्षित्वात्। ग्रेषवद्यया समुद्रादेकं जलपलं लवणमासाद्य ग्रेष स्यायस्ति लवणभाव इति । सामान्यता दृष्टं । देशान्तराद्

देशान्तरं प्राप्तं दृष्टं गतिमचन्द्रतारकं चैचवत् । यथा चैचनामानं देशान्तराद देशान्तरं प्राप्तमव लेक्य गतिमानयमिति तद्यन्द्र-तारकमिति तथा पृष्टिपतामद्रश्नादन्यच पुष्पितामा इति सा-मान्यता दृष्टेन साधयति । एतत्सामान्यदृष्टं ॥ किच्च तिसङ्गलि-क्तिपृब्विकमिति। तदनुमानं । लिक्गपूर्वकं यच लिक्गने लिक्गी अ-नमीयते यथा दण्डेन यति: । लिङ्गिपूर्वेकच्च यच लिङ्गिना लिङ्गमनुमीयते यथा दृष्टा यतिमस्येदं चिद्ण्डमिति ॥

"Inference, which is of three kinds, takes the name of 'that which has the consequent' (see No. 99), 'that which has the antecedent,' and 'that which is [or consists in] the perception of Community.' 'That which has the antecedent,' is that [form of inference] where [it is argued]—'That [which we are adducing as the sign] is the antecedent of this [which we wish to establish]:'-as, for example, when one proves [an approaching fall of] rain by the rising of clouds-because this [rising of clouds] is an antecedent of rain. [As an example of inference] 'which has the consequent'-[suppose that] having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. 'Analogous'-as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive like Chaitra: that is, having seen a person named Chaitra transfer his position from one place to another, and thence having known thathe was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also are locomotive. So too, observing a mango tree in blossom, one establishes the fact that other mango trees also are in flower [not by adducing, in proof of the fact either, the cause of the fact or any consequence of the fact -but] by remarking the common nature [of the mango tree under inspection—in virtue of which common nature the other mango

trees blossom simultaneously with it.] Such is [inference by means of] 'the perception of Community.'

Again [the words] tallinggapúrvvakam &c., [may be rendered otherwise:—thus] tad 'that'—viz., 'inference'—linggapúrvvaka' where, from a characteristic, that which possesses the characteristic is inferred,' as, [one is inferred to be] a mendicant from his staff [when his staff is of the characteristic description carried by mendicants]. And [the act of inference may be said to be] linggipúrvvaka, 'where, from what possesses a characteristic, the characteristic itself is inferred,' as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this [which he holds in his hand, and which, from distance or some other reason, is not clearly discernible in his grasp] is his triple staff—[for where the mendicant presents himself, there his characteristic staff is sure to be found also]."

Now, in his example of inferring the saltness of the ocean from the saltness of a drop taken from it, GAUDAPADA appears to have been misled by the ambiguity of the word s'esha, which the Naiyáyikas employ as the opposite of p'urvva—the opposition intended being that of antecedent, and consequent not that of part and remainder. GAUPAPADA, taking the word in its familiar sense of 'the rest,' imagines that when we infer the rest of the ocean to be salt like a drop taken from it, the process falls under the second head in the division of the modes of inference, whereas it falls under the third head—the same which he exemplifies by the case of the mango-trees. As we infer that other mango-trees blossom when one mango-tree blossoms, because all mango-trees have one common nature; so likewise do we infer that the other drops of the ocean are salt, when we find that one drop is salt, because all the drops in the ocean have one common nature. Thus, whilst our anonymous commentator on KAPILA gives two examples of the second kind and no example of the third, GAUDAPADA gives two examples of the third kind and none of the second. For the illustration of Kapila, therefore, some of his commentators would appear, by these discrepancies, to have borrowed the terminology of the Nyáya without considering themselves bound to adhere to the sense assigned to the terms by the inventors. Whether the writers on the Sánkhya, as has been suggested, intended, by their peculiar application of the terms of the Nyáya, to inculcate their own tenet of the indifference of cause and effect, is a point the consideration of which we remit to another occasion.



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